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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
1.1 Motivation
Why is per capita income in Congo merely a fraction of what it is in Luxembourg?
Why do economic opportunities vastly differ between countries? What type of
economic growth model has been conducive to stimulating growth in Brazil, Chile,
China, India, South Korea, and Singapore and why has GDP growth failed to
materialize in most of Sub-Saharan Africa? What concrete policy advice can be
given to developing countries and to developed countries? These questions have
spurred the research agenda of scholars from various disciplines including political
economy, economic history, social policy, microeconomics, and economic growth and
development. Following some of the more recent advances in the field of economic
growth and development, this thesis aims to make its own unique contribution towards
increasing the understanding of some of the determinants of long-term economic
performance. In this section, we will motivate our analyses by discussing the wider
context and overall relevance of the thesis. In this section, we will make a distinction
between the neoliberal policy approach and the structuralist policy approach. We will
specifically introduce the Washington consensus policy package and briefly outline
its influence on policy making in various countries, its overall effect on countries’
economic development and its relation to the increased recognition of the importance
of institutions. Finally, we will provide a brief overview of the results of some analyses
of the relation between institutions, policy and economic development and we will
discuss some shortcomings in this field.
One way to distinguish economic growth models is by studying the type and degree
of government intervention. We choose to contrast the neoliberal model with the
structuralist model for development. The term neoliberal is used to describe a type
of policy orientation that emphasizes the importance of the free market. Proponents
of a neoliberal approach to development argue that in order for markets to function
well there is relatively limited space for the state to intervene and to correct for market
failures. The neoliberal approach emphasizes the importance of market competition
and of policies that stimulate market competition such as free-trade polices, financial
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. For example, financial flows from
capital-rich to capital-poor countries are relatively low (as noted in the seminal paper
by Lucas (1990) this contradicts basic neoclassical growth models) and therefore
policies that stimulate FDI inflow and competition may have a positive impact on
growth. Additionally associated with neoliberalism is the role of the government
in the enforcement of property rights and law and order. Here, the main objective
is to address aspects of the public sector, including for example corruption, that
constrain the development of the free market. The neoliberal approach to development
is followed by several middle and upper-income economies and this approach was
explicitly advocated by international organizations such as the World Bank in the
1980’s and 1990’s.
However, several scholars argue against the neoliberal model. In 1987 UNICEF
(1987) published a report under the initiative titled ‘Adjustment with a Human Face’
which outlines the negative effect of the policies advocated by the World Bank and
IMF at the time on health and education. Following the report, financial constraints—
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which were partly determined by the World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment
Programmes—had resulted in substantial budget cuts in the social sector. In a later
study about Latin American countries, Ocampo (2004) argues that, to some degree,
the lack of economic development is a result of market-based reforms. Additionally,
opponents of neoliberal policy argue that several economies, e.g. the USA and Chile,
are increasingly unequal as a result of the lack of government intervention to correct
for market failures.
The structuralist approach to economic development is characterized as relatively
more interventionist. According to this approach, structural heterogeneity within the
economy generates unequal opportunities and hence strong government intervention
is necessary to overcome externalities and coordination issues. One of the means
of encouraging domestic industry development is import substitution, which was
implemented in the 1960’s and 1970’s in several developing countries (e.g. Brazil
and Argentina). Import substitution was criticized for having protected failing and
uncompetitive industries for long periods of time and import substitution was largely
abandoned in the 1980’s as the main focus of countries’ growth strategy. However,
the structuralist approach towards development remains embedded in the industrial
policy mix of several (mostly developing) countries.
There is a large amount of literature that emphasizes the role of industrial policy
in stimulating growth and enhancing technological capabilities (e.g. Criscualo et al.,
2012; Buigues and Sekkat, 2011; Rodrik, 2009; Peres, 2009; Gerschenkron, 1962).
According to some of this literature, there should be a more pro-active approach in
development policy. For example, Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006) are in favour of a
return towards more interventionist policies and Wade (2009) argues that developing
countries in particular should enhance the role of (protectionist) industrial policy to
support industrial development. Even though, in the 1990’s, India achieved rapid
economic growth at the same time that markets were being liberalized, Rodrik and
Subramanian (2005) argue that the economy already started to growth in the 1980’s
as a result of industrial support.
The degree to which structuralist policy supporting private sector development
is compatible with a neoliberal approach towards development is not evident. One
perspective is that a government cannot advocate both policy approaches at the same
time. This view suggests a contradiction between structuralist policy and neoliberal
policy and this contradiction fuels policy debate. However, when coming to terms
with policy choices, governments have usually followed a more pragmatic approach.
We will address this reality in the conclusion of the dissertation in an attempt to
reconcile the two approaches to development.
The neoliberal approach to development, and much of modern economic thinking,
is based on the foundation of neoclassical economic theory. The neoclassical growth
literature provides some important building blocks that help understand why some
countries have achieved higher long-run economic growth rates than other countries.
One of the predictions of the neoclassical growth literature is that growth rates are
higher in economies where the capital to labour ratio is relatively low because, in
these economies the return on capital investment is relatively high. When countries
‘catch-up’ they will cease to have relatively higher rates of return on investment and
3
the high-growth rate advantage erodes. This growth literature additionally predicts
that improvements in technology can have a positive exogenous effect on long-run
growth rates. Neoclassical growth models implicitly predict conditional convergence
of income levels in the long-run. Even though the rapid growth and development
in some parts of the world may be considered as evidence supporting neoclassical
growth theory, in other parts of the world growth has failed to materialize. Hence,
economists and policy makers became focused on identifying the determinants of
growth that constrain the convergence of economies.
Building on the models of neoclassical growth theory, several scholars developed
endogenous growth models in the 1980’s. In these models, technological progress is
considered an endogenous factor that can influence the long-run growth rate. The
endogenous growth models also stress the importance of human capital development
as a key growth determinant. And, on the basis of cross-country data, Barro (1991)
confirms this relation. One implication of endogenous growth theory is that by means
of policy (e.g. investment in education, R&D subsidies and stimulating FDI spillovers)
the government can influence long-run growth rates.
Also in the 1980’s, the focus of development economics was on promoting
the adoption of more neoliberal policies as outlined in the Washington consensus.
Williamson (2004) formulated the Washington consensus, a list of ten policies, with
the idea to establish a broad consensus on desirable macroeconomic policies. The list
of policy recommendations concern: (1) fiscal discipline, (2) reorientation of public
expenditures, (3) tax reform, (4), financial liberalization, (5) unified and competitive
exchange rates, (6) trade liberalization, (7) openness to FDI, (8) privatization, (9)
deregulation, and (10) secure property rights (Rodrik, 2006). For example, one
motivation was that “in 1989 there was still widespread reluctance to accept foreign
investment, including FDI. This did not make economic sense” (Williamson, 2004,
pp. 8). Williamson (2004) did not intend this policy programme as a list of policy
prescriptions but the policies were used extensively in policy advocacy by the World
Bank and the IMF. In terms of policy implementation, the Washington consensus
broadened beyond its initial conception and additionally focused on capital account
liberalization and on the establishment of competitive exchange rates (Rodrik, 2006).
The Washington consensus policies were extensively implemented in many developing
countries, in particular in Latin American countries, and several policies were subject
to rigorous reforms: FDI, fiscal policy, financial and trade policy, privatization and
deregulation policies. Overall, the policy programme disastrously failed in delivering
growth.
Partly in response to the failure of the Washington consensus programme,
researchers became interested in explaining the degree to which some of the more
‘ultimate’ factors constrain and sustain growth. According to Szirmai (2012)
‘ultimate’ sources of growth consist of underlying factors of economic growth such
as geographic location, climate, natural resources, demographic factors, culture and
values, economic institutions, political institutions, labour market institutions, and
social institutions, the distance to the technological frontier, and absorptive capacities.
Some of these ‘ultimate’ sources of growth may have an impact on the effectiveness
of the Washington consensus policies and may indirectly have an impact on more
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‘proximate’ sources of growth such as the behaviour of firms and the accumulation
of capital. As such, one way to distinguish ‘proximate’ from ‘ultimate’ sources of
growth is by considering ‘proximate’ sources of growth as factors that have a direct
causal effect on growth and ‘ultimate’ sources of growth as factors that have an
indirect causal effect on growth. Neither neoclassical growth theory nor endogenous
growth theory give insight into how firms behave under different ‘ultimate’ constraints.
However, for example, economic institutions may influence the decision of firms to
invest in various factors of production. One expectation is that learning more about
the role of institutions can help explain the vast difference in per capita income levels
of developed versus developing countries.
North (1990) developed an analytical framework that describes the role of
institutions, i.e. ‘the rules of the game’. According to the work of North and based
on the idea that institutions shape the incentives of individuals and organizations,
institutions became identified as important ‘ultimate’ factors that generate distinct
preconditions for a developmental outcome. The starting point of this work of North
is the recognition that some of the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory ignore
important behavioural aspects. Neoclassical economic theory builds on assumptions
such as the economy is in equilibrium and that individuals have stable preferences
and maximize preferences. To broadly summarize, as a result of complexities in
the social-economic system the above mentioned assumptions are unlikely to hold—
e.g. information is incomplete and multiple equilibria can arise—and economies
can operate at non-optimal levels of economic activity for long periods of time.
Various institutional rules are created in order to address information externalities
and coordination problems and have a positive effect on economic development. Other
institutional rules may have been created with similar intention but, e.g. as a result
of rent-seeking behaviour, generate disproportionate advantages to various actors.
The theory of institutions developed by North (1990) builds on the transaction
cost theory by Coase (1960, 1937) which implicitly discussed the role of institutions in
reducing uncertainty. In the ‘Nature of the Firm’ Coase argues that transaction costs
are the basic reason for firms to exist. Williamson (1979) further developed theory
on transaction costs and proposed that the study of transaction costs ought to be
integrated into mainstream economic thinking. Williamson framed this initiative
under the term ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) in 1975 but most major
contributions in the field NIE were made since the early 1990’s. In particular, several
scholars (e.g. Mauro, 1995 and later Acemoglu et al., 2001) made an important
mark in the literature by empirically establishing a relation between institutions and
long-term growth. Researchers generally concluded that a small selection of countries
has ‘stronger’ institutions than other countries and that the development of such
‘stronger’ institutions has made a significant increase in wealth possible over the past
century. An additional outcome proposed in the literature is that of the formation
of development clusters. The basic idea is that some economies have similar levels
of state capacity, control of violence, respect for property rights, and redistributive
policies, etc. and, as a consequence, some countries have similar levels of per capita
income (see also Besley and Persson, 2011).
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Despite the general support for the Washington consensus package (at the time)
several scholars are not in agreement with its policy prescription. Stiglitz (2008, pp.
41) insists that “there is no consensus except that the Washington consensus did not
provide the answer.” A post-Washington consensus came into existence in response to
the criticism of the original Washington consensus and its overall failure in delivering
growth. The post-Washington consensus development view entails both a broadening
and deepening of policy reform. On the one hand, (in 2004) Williamson reflects on
whether the Washington consensus policies amounted to a sound prescription and
concludes that some countries had not gone far enough in the implementation of
the policy package. On the other hand, inspired by the recognition that institutions
matter, the focus of development economics shifted towards emphasizing the role
of institutions. Rodrik (2006) describes in detail how this shift in focus led to the
proposition of an augmented Washington consensus.1
In addition to the previously mentioned ten point Washington consensus policy list
the augmented Washington consensus includes: (11) corporate governance, (12) anti-
corruption, (13) flexible labor markets, (14) WTO agreements, (15) financial codes
and standards, (16) prudent capital-account opening, (17) non-intermediate exchange
rate regimes, (18) independent central banks/inflation targeting, (19) social safety
nets, (20) targeted poverty reduction (Rodrik, 2006). One observation drawn from
this augmented policy framework is that macroeconomic policy involves a broad(er)
range of policy options that are interrelated. For example, the augmented policy
framework recognizes that development requires economic growth and a reduction
of poverty. A second observation drawn from this augmented policy prescription
is that it places more emphasis on macro-level rules and regulations. According to
the policy prescription, in addition to policy reform, countries should also undergo
institutional reform. One argument for institutional reform is that different rules
and regulations are required to enforce the stipulated policies. According to the
programme prescription, public expenditures should still be redirected from private
sector subsidies towards education, primary health care and infrastructure investment,
whilst at the same time preventing from finances disappearing into the pockets of
corrupt officials.
Today, the overall importance of institutions is well recognized—as well as
the importance of some key economic principles such as financial stability and
accountability. For example, most scholars and policy makers agree that corruption
is ‘bad’. Jones and Romer (2010) assess the progress made in economic thinking since
the adoption of neoclassical growth models (with particular reference to the Kaldor
facts). According to Jones and Romer (2010, pp. 242) modern growth theory “must
consider the interaction between ideas, institutions, population, and human capital”
in order to explain growth accelerations and growth differences and this realization
constitutes a major advancement in economic thinking. Specifically, Jones and Romer
(2010, pp. 242) state that “institutions may have their most important effects on
cross-country income differences by hindering the adoption and utilization of ideas
from throughout the world”.
1 Rodrik is no supporter of the augmented Washington consensus; as discussed below he proposes
a more tailored ‘growth diagnostics’ approach.
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The term ‘governance’ or ‘good governance’, is often interchangeably used with
the term ‘institutional quality’. Conceptually, governance refers to the “play of
the game” and to the actual governance of contractual relations (Williamson,
2000, pp. 597). According to Williamson (2000), institutions include embedded
informal institutions and formal institutional rules such as property rights institutions
and bureaucracy. Additionally, according to Williamson, governance differs from
institutions in the sense that the process of institutional change is slower than the
speed by which governance changes. In the practice of policy making the distinction
between institutions and governance is less clear. The perspective evoked by the
augmented Washington consensus is that ‘good governance’ reflects the ideology that a
government can actively pursue a development agenda that seeks to control corruption
and establish strong property rights and democracy. This is related to the World
Bank’s conceptualization of ‘actionable governance indicators’ which are based on
the assumption that a government can influence the country’s score on an indicator
by following the recommended policy agenda.
One point of view is that ‘good governance’ is a key vehicle to growth and that
therefore developing countries can achieve higher long-term growth levels once they
move towards an institutional system which is more in line with that of the USA
and the rest of the Western world. Moreover, based on this premise, one possibility
is that with the ‘right’ institutions in place, a neoliberal policy agenda can change
the economic fortunes of developing countries for the better. one striking feature
of the work of Kaufmann et al. (2005) is that the authors exclude the possibility
that higher income has a causal effect on ‘quality of governance’. The perspective
outlined above is what Easterly (2008) calls the ‘top down’ view of institutions. Quite
differently, the ‘bottom up’ view “sees current institutions as heavily constrained by
previous institutions. Institutional change in the bottom up view is always gradual,
evolutionary rather than revolutionary” (Easterly, 2008, pp. 95). It is possible that
making ‘good governance’ a distinct goal is distracting developmental efforts away
from alternative approaches to increase growth and development.
Aspects of the World Bank’s neoliberal policy advocacy have persisted in the
form of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) programme (Wade,
2012). The CPIA is used to grade countries that are eligible for development aid under
the International Development Association (IDA).2 The IDA provides these countries
with concessional loans and grants which are dependent on their CPIA scores. Sixteen
criteria are used to evaluate whether a country is maximizing its potential to grow
and develop and whether it can effectively manage aid. According to the The World
Bank Group these sixteen criteria are: (1) monetary and exchange rate polices, (2)
fiscal policy, (3) debt policy and management, (4) trade, (5) financial sector, (6)
business regulatory environment, (7) gender equality, (8) equity of public resource
use, (9) building human resources, (10) social protection and labor, (11) policies
and institutions for environmental sustainability, (12) property rights and rule-based
governance, (13) quality of budgetary and financial management, (14) efficiency of
revenue mobilization, (15) quality of public administration, and (16) transparency,
2 The allocation of aid is also dependent on alternative indicators such as the Heritage Foundation
index of economic freedom.
7
accountability, and corruption in the public sector. Developing countries are scored
on each of the criteria based on a set of conditions. One criteria which is more
strongly associated with neoliberalism is ‘trade’. For example, along with several
other requirements, countries score high on the ‘trade’ criteria if the economy is fully
open to trade and if it has both very low and uniform taxation on imports and exports.
A high score on the ‘property rights and rule-based governance’ criteria requires that
e.g. “all property rights are transparent and well protected. Contract enforcement is
reliable, predictable, and not overly expensive” (The World Bank Group, pp. 38). It
should come as no surprise that there is considerable overlap between the augmented
Washington consensus policy prescription and the CPIA.
Chang (2002) argues that we expect too much from developing countries in terms
of institutional development and in terms of ‘laissez-faire’ policies. Based on a
historical analysis of the ‘now developed economies’ Chang finds that in 1913, when
some of the ‘now developed economies’ had levels of income comparable to present-
day Brazil, Turkey, Thailand, Mexico, and Colombia, their institutions were of a
low-quality and the countries implemented interventionist and protectionist policies
to stimulate industrial development. Chang concludes that, by advocating neoliberal
policies, developed counties are ‘kicking away the ladder’ for developing countries to
catch-up. Related is the argument of Grindle (2004) who argues for ‘good enough
governance’ and a more realistic development agenda.
Despite that there are a lot of “unexploited degrees of freedom” in policy
making (Cimoli et al., 2009a, pp. 543), several aspects of the neoliberal agenda
remain at the forefront of policy advocacy. One reasons may be that since the
Washington consensus no common understanding has been established that outlines
more concretely what institutions and economic policies are essential in stimulating
growth and development. Despite the recognition that ‘institutions matter’, theory on
the causal dynamics by which institutions influence various policy and development
remains underdeveloped. There is no clear evidence on the role that institutions play
in redistributing opportunities for countries at different developmental stages, and/or
for growing economies. Also, from a broader perspective, it remains far from clear
which institutional characteristics are particularly important for stimulating different
factors of development; e.g. human capital development, economic development, and
eradicating poverty. Additionally, several researchers have established that there is
a much weaker relation between institutions and short-run economic growth (e.g.
this is also illustrated in De Crombrugghe and Farla, 2012). What remains is much
ambiguity on the joint role of various policies in driving growth and even on the
complementarity of the relation between policy, political economy and institutions.
Ocampo proposes that one of the shortcomings of the Washington consensus
programme is “its disregard for the role that policy interventions in the productive
sector can play in inducing investment and accelerating growth” (Ocampo, 2004, pp.
294). Ocampo specifically refers to the interventionist and protectionist structural
industrial transformation strategies that were already implemented in Latin America
in the 1960’s. Some scholars are rather pessimistic about the role of economic
policy. For example, Ocampo and Stiglitz (2008) investigate the relation between
capital market liberalization and development and are rather cautious in claiming that
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financial liberalization yields benefits when (amongst others) a strong financial system
and regulations are lacking. Moreover, according to Easterly and Levine (2003) and
Rodrik et al. (2004) trade, inflation, and exchange rate policy (as well as geography)
are not significantly related to long-term economic growth, after controlling for
institutions.
Alternative considerations are that there are many routes to development (see
also Rodrik, 2008). According to Hausmann et al. (2008) development economics
should take a more bottom-up, and country-specific, approach towards ‘growth
diagnostics’. The ‘growth diagnostics’ approach aims to first identify the more
‘proximate’ constraints to growth. The next step is detecting the roots of the
most binding (‘proximate’) growth constraint. For example, following the ‘growth
diagnostics’ approach, one possibility is that a country lacks investment in fixed
capital. This underinvestment can be caused by high costs of finance which in
return can be caused by poor financial intermediation. The idea behind the ‘growth
diagnostics’ approach is to focus on removing the most binding constraint to growth
by means of tailored policies.
Even though the ‘growth diagnostic’ approach has its merits, for several reasons, it
is beneficial to have some general understanding of what policies work best in certain
regions and/or country clusters. Primarily, we seek to identify the key factors of
growth and how these key factors are interrelated. Understanding the interrelations
between growth factors would enable a better approximation of how to compensate
for certain institutional and geographic constraints. One critique of the ‘growth
diagnostics’ approach is that by only focusing on the most serious growth constraints
we cannot learn enough about the interrelationships of policies in an economy. One
argument we make is that policy makers require more specialized knowledge of the
degree to which industrial support is compatible with a pro-market oriented policy
approach. An additional concern with the ‘growth diagnostics’ approach is that
international institutions ought to have a clear standpoint on global issues. This
is particularly important when the industrial policy of one country is harmful to
the industrial development and/or environment of other countries. The complexity of
these issues is most apparent in WTO trade negotiations where the voice of developing
countries is generally overshadowed by that of the WTO founding partners. To what
degree do Sub-Saharan countries require protectionist policies in order to stimulate
growth in their domestic industries? As a result of economic integration and global
challenges, the policy-mix of different countries has become more integrated. This in
return limits a country’s ability to focus exclusively on its own ‘growth diagnostics’.
Finally, to what extent can policies really influence the private sector? There
is limited understanding on the role of individuals and organizations in shaping
their economic fortune versus the effect of macroeconomic determinants such as
institutions and policy. Macroeconomic literature has paid little attention to the
heterogeneities that exist within economies. Yet, microeconomic studies on the
behaviour of the firms have established the importance of factors such as a firm’s age,
training and managerial capacity and working conditions on productivity. Likewise,
the interrelation between micro and macro factors in the development of the private
sector remains understudied.
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This thesis bundles four empirical cross-country analyses. The red line that
connects the various analyses is our interest in identifying the extent to which
institutional and policy variations can explain differences in the economic performance
of countries. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 we also focus on the relation between
foreign investors and domestic investment. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 use data on
both developed and developing countries and Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 use data on
developing and emerging economies. Each of the studies sets out with a distinct
objective and yet the four studies are inherently related. In particular, we take a
common approach towards measuring institutions and policy.
1.2 Measuring Institutions and Policy in Cross-
Country Research
North (1990, pp. 107) proclaimed that “we cannot see, feel, touch, or even measure
institutions; they are constructs of the human mind.” If this statement is true, in
this thesis we seek to do the impossible. We find that measuring institutions is no
easy task but that it is possible to characterize a country’s institutional framework
using indicators. In fact, despite the pessimistic attitude of North towards measuring
institutions, major empirical advancements in the field of NIE were launched (mostly
still in a relative ad-hoc basis) in the 1990’s. In particular, the development of
subjective perception-based datasets have allowed for a richer exploration of the link
between various dimensions of institutions, policy and development. In contrast to
‘hard’ data and ‘de-jure’ indicators for institutional concepts (such as corruption),
perception-based data can better capture a ‘de-facto’ state. Measuring a ‘de-facto’
state entails approximating the actual implementation of rules of institutions including
informal rules such as social norms, values, and beliefs. Arguably, the use of
perception-based data in the comparative analysis of a country’s governance and
policy practices has become part of mainstream economics.
The most comprehensive attempt to collect datasets that capture or are related to
the cross-country measurement of institutions is the Quality of Government dataset
constructed by Teorell et al. (hereafter referred to as QoG). Using a wide range of
sources the QoG combines roughly 700 variables in one dataset. This data collection
includes composite indicators. The dataset includes 194 economies and most variables
are available for the last decade or more. The QoG uses three categories to distinguish
data type: ‘What It Is,’ ‘How To Get it,’ and ‘What You Get.’
First, ‘What It Is’ includes data that seek to measure core features of the quality of
government. According to the QoG dataset this category includes data on corruption,
rule of law, bureaucratic quality, democracy, social security laws, human rights,
women in parliament, freedom of the press, fiscal policy, debt policy, and trade
openness. Because this first category includes data on economic institutions, political
institutions as well as policy indicators, it is clear that quality of government is a broad
concept. There is an additional observation that is important to mention at this point.
Although the term ‘quality of government’ emphasizes the role of the public sector,
in the field of New Institutional Economics the distinction between the public and
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private sector is not emphasized. One reason is that institutional rules are shaped
and reinforced by public bodies, private organizations and individuals. According to
North (1990, pp. 3-4), institutions “structure incentives in human exchange, whether
political, social, or economic.”
Second, ‘How To Get it’ includes data on factors that can promote the development
of government quality. This category includes data on GDP, education, media
ownership, globalization, FDI, veto power, inequality, central bank independence,
colonial origin, religion, linguistic fractionalization, legal origin, and population. Some
of the data in this category—e.g. religion, legal origins and language—are identified
by several scholars as valid proxies and instrumental variables for governance and
institutional quality.
Third, ‘What You Get’ includes data which capture the effect of achieving (or not
achieving) governmental quality. This last category of the QoG dataset includes data
on GDP growth, FDI, public investment, government revenue, agricultural subsidies,
women in parliament, conflict, happiness, and support for democracy and market
competition.
Following the basic logic of the QoG framework it is possible to study the causal
relationship between preconditions for quality of government (‘How To Get It’),
institutions and policy aspects (‘What It Is’) and indicators of development (‘What
You Get’). For example, a high level of initial GDP may be a determinant of
government quality which in return may lead to higher GDP growth. Similarly,
FDI inflow may promote government quality which in return may cause FDI inflow.
The examples above illustrate that (possibly) there is reverse causality affecting the
institutions, policy and growth relationship. The possibility that economic growth→
‘strong’ institutions opposes the view of Kaufmann et al. described above. Moreover,
it is evident that some scholars consider certain indicators (e.g. women in parliament)
as both indicators of governmental quality and indicators that measure the effect of
achieving governmental quality.
Despite the apparent richness of data collection in the field of institutions and
policy and the substantial progress made in collecting various data, the measurement
of institutions is still in its infancy. There also is a trade-off between using raw data
and composite indicators as a proxy for a country’s quality of government.
Raw data, i.e. unaggregated data, remains scarcely available to researchers. The
Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) aims to fill this gap. The IPD provides free
access to more than 350 variables that reflect different aspects of institutions and
policy. The IPD survey is answered by French civil servants working abroad in the
various external representations of the French Development Agency (AFD) and of the
French ministry of Economics, Finance and Industry (MINEFI). Variables measuring
institutional characteristics, policies, and related factors are strongly correlated.
Likewise, conceptually, various aspects of institutions and policy are closely related
making it challenging to distinguish between specific aspects of institutions and
policies. Also, these variables are the result of the perceptions of the survey
respondents. As such, when working with the IPD data, researchers need to be aware
that the data may contain (French) bias. Likewise, it is important to be aware that
perceptions about e.g. property rights or political development are subject to changes
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in opinion. One way to avoid working with a measurement that is highly susceptible
to the opinion of an individual is to use household surveys or firm level surveys that
aggregate the responses of several individuals where respondents are asked the same
survey questions. Sometimes the aggregated data will be made publicly available
to researchers but the raw data not and, in this case, researchers have limited or
no insight in the distribution of the underlying individual responses. At the same
time, using such aggregated data does not eliminate bias which stems from changes
in opinion regarding the interpretation of the scale of a variable that are common
across individuals.
Following the words of Kaufmann et al. (2005, pp. 30), “individual sources
of governance data are imperfect and provide only noisy signals of unobserved
governance.” Because individual sources of data or data points are found to be rather
unreliable, composite indicators such as the widely-used Corruption Perception Index
and the Worldwide Governance Indicators are constructed under the assumption
that data errors and misconceptions are smoothed-out when aggregating different
data-sources together. However, institutional measures lack comparability across
institutional dimensions, across countries, and over time. For example, it is possible
that a change in the score of a country on a composite index reflects a change in the
construction of the index and does not reflect institutional change. Therefore, the
aggregation of this data comes at a cost. Best expressed by Oman and Arndt (2010),
composite indicators lack transparency and include hidden biases.
This thesis uses a wide range of perception-based data to measure concepts
of policy and institutions ranging from widely used composite indicators to more
recently commenced projects collecting institutional data. Aware of the fallacies of
perception-based indicators we employ several strategies. First, whenever a more
precise notion of a policy, institution/governance concept is required we use raw data
to build specific indicators. We avoid relying on single variables to measure a concept.
Because different variables describing institutions and/or policies are highly correlated
we rely on factor analysis techniques to distinguish the effect of characteristics of
institutions on a country’s economic performance. Alternatively, we use data from
expert opinion surveys to measure relatively specific concepts. Finally, whenever a
general measurement of policy, institutions/governance is required, we use one or more
of the widely used composite indexes to gain a general understanding of tendencies
without further pretending to have any specific knowledge about what particular
concepts are captured by the indicator.
1.3 Objectives and Outline
As previously mentioned, the main objective of this thesis is to analyze to what
extent variations in the level of economic performance are determined by countries’
institutions and policies. Hereby, we focus on between-country differences in
institutions and policy and seek to identify a causal relationship between countries’
institutions and their policy and economic performance. Economic performance,
the dependent variable of our analyses, takes the form of income levels, growth,
investment, and financial development.
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Financial development, capital deepening, is one intermediary factor in the relation
between institutions and growth. In developed economies the current discussion
focuses on the excessive and risky lending behaviour made possible following recent
financial innovations and on the volume and conditions of bailouts. It is apparent
that in these economies inadequate institutional and financial rules and regulations
are undermining the credibility of the financial system as well as a smooth recovery.
In developing countries, the economic difficulties associated with underdeveloped
credit markets are severe in the long-run as a result of weak institutional regulations
governing the economies.
The first study, Chapter 2 in this thesis, aims to re-address the detrimental impact
of the lack of financial development that persists in many developing and emerging
economies. We focus on the role that institutions (as well as financial policies) play
in determining private sectors’ access to and reliance on credit markets. This study
builds on the work of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and outlines the extent to which
different institutional factors are related to financial development. In particular, we
investigate to what degree the formalization of property rights, contracting, and
competition institutions are positively related to an increase in the level of credit
to the private sector.
Chapter 3 discusses and empirically investigates the impact of industrial policy
on a country’s income and growth level. First, using perception-based data for
59 countries covering 22 policy aspects we seek to empirically distinguish different
components of industrial policy; policy that primarily targets the development
of industry and policy that primarily stimulates free market development and
competition. Next, we identify the relation between these two policy typologies
in order to establish whether, at the macro-level, there is a trade-off between
implementing the two policy types. We proceed by estimating the impact of these
two policy concepts on economic performance: i.e. GDP growth and income levels.
Additionally, we extend the analysis by investigating the relation between innovation
policy and economic development.
Whereas Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 take a predominantly closed economy
perspective, in the next two chapters we study the role of foreign investors in
supporting a countries’ domestic economy. Chapters 4 and 5 both contribute to
research investigating the degree to which national economies benefit from opening
borders and attracting foreign investment. In Chapter 4 we provide a brief overview of
the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) crowding-in/crowding-out domestic
investment. We use the work of Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) as a
benchmark and examine the extent to which the results of the authors are robust to
alternative choices of investment data and methodology. We study (i.) the impact of
FDI on domestic investment, (ii.) the impact of institutions on domestic investment,
and (iii.) the mediating impact of institutions on the relation between FDI and
domestic investment.
Whilst the above-mentioned chapters exclusively use macro data to describe
aggregate effects on country-level economic performance, in Chapter 5 we extend the
analysis of the previous chapter and use both macro-level and micro-level data. Using
a multilevel probit model we study the determinants of a firms’ likelihood of investing
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and using a multilevel two-step Heckman selection model we study the determinants
of a firm’s investment to sales ratio. First, we outline the relative macro-level impact
on a firm’s investment behaviour. Second, we assess micro-level determinants focusing
on the impact of foreign equity ownership on a firm’s investment behaviour. Third,
we present evidence on the impact of the interaction between macro and micro-level
determinants on firms’ investment behaviour. Here, we focus on establishing the
mediating impact of institutions on the relation between foreign equity ownership
and a firm’s investment behaviour.
Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions brought forward in the different
chapters. Moreover, we discuss the limitations of the findings and suggest some
possibilities by which future research can overcome these challenges.
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Chapter 2
Institutions and Credit
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2.1 Introduction
Credit to the private sector in the Unites States, Japan, Canada, Germany, and
China is higher than 100% of GDP. In countries in Sub-Saharan Africa credit to the
private sector is, on average, lower than 20% of GDP. Why do these wide differences
occur? And are they important? Credit deepening makes possible an increase in
investment, an expansion of production, technological change, and economic growth,
and attracts foreign direct investment. Levine (2005, p. 921) summarizes that
“empirical analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual
country-level studies, time-series studies, panel investigations, and broad cross-
country comparisons, demonstrate a strong positive link between the functioning
of the financial system and long-run economic growth”. Similarly, the more recent
study by Jeong and Townsend (2007) concludes that, in Thailand, financial deepening
plays a substantial role in determining total factor productivity growth. Moreover,
Greenwood et al. (2013, p. 211) estimate that “world output could increase by 53
percent if all countries adopted the best financial practice in the world.”1 Closely
related is the work of Greenwood et al. (2010) who establish a causal relation
between the efficiency of financial intermediation, information frictions and economic
development. On the basis of data on US firms, Gilchrist et al. (2013) specifically
identify the degree of miss-allocation of resources that is attributable to financial
market frictions. These authors use firms’ borrowing costs as a proxy for financial
market frictions and conclude that—in developed capital markets—financial market
frictions only have a small effect on efficiency losses.
We propose that, especially in developing countries, the economic difficulties
associated with underdeveloped credit markets are severe in the long-run as a result
of weak institutional regulations governing the economies. One possible effect of the
development of stronger institutions is reducing financial market frictions which for
example can lower the cost of lending, generate a higher lending base, and increase
the financing of more long-term commitments. In this study we investigate what type
of institutional characteristics enable firms’ access to credit markets, and hence are
related to financial deepening.
Financial deepening is defined as an increase in the volume of credit as a proportion
of GDP and the concept is measured using data on domestic credit to the private
sector by financial intermediaries (the total value of loans, trade credits and non-
equity securities), as a proportion of GDP. Credit data is commonly used in the
literature on financial development.2 In comparison to other financing sources, (e.g.
government finance, equity finance, and corporate bond finance) credit to the private
sector is a good proxy for financial development in low-income countries. Especially
in low income countries the financial system is bank dominated and the benefits from
credit market development are greater. Firstly, in low income countries savings are
relatively smaller than in high income countries, and savings tend to be invested in
liquid forms and trade credits. Secondly, in low income countries there are relatively
1 When taking inefficiencies in the non-financial sector into account, this large potential impact
of financial sector development on economic growth is substantially lower (Greenwood et al., 2013).
2 For example, Huang (2010); Quintyn and Verdier (2010); Baltagi et al. (2009); Djankov et al.
(2007); Safavian and Sharma (2007); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use credit data in their studies.
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few credit worthy, reputable organizations that are worth investing in making bond
and equity financing a challenge. Thirdly, compared to high income countries, low
income countries have relatively few large firms; smaller firms rely more on bank
financing as a source of formal credit allocation. Fourthly, corporate bond markets
depend on formalized financial markets and institutional arrangements which, on
average, low income countries have not acquired.
The types of institutions that we are interested in are (1) property rights
institutions, (2) contracting institutions and (3) competition institutions. There
are several channels by which these types of institutions may influence financial
deepening. First, we expect that strong property rights institutions secure property
ownership over time. Weak security of property rights can endanger investors’
and borrowers’ ability to retrieve future revenue from investment. This has a
negative impact on firms’ ability to borrow and invest and may lower the size of
loans. Moreover, Bae and Goyal (2009) find that banks issue higher loan amounts
with longer loan maturities and request relatively lower loan spreads in countries
with strong property rights protection than in countries with weak property rights
protection. Second, we expect that strong contracting institutions reduce information
asymmetry, the costs of contracting, the risk of contractual breach, and can enhance
the credibility of contracting. Even though personalized contracting systems may
be sufficient to protect ‘small’ loans and short-run lending arrangements, it is likely
that substantial credit deepening requires strong contracting institutions. Third, the
absence of competition institutions may create an environment that only supports the
development of the existing industry. The monopolization of industry creates entry
restrictions and can cause firms to under invest. A lack of competition is especially
detrimental to small organizations, risky projects, and ‘infant’ firms’ willingness
to borrow. Moreover, a lack of competition could result in concentrated sectoral
allocation of investment and general inefficient allocation of investment across sectors
and project owners. Finally, monopolization of the banking industry can cause
frequent breaching of contracts, lack of risk-diversification, and could undermine
credibility in the financial system.
This study is closely related to the work of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)
who find that property rights protection has a positive influence on financial
deepening (as well as on other indicators of economic performance). The authors
find no effect on contracting institutions on financial deepening and hypothesize
that contracting institutions are relatively unimportant because agents can change
financial intermediation and terms of contracts.3 We revisit the relationship between
institutions and financial deepening using alternative measurements of property
rights protection and contracting institutions and additionally estimate the effect
of competition institutions. Contrary to the methodological approach of Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005), we construct indicators for property rights, contracting, and
competition institutions using the same data source. To the best of our knowledge, the
relevance of this combination of institutional characteristics has not been previously
3 Similarly, Djankov et al. (2007) argue that private registries can stimulate the private sector
by facilitating information exchange between firms. Djankov et al. also find evidence that in poorer
countries the private credit to GDP ratio increases along with the introduction of credit registries.
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investigated in relation to financial development. The institutional indicators are
transparent in their composition, comparable in scale and construction, and include
both de-jure and de-facto perspectives on countries’ institutional development. The
institutional indicators describe institutional characteristics which are stable and inert
in the medium/long-term. The Hausman-Taylor method with Amemiya-MaCurdy
(1986) specification is used in order to retrieve the parameter estimates of these time-
invariant institutional indicators.
On the basis of panel data of 81 countries for the period 1994-2005, we
conclude that there is a strong relationship between property rights, contracting and
competition institutions and private sector credit deepening. Overall, the institutional
indicators remain positive and significant when controlling for the effect of financial
policy, and when using alternative measures of financial depth and investment.
2.2 Empirical Approach
Institutional Indicators
We construct institutional indicators using a relatively unexploited perception
based survey, the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD, 2009). The variables
selected describe institutional arrangements for property rights, contracting, and
competition.4 Some of the IPD variables (explicitly) comprise of both a de-jure
and de-facto assessment of a countries’ institutional rules. The IPD data describes
‘stable’ institutional arrangements and do not focus on describing current change in
states’ rule. Moreover, an advantage of using institutional data from the same source
is that there is no difference in data collection and treatment. The data are fit for
cross-country comparison and for comparison across indicators.5
One observation is that, overall, higher scores on the variables are associated
with formal institutional regulations. This observation is related to the work of
Greif and Tabellini (2010) who argues that, in China, institutions rely more on
an informal organization of enforcement and, in Europe, institutions rely more on
a formal organization of enforcement. Hasan et al. (2009) note similar changes in
institutions at the province level in China and argues that these changes have a
positive effect on GDP growth. As such, in this study we will explore whether formal
institutional rules are positively related to credit deepening.
The IPD variables are listed below on the basis of a tentative categorization.
Property rights institutions refer to regulations that protect current and future
tangible and intangible property and revenues that originate from property, i.e., land
and non-land assets and intellectual property. Contracting institutions consist of
arrangements protecting the security of contracts, government respect for contracts,
4 This variable selection does not include variables that describe local and sub-national
institutional arrangements, variables that describe costs for foreign actors, variables that describe
change and reforms, survey questions that are not relevant for all countries, and survey questions
that are unclear, ambiguous, or may be particularly difficult for country experts to answer.
5 Lack of cross-country and over time comparability is a weakness of data from the World Bank
Worldwide Governance Indicators, the International Country Risk Rating (ICRG) / PRS Group,
and the Fraser institute (de Crombrugghe, 2010).
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transparency in the banking system, enforcement of the justice system, creditor
rights, the speed of rulings and effectiveness of commercial courts. Competition
institutions refer to types of regulations that seek to “control or eliminate restrictive
agreements or arrangements among enterprises, or mergers and acquisitions or abuse
of dominant positions of market power, which limit access to markets or otherwise
unduly restrain competition, adversely affecting domestic or international trade or
economic development” (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 3).6
Property rights institutions
• Effectiveness of legal measures to defend property rights between private agents (A6000)
• Degree of reasonable compensation in the event of de-jure or de-facto expropriation of
land property (A6001)
• Degree of reasonable compensation in the event of de-jure or de-facto expropriation of
property for production (A6002)
• Frequency of arbitrary government pressure on private property (e.g. using red tape)
(A6003)
• Respect for intellectual property protection in terms of manufacturing secrets, patents
(B6020)
• Respect for intellectual property protection in terms of counterfeiting (B6021)
Contract institutions
• Predictability of the results of public procurement contract bids (A3040)
• Independence of the commercial courts from the government in commercial disputes
(A6020)
• Extent of enforcement and speed of commercial court rulings (A6023)
• Extent of enforcement of bankruptcy law (A6030)
Competition institutions
• Degree of administrative barriers (e.g. red tape) restricting firm entry (B7000)
• Effectiveness of competition regulation arrangements (non-banking) to combat
restrictive collective agreements i.e. cartels (B7020)
• Effectiveness of competition regulation arrangements (non-banking) to combat abuses
of dominant positions (B7021)
• Existence of competition arrangements in the banking system to combat restrictive
collective agreements i.e. cartels (C7010)
• Existence of competition arrangements in the banking system to combat abuse of
dominant position (C7011)
We consider the IPD data an interesting alternative to the data used, for
example, by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) to measure property rights and contracting
institutions. Acemoglu and Johnson (as well as Tressel and Detragiache, 2008 and
Quintyn and Verdier, 2010) measure property rights protection using data from
6 Competition policy generally comprises the following elements: antitrust and cartels, market
liberalization, state aid control, and merger control. Because competition policy is formalized in
countries’ legal framework, in the context of this study we prefer the label ‘competition institutions’.
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Marshall and Jaggers (2009) as a proxy.7 This data may be unfit to capture
property rights institutions because, as described by Glaeser et al. (2004), ‘constraint
on the executive’ is a volatile measurement which is more a reflection of the
result of elections.8 In order to measure the effect of contracting institutions on
credit deepening, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use de-jure descriptions of legal
arrangements intended to protect contracts. However, the existence of de-jure rules
does not in itself guarantee that these rules are followed.
The core concern with estimating the effect of types of institutions on credit
deepening when the using the IPD data is that the variables are empirically closely
related: the correlation of the variables is around 0.6. We use principal component
analysis (PCA) with varimax orthogonal rotation to create three institutional
indicators. The varimax rotation method is chosen because it produces principal
components (PCs) that contain high loadings for a few variables.9 Three PCs are
retained because the variable selection is made with the objective to describe three
institutional types (property rights, contracting and competition).
Figure 2.1 presents the results—the factor loadings—of the PCA. Principal
component 1 (PC1) contains 32% of the total variation. This PC loads highly
on the variables B7020, B7021, C7010, and C7011 which describe the degree of
existence and effectiveness of competition regulations. PC1 is therefore interpreted
as the component describing the degree of formalization of competition institutions.
Countries that score highly on this PC are for example Ireland, Korea, and the
Netherlands. Countries that score lowly on this PC are for example Kuwait, Qatar,
and Mali. The lower bound of the PC captures countries that have little or no
arrangements to stimulate competition.
Principal component 2 (PC2) contains 25% of the total variation and loads highly
on the variables A6001 and A6002. These variables describe the degree of reasonable
compensation granted in the event of expropriation of property. PC2 is therefore
identified as describing institutional rules to secure property rights. The upper bound
of PC2 describes countries that have secured property rights protection across sectors.
Countries that score highly on this component are Slovenia, Czech Republic, and
Kuwait. Countries that score lowly on component 2 are Pakistan, Cameroon, and
Syria.
Principal component 3 (PC3) contains 21% of the total variation and loads
highly on variable A3040 which describes the predictability of the results of public
procurement contract bids. This PC captures the de-facto role of the state in
contracting. Countries that have transparent contracting regulations score on the
upper bound of this component, for example Finland, Cyprus, and Philippines.
7 Tressel and Detragiache (2008, p. 16) argue that only countries with stronger constrains on
executive experience sustainable financial acceleration after a financial reform, and that creditor
rights, contract enforcement, and legal origins do not determine the success of sustainable financial
accelerations. Similarly, Quintyn and Verdier (2010) find that countries’ probability to achieve
a period of sustained long-run financial development after a financial acceleration is positively
influenced by ‘constraint on executive’ and the durability of democracy.
8 Following calculations on the basis of the sample of 88 countries used throughout this study, the
indicator ‘constraint on the executive’ indeed has more variation over time than between countries.
9 The PCA is run using the 88 countries listed on page 34 in the appendix. The PCA is run using
the Stata command ‘factor’ with specification pcf.
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Countries that score lowly on component 3 are Guatemala, Benin, and Chad. In the
sequel, PC1 is referred to as Competition, PC2 as Property, and PC3 as Contract.
The results of the PCA do not fully confirm our tentative categorization of
variables. In particular, we find that the variable B7000 which captures the degree of
administrative barriers is relatively closer related to Contract. Also, variables B6021
and A6000 are relatively closer related to Contract than to Property. And, contrary
to expectations, variables A6023 and A6030 load relatively higher on Competition.
Excluding these variables from the PCA has no strong influence on the loadings of
the other variables.10
Figure 2.1: Construction of Orthogonal Institutional Measurements
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As illustrated by the scatter plots and the correlation table in the appendix of this
chapter, higher levels of credit in the private sector are associated with higher values
of Competition, Property, and Contract. European countries score on the upper
bound of the institutional indicators but differ substantially in the level of credit
to the private sector. Some more pronounced differences between the institutional
indicators include Qatar and Kuwait that score lowly on Competition but highly
on Property. Syria, Philippines, and Pakistan score lowly on Property but highly
on Contract. Chad, and the Czech Republic score lowly on Contract but highly
on Property. Argentina, Cameroon, China, and India score lowly on Property but
highly on Competition. Guatemala and Korea score lowly on Contract but highly
on Competition.
10 The estimation results (e.g. column 3 Table 2.1) are robust to the exclusion of the variables
B7000, B6021, A6000, A6023, and A6030.
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Model and Methodology
The aim of this study is to estimate effects of the between-country difference of the
institutional time-invariant (TI) indicators and both the between-county and over-
time variation of the time-varying (TV) indicators. In this section, the basic model
is introduced as well as some terminology that is used throughout the remainder of
this study.
Our main methodological challenge is the estimation of the effect of TI institutional
indicators without biases or inconsistencies. The model is estimated using a Hausman-
Taylor estimator with Amemiya-MaCurdy (1986) specification, hereafter AM. The
AM method builds on the instrumental variable method proposed by Hausman
and Taylor (HT) (1981).11 The HT method estimates the parameters using the
TV variables both to estimate their own coefficients and as instruments for the
endogenous TI variables (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The HT method uses the
time-average of the TV exogenous variables as instruments. Amemiya and MaCurdy
(1986) propose combining the between-country and over-time information of the TV
exogenous variables as instruments. The model is mathematically represented by
equation 2.1 below.
Yi,t = βXi,t + γZi + αi + i,t (2.1)
Yi,t is the dependent variable, the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP
in country i in year t. αi represents the unobservable country-specific effects. αi
is assumed a random variable that is distributed independently across our country
sample with constant variance σ2α. i,t is the error term and is assumed to have a
zero mean and constant variance σ2 , conditional on Xi,t and Zi. Xi,t is a vector of
TV indicators and is assumed to contain both exogenous and endogenous indicators.
Zi is a vector of TI indicators and also is assumed to contain both exogenous
and endogenous indicators. The endogenous part of Zi contains the institutional
indicators. Only the between-country variation of the institutional characteristics is
observed and the institutional characteristics are assumed inert in the medium-term.
The vector Xi,t includes several macroeconomic indicators. Data sources are given
in the appendix of this chapter. We control for the effect of savings (Savings) on Yi,t
because the availability of collateral is a major requirement for creditors. Countries’
external debt (ExternalDebt) may be negatively related to financial development.
Countries that have a large capital account surplus may rely on foreign funding for
investment instead of stimulating saving and investment in the domestic economy.
We control for the influence of exchange rates (ExchangeRate). Finally, we control
for inflation (Inflation) measured as the rate of change in the consumer price index.
High inflation discourages lending. All these variables are assumed to be exogenous,
i.e., uncorrelated with αi and i,t.
The following TI indicators are used: incidence of malaria (Malaria), temperate
zones (Temperate), and ethnic (Ethnic), linguistic (Language), and religious
fragmentation (Religion).12 These are all assumed to be exogenous.
11 The Hausman-Taylor estimator with Amemiya-MaCurdy specification is typically used less
frequently than the estimator of Hausman and Taylor (1981) because it requires balanced data. One
alternative application of the model in the field of finance is that of Tchakoute-Tchuigoa (2012).
12 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use an IV approach with legal origins and settler mortality as
22
On the one hand, several scholars argue that the development of institutions is
related to deep historical roots; for instance see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) for
a comprehensive overview of this literature. For example, Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997), propose that countries’ natural resources and climate influences institutional
development. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that the incentives of establishing early
settlements and developing formal property rights is related to malaria incidence
and tropical climates. Similarly, tropical climates may be related to relative
underdevelopment of contracting institutions. Also, it is more likely that industry
developed in countries with temperate zones favorable to agricultural development.
As a result, in such areas there may be a higher need for competition institutions. On
the other hand, institutional formalization may be related to class fragmentation. The
formalization of competition regulations may be influenced by ethnic fragmentation;
high ethnic fragmentation may contribute to the economic/political dominance of
a (small) ethnic majority. Countries with high linguistic fragmentation may have
established more formal regulations to facilitate business. In countries with religious
fragmentation, states may have had more incentive to separate the church from private
sector regulations. Thereby, such countries may have early establishments of a more
formal institutional setting.
In order to assess the sensitivity of the data to unobserved unit effects and reverse
causality, the model is also tested using OLS with panel corrected standard errors
(PCSE)13 and fixed effects vector decomposition, hereafter FEVD.14
A Hausman specification test rejects a random effects model over a fixed effects
model. A Hausman test of the difference between a FE model and Amemiya-MaCurdy
(AM) yields a χ2 value of 0.37, which is insignificant; this supports estimating using
AM.15 The low χ2 statistic indicates that the coefficients of the FE estimation and
the AM estimation are close. A Hausman test based on the difference between HT
and AM yields a χ2 value of 3.47 which also is insignificant. Thereby, this Hausman
test does not reject the additional exogeneity assumptions of AM.
instruments for property rights and contracting. These frequently used indicators are both based
on the argument that the legal system and institutional heritage of countries influence today’s
institutions. Scholars have extensively argued that these indicators suffer from measurement bias,
reverse-causality and/or estimations may suffer from omitted variable bias, in particular see Albouy,
2012 for a critique of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and the use of settler mortality data.
13 PCSEs, as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995), correct for ‘extreme overconfidence’ and yield
standard errors that are within 10% of the true variability, also for data containing heteroskedasticity
and contemporaneously correlated errors. PCSE does not address unit effects.
14 The FEVD estimates for TV variables are the same as Fixed Effect (FE) estimates and are
assumed endogenous. Unlike FE estimations, FEVD estimates TI variables in panel data models
with unit effects. TI variables are assumed exogenous and the method does not control for causality.
FEVD and HT estimators provide equal results when all TV variables are treated as endogenous
and the TI variables are treated as exogenous (Breusch et al., 2011). FEVD has received several
critiques, e.g. see Greene (2011), Chatelain and Ralf (2010) and Breusch et al. (2011). The FEVD
estimations here are based on an updated 2009 version (xtfevd4.0beta.ado) with revised standard
errors (Plumper and Troeger, 2011).
15 The Hausman tests are based on the estimations presented in Table 2.1 where Competition,
Property, and Contract are endogenous.
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2.3 Results
Descriptive Statistics
This study is based on a balanced panel dataset for the period 1994 to 2005.
The sample of countries used throughout the analyses is listed in Table 2.5 in the
appendix.16
There is substantial cross-country variation in the level of credit to the private
sector. As illustrated by Figure 2.2 in the appendix, the average of countries’ ratio of
credit to the private sector to GDP during 1994-2005 ranges from less than 10% to
more than 150%.17 In Table 2.6 in the appendix are the summary statistics for the
sample. The average level of credit to GDP is 47.35%. Figure 2.3 in the appendix
illustrates the variation of credit to GDP by geographic region. The data show that
the level of credit to the private sector are high in some geographic regions and low
in other regions. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa the ratio of credit to GDP is
low.
Main Results
Table 2.1 reports the relation between credit to the private sector and institutional
characteristics whilst controlling for macroeconomic influences. Column 1 to 3 report
the estimation results using the different regression methods. There is a strong
and significant relationship between credit and the formalization of institutional
characteristics. Unlike the OLS with PCSE and FEVD methods, the AM method
seeks to control for endogeneity of the institutional indicators. The magnitude of
the institutional coefficients is relatively similar which suggests that there is limited
reverse causality between credit deepening and the development of formal institutional
rules. Alternatively, one possibility is that the AM method is not sufficient to address
endogeneity and therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility of reverse causality: i.e.
that credit deepening triggers the establishment of more formal institutional rules.
The AM estimations in column 3 report that the formalization of competition,
property and contract institutions is significantly and positively related to credit
deepening.18 Temperate and Malaria are significant at a 10% level and have a direct
impact on credit deepening. Following the results of the OLS estimation, Religion
and Language are also related to credit deepening. ExternalDebt and Savings have
the expected sign, are significant, and the estimations are relatively constant across
16 The countries Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, India,
Kazakhstan, Paraguay, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, and Zambia are not included in the sample because
of hyperinflation rates and/or high levels of exchange rate over-valuation.
17 The dependent variable Credit has missing data for the following countries: Austria, Belgium,
France, Mauritania, Netherlands, and Norway. These countries are excluded when using the variable
Credit. In addition, Japan is excluded because of the country’s high level of credit. For some
countries, data on the credit claims includes credit to public enterprises.
18 The first PC (Competition) contains the highest of the total variation and therefore we expect
that this PC is more closely related to the overall dimension of institutional formalization than
Property and Contract. For this reason, the relative contribution of each institutional characteristics
is not emphasized.
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regressions. The coefficients for Inflation and ExchangeRate are close to zero.
Column 4 in Table 2.1 reports the aggregate / combined magnitude of the
formalization of institutional characteristics on the private sector, measured by
Composite. Composite is measured by the first retained PC from an unrotated
PCA on the total selection of IPD variables. Unrotated PCA yields only one strong
institutional dimension. Composite contains 66% of the total variation and loads
on all underlying variables.19 The coefficient of Composite indicates the overall
degree to which the institutional characteristics are related to financial depth.20 The
coefficient of Composite is higher than the coefficient of Competition, Property and
Contract. The effect of overall institutional quality on financial deepening appears
to be substantial. The coefficient of Composite in the AM model, column 4, suggests
that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in this variable corresponds to
a 0.71 standard deviation increase in credit to the private sector as a percentage of
GDP.21
One concern with data on credit to the private sector is that high levels of credit
may be an indication of excess borrowing and of suboptimal allocation of credit.
Especially since 2008, it is undeniable that rapid private credit build-up, caused
by financial system deregulation and privatization, can have a negative impact on
economic growth. Additionally, Arcand et al. (2013) shows that bailouts can cause
the financial sector to increase beyond the socially optimum level. As such, there are
limitations to the extent to which financial deepening is beneficial to growth. This
has also been recognized by previous literature, such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), and Minsky (1986). Arcand et al. (2012) find that
financial deepening is negatively related to economic growth when the ratio of credit
to GDP reaches (roughly) 100%.
For the years 1994-2005, the average ratio of credit to GDP exceeds 100% for
the following countries: New Zealand, Portugal, China, Germany, Thailand, South
Africa, United Kingdom, Canada, Malaysia, Switzerland, United States, and Cyprus.
The above mentioned countries are excluded in the analysis presented in column 5
and 6 of Table 2.1. By comparing the results in column 3, 4, 5, and 6, we can identify
the extent to which the estimations are influenced by countries with high levels of
credit to the private sector.
In specific, the coefficient of Competition is lower in column 5 compared to column
3 suggesting that competition institutions is more important for countries with high
levels of credit. One possible explanation is that countries that have a relatively
small private sector are typically countries that have lower credit as a ratio of GDP.
And, because in such countries there is a basic absence of competition there are less
incentives to develop rules to stimulate competition. The coefficient for Property is
higher in column 5 compared to column 3 suggesting that property rights protection
is more important for countries with low or moderate levels of credit. Although this
finding is somewhat surprising one explanation is that countries with a relatively high
19 The second PC contains 7% of the variation and the third PC contains 5% of the variation.
20 The results of the Hausman tests in section 2.2 are confirmed when Competition, Property,
and Contract are replaced by Composite.
21 Analysis using FEVD and OLS with PCSE and the composite indicator likewise suggests a
significant and positive relation between institutions and credit deepening.
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ratio of credit to GDP invest more in tertiary sectors which are less dependent on
property rights protection. The magnitude of the coefficient of Composite is higher
in column 3 than in column 5. This suggests that, overall, the private sector is less
influenced by the formalization of institutional rules in countries with lower levels of
credit.
Table 2.1: Regression Results: Dependent Variable Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FEVD OLS with PCSE AM AM AM AM
Competition 0.522*** 0.525*** 0.505** 0.391**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Property 0.376*** 0.362*** 0.398* 0.437***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Contract 0.393*** 0.355*** 0.388** 0.372**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Composite 0.710*** 0.627***
(0.00) (0.00)
Language 0.062 0.032** 0.060 0.060 -0.065 -0.053
(0.60) (0.00) (0.75) (0.67) (0.66) (0.68)
Ethnic -0.028 -0.005 -0.035 -0.046 -0.114 -0.097
(0.81) (0.78) (0.85) (0.74) (0.45) (0.45)
Malaria -0.340** -0.306*** -0.334+ -0.329* -0.172 -0.188
(0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.03) (0.30) (0.20)
Temperate -0.374** -0.354*** -0.372+ -0.366* -0.254 -0.274+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.03) (0.13) (0.06)
Religion 0.152+ 0.148*** 0.153 0.155 0.004 0.003
(0.07) (0.00) (0.26) (0.14) (0.97) (0.98)
ExternalDebt -0.107*** -0.124** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.178*** -0.175***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Savings 0.133*** 0.121** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.205*** 0.198***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation -0.023+ -0.157*** -0.024+ -0.025* -0.043* -0.046*
(0.08) (0.00) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
ExRate -0.015 -0.082*** -0.018 -0.020 -0.028 -0.031
(0.62) (0.00) (0.54) (0.49) (0.49) (0.43)
N 972 972 972 972 828 828
R2 0.912 0.548
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
 exogenous = ExternalDebt, Savings, Inflation, ExchangeRate, Language, Malaria, Ethnic,
Temperate, Religion.  endogenous = Competition, Property, Contract, Composite.
Institutions - Policy Mix
Financial policy is an important tool for states by which they can influence the
allocation of credit. Financial policy may have a positive or a negative impact on
credit deepening. We control for the effect of financial policy on credit to the private
sector using three indicators from Abiad et al. (2010). We use a smaller sample of
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61 countries.22 We control for the influence of the degree of privatization of banks
(Privatization, decrease in State ownership), for the effect of the degree of bank
supervision (Supervision, decrease in independence from executive influence), and for
the effect of entry barriers in the banking sector (Barriers, decrease in state control
over credit allocation). These TV policy indicators are assumed to be endogenous.
The privatization of banks could result in more lending to the private sector. La
Porta et al. (2002) find that in countries with high government ownership of banks,
financial development, productivity and growth is lower.23 Privatization could result
in more efficient and effective allocation of credit. Furthermore, privatization could
result in higher competition, increasing borrowing opportunities for organizations.
Yet, in comparison to government-owned banks, the cost of borrowing is generally
higher in privatized banks.24 High scores on this indicator indicates relatively more
privatized banks.
Banking supervision may increase transparency. The implementation of prudential
regulations can restrain the allocation of credit into unproductive, high risk projects.
In the 1980’s, the objective of most high-income countries was financial market
deregulation. Since 2008, deregulation is heavily debated by stakeholders with the
aim to re-gain control over financial safety. High scores on this indicator represent
relatively more government intervention of the banking sector.
The indicator Barriers captures the degree of entry restrictions of banks’ activities
including restrictions on foreign banks and geographic restrictions on operations. Such
entry barriers may restrict the lending capacity of the financial sector. Entry barriers
may drive up the cost of borrowing which in return can cause a lower demand for
credit. High scores on this indicator represent a more liberal banking sector.
Table 2.2 reports the regression results when the policy indicators are included.
Column 1 and 2 report that the effect of banking supervision and entry barriers on
the level of credit is significant, and the coefficient is positive, albeit low. We expect
that the positive coefficient Barriers indicates that the overall level of credit to the
private sector is higher in countries with less restrictions in the banking sector. One
alternative possibility is that less restrictions in the banking sector is associated with
small economies (low GDP). The coefficient for banking privatization is not significant.
Temperate is significant at a 1% level, and Malaria is significant at a 5% level. The
coefficients for Temperate and Malaria are substantially higher in Table 2.2 than in
Table 2.1. Religion is significant at a 10% level. On the one hand, when controlling
for policy, the coefficients of Contract, Property and Composite are higher. On the
22 The following countries are excluded because of missing policy data: Benin, Botswana, Central
African Republic, Cyprus, Gabon, Honduras, Kuwait, Libya, Mali, Mongolia, Mauritania, Niger,
Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Syrian Arab Republic, Chad, and
Togo. In addition, the following countries are excluded: Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands,
Norway, and Japan. See also footnote 17.
23 Following the political view, La Porta et al. (2002) explain that “government ownership leads
to miss-allocation of resources” and that “governments are less able to use banks they own to
redistribute wealth to political supporters when they are subject to greater oversight by the electorate.
As a consequence they have less interest in owning such banks” (La Porta et al., 2002, p. 188,179).
24 Government-owned banks may select less risky projects to finance. On the basis of a model
of banking Andrianova et al. (2008, p. 230) find that “where private and government-owned banks
co-exist, the former will offer a higher interest rate to depositors reflecting the higher risk”.
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other hand, the coefficient for Competition is lower. The change in the coefficient of
Competition is not surprising because market competition regulations and the types
of financial policy discussed above are closely related aspects in terms of public sector
governance.
Table 2.2: AM Regression Results: Dependent variable Credit
(1) (2)
Competition 0.39*
(0.02)
Property 0.44**
(0.00)
Contract 0.40**
(0.00)
Composite 0.73***
(0.00)
Privatization -0.02 -0.02
(0.50) (0.49)
Supervision 0.07** 0.07**
(0.00) (0.00)
Barriers 0.09** 0.09**
(0.00) (0.00)
Language 0.02 0.01
(0.91) (0.93)
Ethnic -0.03 -0.01
(0.89) (0.96)
Malaria -0.42* -0.40*
(0.03) (0.02)
Temperate -0.62** -0.61**
(0.01) (0.00)
Religion 0.22+ 0.21+
(0.09) (0.06)
ExternalDebt -0.15*** -0.15***
(0.00) (0.00)
Savings 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.00) (0.00)
Inflation -0.02 -0.02
(0.34) (0.31)
ExchangeRate -0.04 -0.05
(0.21) (0.18)
N 732 732
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exogenous = ExternalDebt, Savings, Inflation, ExchangeRate,
Language, Malaria, Ethnic, Temperate, Religion. Endogenous = Competition,
Property, Contract, Composite, Privatization, Supervision, Barriers.
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Alternative Dependent Variables
In this section, we present the estimation results using alternative dependent
variables.25 First, we test the impact of institutional characteristics on the level of
domestic bank credit to the private sector (BankCredit).26 Unlike the dependent
variable Credit, this indicator does not include the volume of credit issued by
development banks. The correlation between these indicators is 0.97. Second, we
test our model using the ratio of bank deposits to GDP.27 The correlation between
Credit and BankDeposit is 0.85. Third, the model is also estimated using investment
as a share of GDP as the dependent variable (Investment). The correlation between
Credit and Investment is 0.49.
The estimations results are reported in Table 2.3. When using BankCredit
as the dependent variable the AM method yields coefficients for the institutional
indicators that are relatively similar to those presented in Table 2.2. In column 3
and 4, Property, Contract, and Composite are significantly related to the ratio of
bank deposits to GDP, although their estimated impact is lower. The coefficient
for Competition is not significant. This suggests that banks’ lending capacity is
dependent on the formalization of property rights and contracting but is unrelated to
competition institutions.
The regression results in column 5, with Investment as the dependent variable,
indicate that formal competition institutions has a positive and significant impact
on the ratio of investment to GDP. Composite is likewise related to Investment,
presumably because of the underlying competition indicator. The coefficients for
Property and Contract are not significant. Countries that have substantially higher
levels of investment have implemented formal competition institutions. Some oil rich
countries have strong property rights protection but have relatively low competition
and relatively lower levels of investment as a percentage of GDP. This could imply
that the translation of credit deepening into higher levels of investment requires the
implementation of competition regulations. When using investment as the dependent
variable, the coefficients of Temperate are close to zero whilst the coefficients for
ExternalDebt and Savings are high.
In contrast to the estimation results with Credit as the dependent variables, the
estimations in Table 2.3 report a significant impact of all policy indicators. The
models in column 1 to 4 suggest that privatization of the banking sector has had a
negative effect on the ratio of bank deposits to GDP and the ratio of bank credit to
the private sector to GDP. From column 5 and 6 we conclude that privatization is
important for stimulating investment, albeit its effect is small.
Overall, both the formalization of institutional characteristics and financial policy
are important for countries’ financial market. Nevertheless, the differences across the
models support the thesis that the development of formal institutions is a stage by
stage process.
25 As in section 2.3, countries with missing policy data are excluded. See also footnote 22. Data
sources are given in the appendix.
26 This regression analysis does not include data for Austria, Belgium, Botswana, France, Japan,
Netherlands, and Norway.
27 The countries Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, China, France, Japan, Libya, Netherlands, and
Qatar are excluded from this regression analysis.
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Table 2.3: AM Regression Results: Alternative Dependent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BankCredit BankCredit BankDeposit BankDeposit Investment Investment
Competition 0.36* 0.35 0.34*
(0.03) (0.11) (0.04)
Property 0.43** 0.53** 0.19
(0.00) (0.01) (0.21)
Contract 0.40** 0.39* 0.04
(0.01) (0.04) (0.75)
Composite 0.70*** 0.76*** 0.32*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Privatization -0.09** -0.09** -0.04+ -0.04+ 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Supervision 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.040*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Barriers 0.08** 0.08** 0.07** 0.07** 0.04* 0.04*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Language 0.08 0.07 0.20 0.16 0.05 0.04
(0.68) (0.67) (0.39) (0.33) (0.79) (0.73)
Ethnic -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.15 -0.17
(0.74) (0.80) (0.75) (0.92) (0.42) (0.16)
Malaria -0.49* -0.46* -0.46+ -0.45* -0.21 -0.29*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.29) (0.04)
Temperate -0.62** -0.61** -0.68* -0.67** -0.03 -0.05
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.91) (0.76)
Religion 0.20 0.19 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.09
(0.13) (0.12) (0.91) (0.81) (0.37) (0.33)
ExternalDebt -0.07* -0.07* 0.05 0.04 -0.71*** -0.71***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00)
Savings 0.13** 0.13** -0.01 -0.01 0.66*** 0.67***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.81) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation -0.00 -0.003 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00
(0.86) (0.83) (0.24) (0.20) (0.96) (0.95)
ExchangeRate -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10*** -0.10***
(0.18) (0.16) (0.32) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00)
N 732 732 720 720 804 804
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exogenous = ExternalDebt, Savings, Inflation, ExchangeRate, Language, Malaria, Ethnic,
Temperate, Religion. Endogenous = Competition, Property, Contract, Composite,
Privatization, Supervision, Barriers.
Robustness
The dynamics are further explored by lagging the TV macroeconomic and policy
variables by one year. The importance of substituting a current value with a one year
lag may be relevant for the estimation of some countries. The regulatory processes
to obtain credit may be relatively slower in countries that have relatively low levels
of credit. The estimation results with the lagged variables are reported in Table 2.4
column 1, 2, 3, and 4. As expected, the estimations for the institutional indicators
remain positive and significant. Several coefficients of institutional indicators are
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lower than the coefficients of institutional indicators presented in Table 2.1 and Table
2.2 but overall the coefficients have similar magnitudes. This suggests that the effect
of institutions on financial deepening is relatively stable. The coefficients of the policy
variables are marginally lower but likewise remain positive and significant. This result
suggests that, based on our sample of countries, banking supervision and financial
barriers do not have a substantial delayed effect on credit markets. In addition, we
smooth the TV data into five year average levels and growth rates. Current values
are substituted for the average of the observations in the current year and for those
in the previous four years. The results are presented in Table 2.4 column 5, 6, 7,
and 8. Again, as expected, the institutional variables remain positive and significant.
However, the policy indicators are not significant. This supports the thesis that
financial policy only has an impact on short term macroeconomic changes.
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Table 2.4: Robustness Tests. AM Regression Results: Dependent Variable Credit
Models with lags Models with smoothed averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Competition 0.49** 0.40* 0.54** 0.35+
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.06)
Property 0.38* 0.46** 0.36* 0.57***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Contract 0.37* 0.39** 0.50*** 0.45**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Composite 0.68*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.82***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Privatization -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.86) (0.85) (0.66) (0.64)
Supervision 0.06* 0.06** 0.04 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.20)
Barriers 0.08** 0.08* 0.07 0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.15)
Language 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.04
(0.73) (0.65) (0.92) (0.97) (0.90) (0.84) (0.91) (0.81)
Ethnic -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.03
(0.83) (0.71) (0.88) (0.99) (0.89) (0.93) (0.88) (0.85)
Malaria -0.33+ -0.33* -0.40+ -0.39* -0.30+ -0.28+ -0.34+ -0.32
(0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Temperate -0.35+ -0.34* -0.60** -0.60** -0.35+ -0.34+ -0.59** -0.57*
(0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Religion 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.21+ 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.18
(0.24) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.16)
ExternalDebt -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.35*** -0.36***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Savings 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.49*** 0.47***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation -0.03* -0.03** -0.03 -0.03 -0.04* -0.04* -0.03 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.16)
ExchangeRate -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
(0.69) (0.63) (0.33) (0.30) (0.72) (0.65) (0.37) (0.35)
N 891 891 671 671 648 648 488 488
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exogenous = ExternalDebt, Savings, Inflation, ExchangeRate, Language, Malaria, Ethnic,
Temperate, Religion. Endogenous = Competition, Property, Contract, Composite.
2.4 Conclusion
The results of this study only partially confirm those of Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005). Following these authors’ conclusive argument, property rights institutions
are related to countries’ level of credit to the private sector. However, the authors
find that contracting institutions do not matter for credit deepening. Our findings
are in line with the conclusions drawn by La Porta et al. (2000) who argue that
creditor rights, which protect investors from expropriation, encourages financial
development. We find empirical evidence that suggests a strong positive relationship
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between credit deepening and the development of formal property rights, contracting,
and competition institutions. Our results also suggest that only property rights
and contracting institutions are related to banks’ lending capacity, and that only
competition institutions have a positive impact on investment. Based on a broader
indicator of institutional development we conclude that the development of formal
institutions is positively related to financial deepening and to the ratio of investment
to GDP.
The financial sector is an important intermediating factor in the institutions
- growth relationship. Before the crisis, formal institutional rules were generally
described as beneficial because of their association with high volumes of credit. Since
the crisis, more focus is on understanding the extent to which credit deepening is
beneficial for economic growth. We emphasize that a lack of credit to the private
sector is expected to form an obstacle to growth and development.
This study documents why institutional characteristics are difficult to measure.
On the one hand, composite institutions / governance indicators as well as broad
institutional surveys can not be used to assess a country’s performance on specific
institutional aspects. On the other hand, specific institutional aspects are closely
related amongst each other and are closely related to composite indicators. Therefore,
we estimate the impact of closely related institutional characteristics by constructing
orthogonal institutional indicators. Policymakers need to be careful when assessing
a country’s institutional development. Because of the interrelatedness of the
institutional characteristics, institutions may be best documented on the basis of
a more general institutional dimension.
This study would benefit from further analysis on the impact of institutional
characteristics on credit markets, investment, and growth. Questions that arise
include: Under what institutional conditions does credit deepening have a positive
effect on growth? What is the effect of institutional formalization on informal lending?
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2.5 Appendix 2A
Table 2.5: Country List
Code Country Code Country Code Country
ARG Argentina GHA Ghana PAK Pakistan
AUS Australia GRC Greece PAN Panama
BEN Benin GTM Guatemala PER Peru
BFA Burkina Faso HND Honduras PHL Philippines
BGD Bangladesh HUN Hungary POL Poland
BOL Bolivia IND India PRT Portugal
BWA Botswana IRL Ireland QAT Qatar
CAF Central African
Republic
ISR Israel ROM Romania
CAN Canada ITA Italy RUS Russia
CHE Switzerland JOR Jordan SAU Saudi Arabia
CHN China KEN Kenya SDN Sudan
CIV Cote d’Ivoire KOR Korea, Rep. SEN Senegal
CMR Cameroon KWT Kuwait SVK Slovak Republic
COL Colombia LBY Libya SVN Slovenia
CYP Cyprus LKA Sri Lanka SWE Sweden
CZE Czech Republic LTU Lithuania SYR Syria
DEU Germany LVA Latvia TCD Chad
DNK Denmark MAR Morocco TGO Togo
DOM Dominican
Republic
MDG Madagascar THA Thailand
DZA Algeria MEX Mexico TUN Tunisia
ECU Ecuador MLI Mali TUR Turkey
EGY Egypt MNG Mongolia TZA Tanzania
ESP Spain MOZ Mozambique UGA Uganda
EST Estonia MYS Malaysia URY Uruguay
FIN Finland NER Niger USA United States
GAB Gabon NPL Nepal VEN Venezuela
GBR United
Kingdom
NZL New Zealand ZAF South Africa
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Figure 2.3: Credit to the Private Sector: by region
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Western Europe and North America
South−East Asia
East Asia
North Africa and the Middle East
Latin America
Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
South Asia
Sub−Saharan Africa
Source: WDI 2011
Regional variation in credit to the private sector / GDP: 1994−2005
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max Number of
observations
Credit 47.35 45.10 0 231.70 972
Credit* 52.77 45.29 0 195.52 732
BankCredit* 65.10 48.32 1.89 225.17 732
BankDeposit* 43.76 28.84 6.66 151.28 720
Investment* 20.85 9.30 1.16 48.61 804
Composite 0.47 0.31 0 1 1056
ExternalDebt -1.66 10.73 -100.97 44.95 1056
Savings 20.21 11.52 -40.81 69.61 1056
Inflation 9.00 18.63 -9.80 307.63 1056
ExchangeRate 182.71 382.12 0.03 2877.65 1056
Privatization 1.77 1.12 0 3 804
Supervision 1.64 0.92 0 3 804
Barriers 2.65 0.72 0 3 804
*Summary statistics for sample with policy indicators
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Figure 2.4: Scatter Plots: Credit and Institutional indicators
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Figure 2.5: Scatter Plots: Credit and Composite
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Table 2.8: Sources
Variable Definition Source Scale
Credit Domestic credit to
private sector
World Bank (2011),
IMF
% of GDP
BankCredit Domestic credit
provided by banking
sector
World Bank (2011),
IMF
% of GDP
BankDeposit Deposits of deposit
monetary institutions
Beck and Demirg-Kunt
(2009), IMF
% of GDP
Investment Investment, Current
Price National
Accounts at PPPs
Heston et al. (2009) % of GDP
Property, Contract,
Competition,
Composite
Institutional indicators IPD (2009) Indicators are
normalized on a
scale of 0 = low
formalization of
rules to 1 = high
formalization of rules.
Original data ranges
from 0-4 and 1-4
Supervision Prudential regulations
and supervision of the
banking sector
Abiad et al. (2010) From 0 = unregulated,
to 3 = regulated
Privatization State ownership in the
banking sector
Abiad et al. (2010) From 0 = repressed, to
3 = liberalized
Barriers Entry barriers in the
banking sector
Abiad et al. (2010) From 0 = repressed to
3 = liberalized
Inflation Rate of change in the
consumer price index
World Bank (2011),
IMF
% change
Savings Gross domestic savings World Bank (2011) % of GDP
ExternalDebt External balance on
goods and services
World Bank (2011) % of GDP
ExchangeRate Exchange rate Heston et al. (2009) US = 1
Continued on next page
39
Continued from previous page
Malaria Population at risk of
malaria transmission in
1994
World Health
Organization 1997
/ Glaeser et al. (2004)
Probability of 0 = no
malaria risk to 1 = high
malaria risk
Temperate Population in
Koeppen-Geiger
Climatic zone in 1995
Gallup and Mellinger
and Sachs (2001)
% of population
Religion Religious
fractionalization
Alesina et al. (2003) Probability of 0 =
homogenous to 1 =
fractionalized society
Ethnic Ethnic
fractionalization
Alesina et al. (2003) Probability of 0 =
homogenous to 1 =
fractionalized society
Language Linguistic
fractionalization
Alesina et al. (2003) Probability of 0 =
homogenous to 1 =
fractionalized society
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Chapter 3
Industrial Policy for Growth
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3.1 Introduction
Followers of neoliberal theory believe in the efficient and self-organizing capacity of
free markets to the extent that market liberalization, deregulation, openness, and
competition are key to growth. Policies that favor given sectors or industries are
generally criticized for inducing firms to lose competitive drive and lower investment.
More recently, Aiginger (2007) argues that in developed countries policy supporting
specific sectors and industry has re-emerged. Similarly, Peres (2009) finds that,
contrary to the conventional notion, Latin American countries have implemented
more industrial policy in combination with an outward oriented policy approach.
What is the benefit of the government taking on a more active role in terms of
market intervention? To what extent is industrial policy aimed at supporting existing
industry competitiveness and/or at supporting market competition and consumer
protection? Do such policies effectively stimulate growth? The main contribution
of this study is that, based on a broad understanding of industrial policy which
encompasses e.g. competition policies, we use cross-country data to study the relation
of countries’ industrial policy package and growth.
Industrial policy is generally understood to refer to a mix of policies that
support the structural transformation and development of a country’s industry.
Industrial policy covers a broad range of policies. For example, Di Maio (2009)
describes industrial policy as including the following policies: innovation and
technology, education and skills formation, trade, targeted industry support measures,
competitiveness, and competition regulation. Rodrik and Subramanian (2005)
distinguish between policy that targets the development of business—‘pro-business’
policy—and policy that targets the development of free markets—‘pro-market’ policy.
The authors define pro-business policies as policies that support the development of
existing industry and are “aimed primarily at benefiting incumbents in the formal
industrial commercial sector” (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005, p. 215). Furthermore,
the authors define pro-market polices as policies that are aimed at stimulating
competition and benefit new entrants and consumers. Rodrik and Subramanian find
that in India high levels of growth in the 1980’s were triggered by pro-business rather
than by pro-market policy.1 Also, Khan and Blankenburg (2009) and Acemoglu et al.
(2006) suggest that in the first stage of development industrial policy should focus on
supporting industrial development and in the second stage industrial policy should
stimulate competition.
The policy classification as offered by Rodrik and Subramanian is particular
useful for our analysis mainly because it allows for a de-facto distinction between
policies rather than a de-jure distinction of policies. The distinction between pro-
market and pro-business policy is similar to the policy contrast of market-oriented
and structuralist policy but we assume that the focus of the former is on industrial
policies and that the focus of the latter additionally extends into other policy areas.
On the basis of perception-based policy data on industrial policy and principal
1 Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) study the variation in political alliances between state
governments and the Indian national government and interpret this as a proxy for an attitudinal
shift toward pro-business policy.
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component analysis we seek to differentiate between different aspects of policies that
support business development (pro-business) and policies that support free markets
(pro-market). We use cross-country data on 59 countries to empirically assess the
extent to which there is a trade-off between the pro-market and pro-business policy
types at the macro level. We find that it is possible to distinguish between pro-
market and pro-business type policies and, on the basis of this categorization of data,
we construct an indicator for each policy type.
Contrary to the description of pro-market and pro-business policy that is proposed
by Rodrik and Subramanian (2005), our policy measures do not specify which
industries/actors are targeted by the policies. In particular, as a result of data
limitations we cannot distinguish between policy that specifically targets incumbents
and policy that specifically targets new market entrants. Our measures of pro-market
and pro-business policy are positively correlated implying that at the macro-level
there is no trade-off between the implementation of pro-market and pro-business type
policy. We analyze the relationship between countries’ industrial policy and economic
performance. Fixed-effects analysis using data from 1995-2009 and 56 countries
suggests that pro-business policy is positively related to growth but not to per capita
income. We find no clear effect of pro-market policy on economic performance. In
the final section of this study we extend the analysis and focus specifically on the
contrast between competition policy and innovation policy which several scholars (e.g.
Aiginger, 2007) describe are key concepts in industrial policy. Soete (2007) emphasizes
the importance of innovation policy and argues that industrial development is
much dependent on strong policy stimulating innovative advances. According to
Soete, consumers and market take-up are lagging behind industry capacity in terms
of green technologies; therefore there is a lack of incentive for further industrial
development. Scholars have established a relation between innovation capacity and
growth (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008) but, overall, cross-country empirical evidence
on the effect of innovation policy on growth is lacking. We measure innovation policy
using a sub-set of indicators from our ‘pro-business’ policy indicator. We conclude that
an industrial policy package which has a strong emphasis on supporting innovation
and technological development is most successful in stimulating economic development
because we find a relatively strong positive effect of innovation policy on growth as
well as a small but nonetheless positive and significant effect on income.
3.2 Some Recent Trends in Industrial Policy
“Industrial policy is open to corruption and rent-seeking. Any system of incentives
designed to help private investors venture into new activities can end up serving
as a mechanism of rent transfer to unscrupulous businessman and self-interested
bureaucrats” (Rodrik et al., 2004, pp. 17). North et al. (2009) argue that
elite distribute rents in order to maintain political stability and hence, elite
prosperity. Both pro-market and pro-business type policy are (possible) sources of
rent distribution. On the one hand, an absence of anti-competition policy could be
an indication that the economic elite exercises pressure in order to secure industry
dominance (Acemoglu et al., 2006). And, pro-business policy reforms have been used
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to gain political support from the private sector (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005).2
On the other hand, market liberalization and privatization have re-distributed large
rents to elite under the pretext of market development (Schamis, 2002).
Industrial policy is heavily contested because industrial policy creates rent-seeking
opportunities and is more rewarding to some individuals and firms (Pack and Saggi,
2006). Most economists share the belief that policies should refrain from ‘picking
winners’. Some economists view markets as self-regulating—developed countries are
not in need of industrial policy, industrial policy should be largely non-existent. The
neoliberal applications of the Washington consensus left little space for a generous
industrial policy agenda (Cimoli et al., 2009b). As a result of the controversy around
industrial policy, some governments downplay the role of the implemented policy
mix, especially those policies that support particular industry. To some degree the
term ‘industrial policy’ has been avoided altogether and replaced with new and less
controversial terms such as ‘competitiveness policy’. Moreover, industrial policy has
been subject to several reforms.
Chang (2002) extensively outlines that almost every ‘now-developed country’ used
infant industry policy in order to catch-up on industrial development. Even after the
Second World War several developed economies heavily protected infant industries
using an interventionist approach (Aghion et al., 2012). In the 1980’s industrial policy
shifted towards a policy-mix with a strong horizontal component (policy that does not
favour specific sectors). For example, for the EU overall, this change implied giving
up on policies that favoured specific sectors and industries and therefore generated
an unfair competitive advantage in the common market (Aiginger and Sieber, 2006).
In France this change implied that the previously large scale interventionist policies
were remodeled (Cohen, 2007).
More recently, in developed countries the neoliberal approach to industrial policy
is contrasted by several trends which suggest a re-emergence of industrial policy
(Aiginger, 2007). First, since the onset of the financial crisis several governments
have actively implemented policies that help ‘save’ industries and organizations (e.g.
by means of bail-outs), combat unemployment, and generate fiscal stimulus. Second,
the globalization of markets has emphasized the need to protect local industry and
stimulate regional development. Third, as a result of structural changes in the
economy, industrial policy has extended further into new industries. In particular,
developments in industrial policy are organized more strategically along the lines of
technology and innovation policy. In both the US and the European Union (EU)
such policies are directed towards public private partnerships and research-industry
cooperations, and regional clustering and specialization. In the EU, this ‘new’ type
of industrial policy (i.e. implemented since 2005) has a strong horizontal component
but the policy measures are tailored to specific sectors and industries of strategic
importance (Zourek, 2007). This new approach is less extreme than both the previous
‘interventionist’ approach and neoliberal approach. Aiginger and Sieber (2006) has
labeled this EC approach towards industrial policy as the ‘matrix approach’ (see also
2 In democratic countries, the political elite is arguably less influenced by rent-seeking. Yet,
as a result of strong industrial representation and lobbying, to some degree in developed countries
industrial policy also favours the dominant industry (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Breschi and Cusmano,
2004).
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Aiginger, 2007) and Bianchi and Labory (2006) refers to this phase of EC industrial
policy as ‘pragmatic’.
Industry restructuring, diversification, and upgrading remain key components
for continuous industrial development. Developing countries have experimented
with a range of industrial policies and combinations of policy. Some (East Asian)
countries have acquired considerable success following a strategic export-oriented
strategy in combination with infant industry protection (Hiley, 2000). In particular,
Zhu (2007) studies industrial policy in Thailand and China and argues that both
economies combined an import-substituting industrialization (ISI) strategy with an
export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy when the economies shifted to export
promotion; Taiwan since the 1960’s and China since the 1980’s. According to
Zhu, the economic success of the economies is attributable to having implemented
a combination of ISI and EOI strategies. Also other developing countries, under
the agenda of import substitution, have provided significant support for public and
privately owned enterprises (Amsden, 2008). In particular in African countries,
infant industry support policies have played an important role in providing continued
support for industrial development (Tribe, 2000). However, Wade (2009) suggests
that low income countries to have done too little to steer industrial development and
argues that these economies require more rigorous industrial policies that support and
protect industries.
Similar to the experience in Western Europe, Wade (2012) argues that developing
countries are showing a renewed interest in reinforcing industrial policy, for example
because of increased international competition. In the 1980’s, the Washington
consensus heavily promoted a neoliberal policy agenda in Latin American countries;
this included extensive privatization and financial liberalization. And, in the 1990’s,
several Latin American countries moved away from this policy trend. Melo (2001)
surveys industrial policies implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean with
particular emphasis on the emergence of new policies in 1994—1996. The author
finds that these policies “aim to improve the competitiveness of domestic producers
in a new, increasingly integrated and open world economy” by means of explicit
government intervention (Melo, 2001, pp. 7). Based on an overview of industrial
policy in Latin America, Peres (2009) argues that since the 1980’s industrial policy
still continues to have a sectoral focus although the experience within Latin America
differs. For example, Chile also relied on a horizontal policy framework approach and
in Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay the government provided support for specific firms
(Peres, 2009). Moreover, according to Peres, Brazil and Mexico created technology
funds and other specific programmes to stimulate technological development following
a sectoral focus. With emphasis on the policy toolbox intended to stimulate
financial access in Latin America, (e.g. the public provision of market infrastructure,
structured finance, credit guarantee systems, and transaction cost subsidies) De la
Torre et al. (2007) differentiate between interventionist policy, laissez-faire policy, and
an intermediate policy variant that specifically targets, in a more restricted manner, a
set of policy interventions that addresses market failures and supports private sector
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development.3 The authors find that several regional institutions are implementing
more policy of the intermediate variant.
3.3 Evidence and Theory on the Relation between
Industrial Policy and Growth
There is no clear understanding on the type of industrial policy that is most effective
in stimulating growth. Yet most scholars argue that, at least under certain conditions,
policies that support business development are effective in stimulating growth. In this
section we provide a brief overview of this literature.
Aghion et al. (2012) develop a theoretical model and an empirical analysis using
data on firms located in China to test the effect of sectoral policies (tariffs, subsidies,
and tax) and competition on productivity. The authors find that sectoral policies
are successful in delivering growth when allocated to competitive sectors. Similarly,
using data on firms located in the UK, Criscualo et al. (2012) find a positive effect of
investment subsidies on investment and employment. Acemoglu et al. (2013) are more
skeptical of the benefits of R&D subsidies on productivity growth. Using firm-level
data from the US, the authors find a negative effect of subsidies allocated towards
incumbents on productivity growth. Yet, the authors also find substantially higher
growth when subsidies target both incumbents and new market entrants and, in
addition, incumbents are (heavily) taxed. Buigues and Sekkat (2011) summarize
additional empirical evidence on the effect of subsidies on firm performance and
conclude that most studies suggest a positive relation of public support on R&D.
However, Buigues and Sekkat find that the effect of public support on productivity
is inconclusive. In a related theoretical study Acemoglu et al. (2006) show that low
competition may have negative long-run effects and may prevent catch-up. Acemoglu
et al. also show that countries at early stages of development may benefit from
anticompetitive policy that protects or supports incumbent industry development
and, as a result, may experience faster growth and technological convergence.
Aside from the work of Rodrik and Subramanian (2005), several additional
country-case studies conclude that industry support generates growth. Gerschenkron
(1962) already proposed that government and banks’ support towards business helped
‘backward’ economies in the nineteenth century to catch-up. This view is, for
example, also shared by Cimoli et al. (2009a). Lee (2011) argues that, in Korea
in the 1970’s, infant industry protection resulted in industrial growth. Similarly,
Khan (2008, p. 57) argues that, in Pakistan, “protection and subsidies proved to
be extremely effective in driving investment in sectors that had previously been
neglected”, and “import substitution, as a method of developing new capabilities,
was initially extremely successful in both India and Pakistan.” Similar to the work of
Rodrik and Subramanian, Khan and Blankenburg (2009) likewise distinguish between
two industrial policy groups: strong and targeted policy and weak and horizontal
3 De la Torre et al. (2007) refer to this intermediate policy variant as ‘pro-market activism’.
Despite this wording, this intermediate policy variant is rather different from the ‘pro-market’ type
policy (which is described by Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005).
46
policy. The first group comprises policies that target firms or sectors to enable these
to become competitive. The second group comprises policies that sustain productivity
in competitive markets and thereby discourage permanent rent-seeking behaviour.
Building on the argument of Khan and Blankenburg (2009), a possible scenario
is that countries’ policy emphasis shifts from strong industry support to weak
horizontal support as industrial development catches up. According to Khan and
Blankenburg (2009), the first stage of industrial development requires pro-business
type policies that protect the incumbent industries’ knowledge acquisition. The
second phase of industry development requires pro-market type policies that increase
market competition with the aim to spread innovation and technology and set-off a
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). Possas
and Borges (2009) find that competition policy is only enforced gradually. Bianchi and
Labory (2006) provide an overview of industrial policy in 8 countries (Italy, France,
Germany, UK, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) and argue that in the phase
of industrialization and at different phases of industrial restructuring these countries
implemented relatively more protectionist and interventionist policy. But, from the
1980’s these countries adopted more liberal policies. This is related to the progress
made under WTO law, community law, and other trade agreements which altogether
has resulted in a more limited implementation of policy instruments such as trade
subsidies (Aiginger, 2007).
If industrial development is steered by the sequential implementation of pro-
business and pro-market policy, at the macro level—or possibly at the industry level—
there may be a trade-off between these policies. Indeed, Rodrik and Subramanian
(2005) describe pro-market and pro-business policy as opposing policy packages.
One the one hand, this trade-off would imply that the degree of industry maturity
determines whether to invoke either pro-business and pro-market type policies. In
developing countries with a relatively weak institutional setting pro-business policies,
including infant-industry protection, may play a relatively important role as a
temporary short-run solution to market failure (Wade, 2012). Furthermore, scholars
such as Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006) challenge conventional theory that trade
generates growth and argue that restricting trade can be beneficial for technological
spillovers, industrial development and growth. On the other hand, pro-business and
pro-market policy may be inherently opposing to the extent that implementing both
at the same time will cause the effectiveness of either policy to dwindle. Based on
a study of Belgium firms, Buts and Jegers (2013) find a positive relation between
subsidies (i.e. grants intended for investment in fixed assets) and firms’ market share;
this result implies that subsidies distort competition.
To what extent does the thesis of the sequential implementation of (a) pro-
business policy and (b) pro-market policy and that of a possible policy trade-off
contradict the re-emergence of industrial policy that targets industrial development
as is witnessed in developed and some developing countries today? Valila (2006),
who analyzes industrial policy using a more restricted definition, argues that the
objectives of industrial policy are in conflict with the objectives of competition
and trade policy. However, the author also argues that in practice conflict does
not need to materialize, e.g. as in the case of pure horizontal policy. Likewise
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(Aiginger, 2007) argues that only the ‘old’ EU industrial policy conflicted with
competition policy but the ‘new’ industrial policy does not i.e. as a result of
increased transparency, tendering and cooperation. These view is also shared by
Possas and Borges (2009, pp. 461) who specifically focus on competitions policy (as
an integral part of industrial policy) and argue that “the potential conflict between
industrial policies and competition policies tends to fade away in relatively advanced
developing-but-industrialized countries because in such countries industrial policy
focuses on competitiveness and technological development”. One possibility is that,
on average, in countries with a low industrial development pro-business type policies
are implemented relatively more than pro-market type policies. In addition, possibly,
pro-business type policies remain important in industrialized countries and, in these
countries, these policies do not oppose pro-market type policies.
3.4 Industrial Policy Indicators
We are interested in policy data that covers a broad range of industrial policy aspects.
This objective is particular challenging for several reasons. First, comprehensive
indicators on industrial policies are lacking. For this reason, several scholars restrict
their empirical analysis of industrial policy to one dimension (e.g. Bianchi and Labory,
2006). Second, ‘hard’ data on industrial policy lacks cross-country comparison
because the definition and industrial policy measure are country (and industry)
specific. For example, Buigues and Sekkat (2011) emphasize the difference in the
measurement of subsidies across the OECD. Moreover, according to Livesey (2012)
the framework of analysis of industrial policy in both developing and developed
countries must be broad enough to capture the effect of (1) policies that target
different industrial stages, (2) horizontal and vertical policy, (3) policy targeting
firms of different sizes, and (4) policies for structural change and policies stimulating
industrial upgrading.4 These challenges contribute to explain why empirical evidence
on the effect of different industrial policy on growth is lacking.
With the ambition to distinguish between pro-business and pro-market policy
we rely on perception-based data that allows for a broad cross-country comparison
of policies. We use survey data from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook
(IMD), hereafter referred to as WCY, because the data has a broad range of variables
that describe policy that targets the private sector. We use a selection of 22 policy
variables; these variables are listed in Table 3.1.5 The WCY survey data covers 59
countries and includes data for the years 1995-2011. However, the WCY did not
systematically conduct surveys in all countries for all years and therefore there are
4 Livesey (2012) propose a meso-level framework approach that outlines specific industry
comparative maturity. This specific approach can not be applied within the macro context.
5 The WCY survey data is collected with the intention to describe the degree of competitiveness
of countries. The WCY survey is sent to executives working in a range of sectors. The sample size
of each country is proportional to the countries’ GDP. Data is collected during the period January
to April. In 2011, the WCY collected 4,935 surveys (IMD, 2011). Survey respondents are asked to
make a country assessment on the basis of a scale of 1 to 6. The WCY presents the average country
score per variable on a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 is associated with high competitiveness.
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several missing observations in the data. The countries included in the WCY dataset
are listed in Table 3.8 in the appendix.
Table 3.1: WCY 1995-2011
Pro-business Development Policy
Exchange: Exchange rates support the competitiveness of enterprises (1997-2011)
Research: Laws relating to scientific research do encourage innovation (2004-2011)
Regulation: Technological regulation supports business development and innovation (2005-2011)
Funding: Funding for technological development is readily available (1995-2011)
Ventures: Public and private sector ventures are supporting technological development (2007-2011)
Legal: Development and application of technology are supported by the legal environment (1997-
2011)
Labour: Labour regulations (hiring/firing practices, minimum wages, etc.) do not hinder business
activities (1995-2011)
Creation: Creation of firms is supported by legislation (2002-2011)
Ease: Ease of doing business is supported by regulations (2003-2011)
Framework: The legal and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness of enterprises (1997-
2011)
Tax: Real corporate taxes do not discourage entrepreneurial activity (1997-2011)
Environment: Environmental laws and compliance do not hinder the competitiveness of businesses
(1995-2011)
Pro-Market Development Policy
Immigration: Immigration laws do not prevent your company from employing foreign labor (1995-
2011)
Competition: Competition legislation is efficient in preventing unfair competition (1995-2011)
Ownership: State ownership of enterprises is not a threat to business activities (2007-2011)
Subsidies: Subsidies do not distort fair competition and economic development (2003-2011)
Incentive: Investment incentives are attractive to foreign investors (2007-2011)
Market: Capital markets (foreign and domestic) are easily accessible (2004-2011)
Investor: Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic companies (1995-2011)
Contract: Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders (1995-2011)
Protection: Protectionism does not impair the conduct of your business (1995-2011)
Customs: Customs’ authorities do facilitate the efficient transit of goods (1997-2011)
We analyze the selection of WCY policy data with the intention to identify a
pattern for the pro-business and/or pro-market type policy variables. This analysis
is done on the basis of principal component analysis (PCA). A PCA is run on the
WCY policy indicators for the years 2007-2011, and two principal components (PCs)
are retained. We retain two PCs because we are interested in identifying two policy
domains. For the PCA we rely on data from 2007-2011 because prior years contain
more missing observations. For the years 2007-2011, the following countries have
missing observations for one or more years: United Arab Emirates for 2007-2010,
Peru for 2007, Iceland for 2009, Kazakhstan for 2007, and Qatar for 2007-2008.6 In
order to facilitate the interpretation of the PCs, the PCs are rotated using varimax
rotation which computes orthogonal factors. The first PC contains 40% of the total
variation, and the second PC contains 30% of the total variation. The loadings of the
PCA are presented in Figure 3.1.
6 The total number of observations used in the PCA is 286.
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Figure 3.1: Analysis of Policy Indicators: loadings of PCA
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Policy Variables
WCY 2007−2011
Results of Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation (59 countries)
PC 1 PC 2
PC 1 loads high on the variables Labour, Environment, Ventures, Creation,
Funding, Research, Legal, Tax, Ease, and Regulation. This PC also loads relatively
high on the variables Framework and Exchange in comparison to the loadings of PC
2. PC 1 loads high on policy variables that support technological advancement and
knowledge accumulation. PC 1 loads strongly on variables that describe the ease
of access to funds to finance research and technological development. PC 1 also
loads strongly on variables that support the existing industry competitiveness and
development. These policies support industry that otherwise may be under-invested.
PC 1 is related to the concept of pro-business policy (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005)
and strong and targeted policy (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). However, unlike the
industrial policy definition proposed by Rodrik and Subramanian, this measure of
industrial policy does not specify incumbents as the industry target.7
PC 2 loads high on the variables Subsidies, Competition, Customs, Market,
Investor, Contract, and Protection. Moreover, the loadings of the variables
Ownership, Incentive and Immigration are relatively higher for PC 2 than for PC 1.
PC 2 summarizes a group of variables that describe market liberalization, competition
policy and deregulation. PC 2 describes regulations that are aimed at stimulating a
7 The WCY data is limited in the sense that it does not have any indicators of the degree to
which policy favours either incumbents or new market entrants.
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free market economy. PC 2 can be considered a proxy for the following concepts:
pro-market policy (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005) and weak and horizontal policy
(Khan and Blankenburg, 2009).8
Figure 3.2 presents a scatter plot of PC 1 and PC 2.9 The scatter plot gives
a first indication of the extent to which a country scores relatively higher on pro-
business policy rather than on pro-market policy. For example, Malaysia, Iceland,
and Singapore score relatively higher on PC 1. Chile, New Zealand, and Ireland score
relatively higher on PC 2.
Figure 3.2: Analysis of Varimax Rotated Policy Indicators
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Average Score on Policy Indicators
The orthogonality of these indicators inhibits their comparability with alternative
indicators and does not allow for the study of countries’ ‘natural’ scores. In particular,
on the basis of the orthogonal indicators we cannot identify if there is a trade-off
between the implementation of pro-business and pro-market type policy. Moreover,
we are interested in studying the policy data for the years 1995-2011. Therefore, the
results from the PCA with varimax rotation are used to separate the policy variables
into two policy domains: pro-market and pro-business. Variables are identified as
pro-market when they load relatively higher on PC2 and variables are identified as
8 In Appendix 3.8 we test the validity of this categorization of policies using external data.
9 The PCs are normalized on a scale of 0 to 1.
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pro-business when they load relatively higher on PC1 (see Figure 3.1). We calculate
the average score of the pro-market policy variables and of the pro-business policy
variables for each country and year; missing values are ignored. Finally, the indicators
are normalized on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is associated with more implementation
of pro-market and pro-business policy. Hereafter, these indicators are referred to as
Pro−market and Pro−business. Thus, the motivation for creating the Pro−market
and Pro−business indicators is inspired by the conceptual framework of Rodrik and
Subramanian and Khan and Blankenburg and the categorization of the underlying
variables is made on the basis of exploratory empirical analysis.
The average scores over time of the resulting policy indicators are illustrated in
Figure 3.3. Whereas Figure 3.2, as previously discussed, shows the relation between
orthogonal policy indicators, Figure 3.3 shows the relation between non-orthogonal
policy indicators.
Following Figure 3.3, Pro−market and Pro−business policy appear to be
positively correlated. We find no evidence that, on average, at the macro-level
countries that are in a catch-up stage implement relatively more pro-business
policies.10 Instead, Figure 3.3 suggests that pro-market and pro-business policies
are complementary.11
10 In the Appendix 3.8 we plot the relation between pro-business and pro-market policy using
alternative data that covers a wider range of developing countries. This analysis confirms that of a
positive relation between Pro−market and Pro−business.
11 At the meso-level, when comparing across-industries, pro-business type policies may be more
prominent in industries that are less mature and pro-market type policies may be relatively more
enforced in mature industries.
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Figure 3.3: Analysis of Non-rotated Policy Indicators
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Figure 3.4: Analysis of Policy Indicators over Time
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The first scatter plot illustrated in Figure 3.4 shows countries’ scores on the policy
indicators in 2011. Likewise, as in Figure 3.3, Pro−market and Pro−business policy
have a strong linear relation. The correlation between these indicators in this year
is 0.82. The second scatter plot in Figure 3.4 illustrates the association between
Pro−market and Pro−business policy for the year 1995. The correlation between
the Pro−market and Pro−business indicators in year 1995 is 0.38. This scatter plot
illustrates that in 1995 the countries in the lower-right corner, e.g. Japan, Malaysia,
Korea, Switzerland, and Brazil, had a stronger emphasis on pro-business policy than
on pro-market policy. However, in 2011, this observation is no longer valid. In 1995,
few countries scored high on the pro-business indicator. The overall dispersion of
countries on the pro-business policy indicator is lower when using policy data from
1995 than when using policy data collected in 2011.
3.5 Industrial Policy, Growth and Income
Model
The following fixed effect models are used to investigate the effect of pro-market and
pro-business type policy on economic performance:
Incomei,t = β0 + β1Pro−marketi,t + β2Pro−businessi,t
+β3Gconsumptioni,t + β4Opennessi,t + β5Investmenti,t
+β6Educationi,t + β7Institutionsi,t + i,t (3.1)
Growthi,t = β0 + β1Pro−marketi,t + β2Pro−businessi,t
+β3Gconsumptioni,t + β4Opennessi,t + β5Investmenti,t
+β6Educationi,t + β7Institutionsi,t + β8Incomei,t−1 + i,t (3.2)
The dependent variable by which we measure economic performance takes the form
of either Income (equation 3.1) or Growth (equation 3.2) in country i and year t.
Income is measured using natural logarithm of real GDP per capita and Growth is
measured as the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. β1-β7 (equation
3.1) and β1-β8 (equation 3.2) are the various parameters of interest and i,t is a
disturbance term which has the usual characteristics. Our main focus is on the
estimation of β1 and β2 which we expect to be positive indicating that both pro-
market and pro-business policy are successful in stimulating growth. The industrial
policy types are measured using the average scores of the pro-market (Pro−market)
and pro-business (Pro−business) variables from the WCY data for each country and
year.
For both the growth and the income model (equation 3.1 and equation 3.2), we
control for the effect of government consumption (Gconsumption), trade openness
(Openness), level of investment (Investment), and for the average years of education
for the country population aged 25 and above (Education).12 Additionally, we control
12 The definitions and sources of the control variables are given in Table 3.9 in the appendix.
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for a country’s institutional development (Institutions) using two proxies: property
rights protection (Property) and freedom from corruption (Corruption). We include
these two indicators separately in the regression analysis. Recent literature has
stressed the importance of institutions on growth (North et al., 2009; North, 1990) as
well as the importance of institutions in influencing and constraining industrial policy
(Rodrik, 2008; Rodrik et al., 2004). We expect the results to show that the sign of β7
is positive indicating that institutional development (i.e. property rights protection
and freedom from corruption) is positively related to economic performance. Finally,
for the growth model (equation 3.2) we also control for the initial level of income
using the log of real GDP per capita (Income).
Several of the pro-business indicators are related to government support for
technological advancements and innovation. And, (as briefly explained in section 3.2)
because innovation and technology policies have recently become a strong component
of industrial policy in advanced economies we are interested in investigating the effect
these policies on stimulating growth. On the basis of a conceptual approach we
construct the indicator Innovation by computing the simple average of the variables
Research, Regulation, Funding, Ventures, and Legal for each country and year.
Hence, the indicator Innovation is in fact a sub-set of the indicator Pro−business.
Additionally, in order to test the robustness of the relation between pro-business
type policy and economic performance, we construct the indicator, Pro−business2.
Pro−business2 is a simple average of the pro-business type variables for each year
and country that are not related to innovation and technological development. The
variables included in this indicator are the following: Exchange, Labour, Creation,
Ease, Framework, Tax, and Environment. We will produce additional estimations
where we replace the indicator Pro−business with the indicator Innovation and
with the indicator Pro−business2.
We conclude the analysis by experimenting with the degree to which the effect
of industrial policy on growth shows up with a one year delay. Hence, we modify
equation 3.2 and produce estimations following equation 3.3.
Growthi,t = β0 + β1Pro−marketi,t−1 + β2Pro−businessi,t−1
+β3Gconsumptioni,t + β4Opennessi,t + β5Investmenti,t
+β6Educationi,t + β7Institutionsi,t + β8Incomei,t−1 + i,t (3.3)
Descriptive Statistics
The growth and income models are estimated using an unbalanced dataset for the
years 1995-2009 and 56 countries listed in Table 3.8 in the appendix.13 Iceland and
Hong Kong are not included in the analysis because of missing data for the control
variable Education. Moreover, there is no policy data for the United Arab Emirates
for the years prior to 2010. Also, the data on institutions has additional missing
observations for the year 1995 for the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, and Switzerland.
13 The macroeconomic controls have missing data for the years 2010-2011.
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The summary statistics are presented in Table 3.2. On average, countries score
higher on pro-market than on pro-business policy. Also, on average countries score
higher on Property than on Corruption. Moreover, the average growth rate is
2.5% but some countries experienced high negative growth rates and other countries
experienced high positive growth rates. The correlations between the various variables
are presented in Table 3.3. For this sample, the Pro −market and Pro − business
indicators are correlated 0.71. The correlation between Pro−market and Innovation
is 0.60. The correlation between the policy indicators and the institutional indicators
is also high.14 The policy indicators have a low correlation with Growth and a positive
and relatively high correlation with Income.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max N
Pro-market 0.63 0.20 0.00 1.00 715
Pro-business 0.50 0.18 0.00 1.00 715
Innovation 0.60 0.18 0.00 1.00 715
Pro-business2 0.52 0.17 0.00 1.00 715
Income 9.72 0.83 7.36 11.98 715
Growth 2.50 4.04 -17.27 20.41 715
Investment 24.32 6.35 9.31 51.37 715
Openness 86.51 64.03 17.95 443.18 715
Gconsumtion 8.74 2.97 2.58 18.91 715
Education 9.83 2.53 3.50 14.20 715
Property 0.71 0.23 0.00 1.00 715
Corruption 0.55 0.27 0.00 1.00 715
Data from 1995-2009
Policy indicators and institutional indicators are normalized on a scale from 0 to 1
14 Despite these high correlations, variance inflation factors tests indicate no warning of
multicollinearity.
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Table 3.3: Pairwise Cross-Correlations
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Pro-market 1
Pro-business 0.71 1
Innovation 0.60 0.84 1
Pro-business2 0.67 0.94 0.61 1
Income 0.53 0.47 0.63 0.30 1
Growth -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.11 -0.10 1
Investment -0.04 0.20 0.08 0.24 -0.07 0.31 1
Openness 0.29 0.43 0.35 0.40 0.26 0.07 0.27 1
Gconsumption 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.03 -0.01 1
Education 0.21 0.24 0.41 0.10 0.68 -0.10 -0.24 0.00 0.18 1
Property 0.74 0.64 0.61 0.55 0.71 -0.14 -0.03 0.22 0.08 0.47 1
Corruption 0.70 0.69 0.75 0.55 0.79 -0.10 -0.02 0.25 0.15 0.53 0.83 1
Data from 1995-2009
The scatter plots in Figure 3.5 provide a rough assessment of the relation between
policy and countries’ institutional development.15 Overall, we find that pro-market
and pro-business policy has a positive and linear relation with property rights
protection and control of corruption. As such, countries with a more developed
and formalized institutional setting implement relatively more industrial policy. We
find no evidence that governments implement relatively more pro-business policy
to overcome market failure in countries with relatively weak institutions. On the
contrary, the scatter plots suggest that countries’ institutional setting plays an
important role in defining a countries’ policy space and hence, the implementation of
a given policy package.
15 The property rights and corruption indicators are normalized on a scale of 0 to 1.
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Figure 3.5: Institutions and Policy
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Main Results
In this section, we present the results of fixed effects estimations that study the effect
of pro-market and pro-business policy on growth and on income. Standard errors
(and hence significance levels) are cluster-robust to simultaneous correlation across
both country effects and year effects. This method of two-way clustering approach is
based on the approach outlined by Cameron et al. (2011).
First, we investigate the effect of the coefficient of Pro−market and that of
Pro−business on income and growth levels. Table 3.4 reports the results for the
growth regressions and Table 3.5 reports the results for the income regressions. For
both tables, the preferred models are models 3 and 6.16
In model 1 of Table 3.4 we include only the policy indicators. Here, we find a
significant effect of the coefficient of Pro− business on growth and we find no effect
of the coefficient of Pro−market on growth. In model 2 the macroeconomic controls
are added to the model and as a result the coefficient of Pro − business changes
16 On the basis of the parameters used in Table 3.4 model 3 and model 6 we compute Hausman
tests of the difference between fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The Hausman tests yield
χ2 values of 333.77 and 335.23 which are significant and thereby reject estimating using a RE model.
The Hausman tests of the difference between FE and RE for the income models (3 and 6 of Table
3.5) fail to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test.
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moderately but remains significant and does not change sign. Nevertheless, the
coefficient of Pro−market remains relatively close to zero and remains insignificant.
Relative to the other covariates, the coefficient of Pro − business is rather small
in magnitude but unlike that of Pro −market, this coefficient is not close to zero.
Following model 2, the estimated effect of a one standard deviation increase in pro-
business policy leads to a 0.34 standard deviation increase in growth. As expected,
the coefficients of Investment and Education are significant and positive. Likewise,
the coefficient of Openness is significant and positive suggesting that more trade is
related to higher growth levels. Government consumption has a negative effect on
growth. And, the coefficient of Income is negative and significant and is relatively
high in magnitude. In model 3 we control for the effect of Property and in model
6 we control for the effect of Corruption. After adding these additional covariates
to the model we maintain that pro-business policy has a positive effect on growth.
Contrary to expectations, the coefficient of Property is negative and significant and
the coefficient of Corruption is negative but insignificant.
In models 4, 5, 7, and 8 we experiment by estimating the effect of either Pro −
market or Pro − business on growth. Based on this experimentation we find that
when not controlling for Pro − business the coefficient of Pro − market remains
insignificant and when not controlling for Pro − market the coefficient of Pro −
business remains positive and significant.
Table 3.4: FE regression results: pro-market policy versus pro-business policy
Dependent variable: Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pro-Market -0.03 -0.08 -0.00 0.15 -0.09 0.09
(0.93) (0.63) (0.98) (0.21) (0.57) (0.49)
Pro-business 0.46** 0.34* 0.31* 0.31** 0.36* 0.32**
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Investment 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.75*** 0.72***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Openness 1.41*** 1.51*** 1.58*** 1.51*** 1.41*** 1.49*** 1.39***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gconsumption -0.89* -0.88** -0.94** -0.88** -0.85* -0.93* -0.86*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Education 2.36* 1.61+ 1.62+ 1.62+ 2.34* 2.37* 2.47*
(0.02) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Income -5.46*** -5.18*** -5.12** -5.18*** -5.42*** -5.37** -5.45***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.68*** -0.70*** -0.68***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Corruption -0.20 -0.13 -0.19
(0.17) (0.38) (0.19)
N 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 715
R2 0.04 0.39 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.37 0.39
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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In Table 3.5 we repeat the exercise using Income at the dependent variable. In
the first step we again estimate the effect of Pro − market and Pro − business
without controlling for the effect of additional covariates (model 1). Here we find
a negative and significant effect of pro-market policy on income and a positive and
significant effect of pro-business policy on income. However, these findings are not
robust when adding the macro-economic and institutional controls. Based on models
2, 3, and 6 we find no effect of industrial policy on income. As for the models displayed
in Table 3.4, following the models displayed in Table 3.5 we find that the effect of
Investment, Openness, and Education is significant and positive and that the effect
of Gconsumption is significant and negative. We find no effect of institutions on
income and the coefficients of Property and Corruption are close to zero.
Again, we explore whether the sign and significance of the coefficients of pro −
market and Pro − business change when these covariates are entered separately in
the model. These results are reported in models 4, 5, 7, and 8. We find that, when
not controlling for the effect of pro-business policy on income, the estimated effect
of pro-market policy on income is positive and significant. As such, it may be that
not controlling for the effect of pro-business policy may cause researchers to wrongly
conclude that pro-market policy has a positive effect on income. The coefficient of
Pro− business remains insignificant in models 5 and 8.
Table 3.5: FE regression results: pro-market policy versus pro-business policy
Dependent variable: Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pro-Market -0.15*** 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.02+
(0.00) (0.31) (0.27) (0.05) (0.29) (0.06)
Pro-business 0.13** 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.00) (0.27) (0.28) (0.12) (0.25) (0.11)
Investment 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Openness 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gconsumption -0.10* -0.10* -0.11* -0.10* -0.10* -0.11* -0.10*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Education 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.58***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.54) (0.49) (0.62)
Corruption 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.89) (0.72) (0.94)
N 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 715
R2 0.14 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results when estimating using the policy
indicator Innovation and the policy indicator Pro−business2 instead of the indicator
Pro − business. We produce estimations for the full models using either Property
or Corruption as a proxy for institutional development and using either Growth
or Income as the dependent variable. For all models (1-8) we find no effect of
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pro-market policy on economic development. This result is consistent with the
previous estimations reported in models 3 and 6 of Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Moreover,
the coefficient of Pro−market is close to zero and is neither systematically positive
nor negative. The coefficient of Innovation is positive and significant for all models
(1-4). The estimated effect of a one standard deviation increase in pro-business
policy corresponds to a 0.33 standard deviation increase in growth (model 1). And,
the estimated effect of a one standard deviation increase in pro-business policy
corresponds to a 0.03 standard deviation increase in income.
We find a significant effect of pro-business type policies when using the indicator
Pro − business2 and estimating its effect on growth but not when using Income
as the dependent variable. The coefficient of Pro − business in Table 3.4 model 3
is somewhat higher in magnitude than the coefficient of Pro − business2 in Table
3.6 model 5. Also, regarding the results presented in Table 3.6, the magnitude of
the coefficient of Pro − business in models 5 and 6 is roughly half the size of the
coefficient of Innovation in models 1 and 2. Overall, we find no notable changes
in the coefficients of the other macro covariates. One exception is the coefficient of
Education which is no longer significant in model 1 of table 3.6. Overall, the results
support the thesis that the positive growth effect of industrial policy are to large
extent a result of policies that support advancements in technology and innovation.
Table 3.6: FE regression results: pro-market policy versus innovation/pro-business2
policy
Dependent variable: Growth and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth Growth Income Income Growth Growth Income Income
Pro-Market 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.79) (0.65) (0.24) (0.27) (0.72) (0.92) (0.10) (0.11)
Innovation 0.33*** 0.44*** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02)
Pro-business2 0.19+ 0.19+ 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.09) (0.52) (0.54)
Investment 0.74*** 0.71*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Openness 1.45*** 1.32*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 1.57*** 1.47*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gconsumption -0.91** -0.88* -0.10* -0.10* -0.89* -0.88* -0.10* -0.11*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 1.36 1.91** 0.55*** 0.55*** 1.74+ 2.50* 0.59*** 0.60***
(0.21) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Income -5.29*** -5.53*** -5.13*** -5.37***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.62*** -0.01 -0.70*** -0.01
(0.00) (0.76) (0.00) (0.49)
Corruption -0.23+ -0.00 -0.16 0.01
(0.10) (0.96) (0.30) (0.76)
N 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 715
R2 0.44 0.40 0.83 0.83 0.43 0.38 0.82 0.82
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Finally, we test whether the effect of industrial policy on GDP growth is more
pronounced when lagging the policy indicators with one year. We report all
estimations results using the full models containing either Property or Corruption
and the indicators for pro-business type policy: i.e. Pro − business, Innovation,
and Pro − business2. These results are reported in Table 3.7. We find no effect of
Pro−markett−1 on growth and no effect of Pro−businesst−1 and Pro−business2t−1
on growth. We still find a positive and significant effect of Innovationt−1 on growth,
but in comparison with the result reported in models 1-2 of Table 3.6, the coefficient
is smaller in magnitude. As such, even though the effect of industrial policy on
growth may be more pronounced one or more years after a policy reform, when using
perception-based policy data we find no strong evidence for a delayed time effect.
Table 3.7: FE regression results. Robustness check for delayed effects
Dependent variable: Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pro−Markett−1 -0.03 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 -0.00 -0.05
(0.84) (0.53) (0.83) (0.45) (0.98) (0.69)
Pro− businesst−1 0.17 0.19
(0.21) (0.17)
Innovationt−1 0.25+ 0.33*
(0.07) (0.02)
Pro− business2t−1 0.11 0.10
(0.24) (0.30)
Investment 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.82*** 0.80***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Openness 1.69*** 1.60*** 1.63*** 1.53*** 1.71*** 1.62***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gconsumption -0.95* -0.97* -0.97** -0.98** -0.96* -0.98*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 1.70+ 2.52* 1.53 2.25* 1.75+ 2.55*
(0.10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.05) (0.09) (0.03)
Income -5.58*** -5.85*** -5.73*** -6.05*** -5.50*** -5.75***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.69*** -0.65** -0.69***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Corruption -0.27 -0.24 -0.20
(0.14) (0.20) (0.32)
N 658 658 658 658 658 658
R2 0.43 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.38
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
3.6 Conclusion
The key contribution of this study has been that of systematically unbundling the
effect of different industrial policies on growth. We have presented empirical evidence
that compares and contrasts the success of a wide notion of industrial policy: market
oriented policy and industry support. To some extent the pro-market and pro-
business distinction made by Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) is empirically traceable.
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We construct a measure for pro-market policy that captures a country’s degree
of implementation of free-market type policy and we construct a measure for pro-
business type policy that summarizes a country’s degree of implementation of policy
that supports the development of (incumbent) industry. Overall, there is no strict
opposition between pro-market and pro-business policy. Rather, countries’ industrial
policy path consists of a gradual implementation of more pro-business and pro-market
policies. Further research investigating the compatibility between infant-industry
support and pro-market policy is necessary to enrich this understanding; such analysis
would benefit from industry-level data.
We find that pro-business type policy, in particular investment in technology
and innovation, is an essential part of countries’ overall industrial policy package
and investing in such policy has a positive effect on economic development. We
expect that extending the work of Furman et al. (2002)—on the determinants of
innovation capacity—by separating innovation policy and innovation capabilities or
the ‘innovation system’ (Soete, 2007) will increase understanding of the degree to
which policy encourages innovative behaviour and acts as a growth driver. Moreover,
this research has not controlled for the relation between competition and innovation.
Yet, according to Aghion et al. (2005) competition creates both incentives and
disincentives for innovation. Peneder (2012, pp.1) refers to this as the “misguided
antagonism between” the positive ‘Arrow effect’ theory that is valid under low levels
of initial competition versus a negative ‘Schumpeter effect’ theory that is valid under
conditions of high-level of initial competition and low initial profits. We hope that
further research will reveal the extent to which the optimal pro-market and pro-
innovation policy mix is dependent on the level of competition. Finally, this study
would benefit from further analysis comparing the perception-based policy data with
qualitative data describing policy outcomes.
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3.7 Appendix 3A
Table 3.8: Country List
Code Country
ARG Argentina JPN Japan
AUS Australia KAZ Kazakhstan
AUT Austria KOR Korea, South
BEL Belgium LTU Lithuania
BGR Bulgaria LUX Luxembourg
BRA Brazil MEX Mexico
CAN Canada MYS Malaysia
CHE Switzerland NLD Netherlands
CHL Chile NOR Norway
CHN China NZL New Zealand
COL Colombia PER Peru
CZE Czech Republic PHL Philippines
DEU Germany POL Poland
DNK Denmark PRT Portugal
ESP Spain QAT Qatar
EST Estonia ROM Romania
FIN Finland RUS Russia
FRA France SGP Singapore
GBR United Kingdom SVK Slovakia
GRC Greece SVN Slovenia
HKG Hong Kong SWE Sweden
HRV Croatia THA Thailand
HUN Hungary TUR Turkey
IDN Indonesia TWN Taiwan
IND India UAE United Arab Emirates
IRL Ireland UKR Ukraine
ISL Iceland USA United States
ISR Israel VEN Venezuela
ITA Italy ZAF South Africa
JOR Jordan
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Table 3.9: Sources
Variable Definition Source Scale
Pro-market, pro-
business, Innovation,
Pro-business2
Policy indicators IMD (2011) Indicators are
normalized on a
scale of 0 to 1.
Pro-market and pro-
business
Policy indicators IPD (2009) Indicators are
normalized on a
scale of 0 to 1.
Income Real GDP per capita
(Constant Prices:
Chain series)
Heston et al. (2011)
Growth Growth rate of Real
GDP per capita
(Constant Prices:
Chain series)
Heston et al. (2011) Logarithmic change
Openness Openness at 2005
constant prices
Heston et al. (2011) % of GDP
Investment Investment Share
of PPP Converted
GDP Per Capita at
2005 constant prices
(Laspeyres series)
Heston et al. (2011) % of GDP
Gconsumption Government
Consumption Share
of PPP Converted
GDP Per Capita at
2005 constant prices
(Laspeyres series)
Heston et al. (2011) % of GDP
Education Average of mean years
of education men and
mean age of education
woman; 25 and older
Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation
(IHME) (2013)
Average years of
education
Property Property Rights Heritage Foundation
(2013)
From low property
rights protection = 0
to high property rights
protection = 1
Corruption Freedom from
corruption
Heritage Foundation
(2013)
From lack of freedom
from corruption = 0
to high freedom from
corruption = 1
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3.8 Appendix 3B
Validity of Policy Indicators
In this section, the two policy domains constructed on the basis of the WCY data are
compared with alternative policy indicators. We select variables from the Institutional
Profiles Database (IPD) 2009 that are conceptually close to the variable selection of
the WCY dataset. The policy indicators from the IPD are listed in Table 3.11. Based
on the policy domains constructed for the WCY dataset, the IPD variable selection
is sorted in order to describe either pro-business or pro-market policy.
We use Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) to compare the variable selection
from the WCY with the variable selection from IPD. We assume that countries’ score
on pro-market and pro-business policy is relatively constant over time and therefore
use the IPD data from 2009 and WCY data from the years 2007-2011. The CCA is
based on 272 sample observations and 56 countries. Unlike the sample used for the
PCA in section 3.4, the countries Croatia, Iceland, and Luxembourg are excluded
in the CCA due to missing observations in the IPD 2009 dataset. The results of
the CCA are presented in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. We focus on the first and second
linear combinations. The Pearson canonical correlations of the first and second linear
combination are 0.9 and 0.85.17
The raw coefficients of the first two linear combination of the CCA are presented
in Figure 3.6. The raw coefficients are interpreted as the effect of a one unit increase
in a variable on the corresponding canonical variate. We cannot identify a pattern
across the pro-market and/or pro-business policy variables based on the first linear
combination and the raw coefficients. The second linear combination does identify
some pro-business variables from the WCY dataset that are positively associated
with pro-business variables from the IPD dataset. The pro-business variable that
describes the availability of funding for technological development (Funding) has
a very high positive loading compared to the other variables in the WCY data.
Also, in descending order, Framework, Research, and Environment have a positive
loading and have previously been identified as pro-business variables. The three
variables that have the highest positive loading amongst the IPD variables are
classified under pro-business policy. These three variables describe government
support for research and development (A5033), institutions that support research
and technological acquisitions for SMEs (B5010), and government venture capital
initiatives (C5010). The variables that have high negative loadings include both pro-
business and pro-market variables.
The loadings resulting from the CCA are presented in Figure 3.7. Following
Rencher (1992), the canonical loadings represent the correlation of the variables with
their corresponding linear combination (canonical variate). The canonical loadings
include less information than the raw coefficients do. However, the canonical loadings
are useful to assist in the interpretation of results. The loadings of the first linear
combination are high for most of the variables in both datasets. Some of the
17 The Wilks lambda, Pillai’s trace, Lawley-Hotelling trace, and Roy’s largest root tests are all
significant at a 1% level.
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WCY variables have a relatively low loading (e.g Tax). These variables also have
conceptually less relation with the IPD variables. The second linear combination
distinguishes two groups of variables in both datasets. Most of the variables that
have negative loadings have previously been identified as pro-market variables. And,
most of the variables that have positive loadings are associated with pro-business
policy.
Based on the raw coefficients, the canonical loadings, and the canonical
correlations we find that (1) the WCY and IPD policy variables have similar variation
(2), and for both datasets, the pro-market and pro-business policy variables can be
distinguished.
Finally, we compute averages for the selection of pro-market variables and for the
selection of pro-business policy variables from the IPD dataset. Table 3.10 presents the
Pearson correlations for the WCY and IPD pro-market and pro-business indicators.
The indicators are all positively correlated. The correlation amongst the WCY data is
the highest. The correlation between the policy indicators constructed from the IPD
data is 0.53. The pro-business indicator from WCY has a higher correlation with the
IPD pro-business indicator than with the IPD pro-market indicator. Also, the WCY
pro-market indicator has a higher correlation with the IPD pro-market indicator than
with the IPD pro-business indicator.
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Table 3.10: Correlations between Policy Indicators (WCY 2007-2011 & IPD 2009)
WCY IPD
P
ro
-m
a
rk
et
P
ro
-b
u
si
n
es
s
P
ro
-m
a
rk
et
P
ro
-b
u
si
n
es
s
WCY Pro-market 1
Pro-business 0.82 1
IPD Pro-market 0.56 0.31 1
Pro-business 0.44 0.41 0.53 1
Table 3.11: IPD 2009
Pro-business Development Policy
A5033: Government support for private or public research & development (1-4)
B3022: Existence of targeted support measures for emerging growth sectors (0-4)
B5010: Existence of institutions or arrangements to support research and technological acquisitions
for SMEs (0-4)
B5011: Existence of institutions or arrangements to support research and technological acquisitions
for large firms (0-4)
B5012: Existence of institutions or arrangements to encourage technology transfers and skills
transfers from foreign players to domestic players (0-4)
C5010: Government venture capital incentives (0-4)
Pro-market Development Policy
B6031: Effectiveness of enforcement of international TRIPS arrangements for the protection of
intellectual property (0-4)
B7020: Effectiveness of competition regulation arrangements (non-banking) to combat restrictive
collective agreements i.e. cartels (0-4)
B7021: Effectiveness of competition regulation arrangements (non-banking) to combat abuses of
dominant positions (0-4)
B8002: Restrictions on the issue of import licenses (1-4)
C6020: Publication requirement for firms issuing shares (0-4)
C7010: Existence of competition arrangements in the banking system to combat restrictive collective
agreements i.e. cartels (0-4)
C7011: Existence of competition arrangements in the banking system to combat abuse of dominant
position (0-4)
C8000: Openness of bank capital to foreign shareholding (0-4)
C8001: Right of establishment for foreign deposit banks and investment banks (0-4)
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Extrapolation of Policy Indicators
We are interested in mapping countries’ industrial development path ranging from
countries with low income and a fragile institutional setting to countries with high
income and a strong institutional setting. We construct average pro-market and pro-
business indicators for the 123 countries in the IPD 2009 data using the selection of
policy indicators from IPD as discussed above in section 3.8. The IPD data contains
more less developed countries than the WCY dataset.
Figure 3.8: Analysis of Policy Indicators using IPD data
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Extrapolation of Policy Indicators
The scores of the 123 countries on the pro-market and pro-business indicators are
illustrated in Figure 3.8. As indicated by the legend in the figure, the countries that
we document using the WCY dataset are given a different label than the countries
for which WCY has no data. Overall, the former group of countries score higher on
the policy indicators than the latter group does. Based on this figure it seems that
there is a linear relationship between the two policy indicators constructed using the
IPD data. This result also confirms that countries that have a relatively low income
level and weak institutional setting have implemented less industrial policy.
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Chapter 4
Institutions, Foreign Direct Investment, and
Domestic Investment: crowding out or
crowding in?
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4.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the type of capital inflow from abroad that is most
directly related to the productive capacity of a country. Its effect of transferring
foreign know-how, creating additional investment funds and even improving labour
standards is often seen as one of the important benefits of globalization for growth and
development of relatively poor countries. According to Kosova` (2010, pp. 861), “since
the mid-1990s, FDI has become the main source of external finance for developing
countries and is more than twice as large as official development aid”. In order to
build domestic capacity, some countries have adopted special policies targeting foreign
investors, including investment treaties, preferential taxation schemes and preferential
loans. Busse and Ko¨niger and Nunnenkamp, (2010) and Bu¨the and Milner (2008)
provide evidence about the effectiveness of such policies in attracting FDI.
However, the role of FDI is not uncontroversial. It implies control of foreign firms
over the domestic productive capacity, including technological knowledge. For some of
the dynamic Asian economies that were growing rapidly in the second half of the 20th
century, this was a reason to limit inward FDI, and instead focus on other channels for
technology transfer (e.g., licensing or ‘arms-length’ relationships with foreign firms).
This seems to have been the case for Japan (Goto and Odagiri, 2003), Korea (Kim,
2003, 1997) and Taiwan (Aw, 2003). On the other hand, in Singapore (Wong, 2003)
and more recently China, inward FDI seems to be encouraged by policy makers.
The academic debate does not show any consensus on the benefits of FDI
either. Here, two issues are central to the debate: whether or not FDI has positive
productivity spillovers (through transfer of know-how) on domestic firms, and which
effect FDI has on (private) domestic investment. With regard to the latter, one may
either expect “crowding in”, which means that FDI will lead to more investment from
(private) domestic sources, or “crowding out”, which is the opposite, i.e., FDI leads
to less domestic (private) investment. Crowding in can be interpreted as beneficial for
economic growth, but the effect of crowding out on economic growth is ambiguous.
On this topic of crowding in or crowding out, it is sometimes argued that market
entry of foreign owned firms pushes less efficient domestically owned firms out of
the market, which may be beneficial for productivity, but implies a negative effect
on investment and productive capacity. And, when foreign firms gain significant
competition power, markets become less efficient, with a potentially negative effect on
growth and investment. Crowding out is more likely to occur in markets with limited
investment opportunity such as markets where competition is dependent on firm-
specific assets, i.e. medium-tech and high-tech industries (Amsden, 2011). Moreover,
crowding out is more likely when domestic firms have limited absorptive capacity
and foreign firms have relatively more know-how, experience, innovation capacity,
monitoring skills, better access to finance and skilled labour, and when foreign firms
are relatively more productive.
In terms of the empirical evidence, some scholars find that increases in FDI crowd
out domestic investment, implying that FDI has a limited effect on the development of
domestic productivity capacity and growth (Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol, 2012;
Mutenyo et al., 2010; Titarenko, 2005). Other scholars find that FDI stimulates (or
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crowds in) private domestic investment (Al-Sadig, 2013; Ramirez, 2011; Ndikumana
and Verick, 2008; Tang et al., 2008; de Mello, 1999; Bosworth and Collins, 1999;
Borensztein et al., 1998). Several scholars find mixed evidence when using several lags
for FDI or when splitting the country sample according to geographic region (Adams,
2009; Apergis et al., 2006; Agosin and Mayer, 2000; Misun and Tomsik, 2002; Agosin
and Mayer, 2000), or find no effect of FDI on domestic investment (Lipsey, 2000).1
Similarly, the productivity spillovers of inward FDI is disputed in the literature.
For example, Wooster and Diebel (2006) provide an overview of 32 econometric
studies of the impact of FDI in developing countries (among which they include
transition countries in Eastern Europe), covering a publication time span of 1983–
2004. They find positive effects of spillovers in about half of the included observations
(an observation is a regression result, of which there are generally more than one per
paper analyzed), and slightly less than half of the reported coefficients—both positive
and negative—are statistically significant.
At a more basic level, one may also ask whether, in a particular country context,
the performance of foreign-owned firms differs from domestically-owned firms. Huang
and Shiu (2009) study the effect of foreign ownership on stock market performance in
Taiwan and find that stocks of firms with high foreign ownership rates outperform.
Based on data from firms located in Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that
small firms with a higher share of foreign ownership have relatively higher productivity
than small firms that do not have foreign ownership. Related research on investment
by Koo and Maeng (2006) shows that firms in Korea with high foreign ownership have
relatively higher investment levels than firms with domestic ownership. Nevertheless,
domestically owned firms may have better access to market knowledge and be more
entrepreneurial (Amsden, 2011; Koo and Maeng, 2006). FDI inflow can free domestic
capital and gives domestic investors more opportunity to invest in new business
opportunities (Lipsey, 2000).
Further controversy lies in the role of institutions and governance in FDI and
domestic investment, and their relationship (crowding in or crowding out). It is
generally accepted that both foreign and domestic investors will prefer investing
in countries with secured property rights, a stable institutional setting and other
desirable institutional features which are broadly associated with the term ‘good
governance’. For this reason, ‘good governance’ is expected to have a positive effect
on overall investment. However, what role institutions and governance may have
on whether FDI crowds in or crowds out domestic private investment, is less clear.
Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012), hereafter M&U, estimate an equation for
domestic private investment, and use FDI, a number of governance variables, and an
interaction term between governance and FDI as explanatory variables. They find a
negative coefficient both for the direct effect of FDI on domestic private investment,
and for the interaction term between governance and FDI. This leads them to conclude
that FDI crowds out domestic private investment, and that it does so in a stronger
1 Similarly, cross-country evidence on the impact of public investment (e.g. investment by national
governments, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) on private sector investment
also shows mixed results of crowding in and crowding out (Cavallo and Daude, 2011; Belloc and
Vertova, 2006; Erden and Holcombe, 2006; Atukeren, 2010; Bird and Rowlands, 2001; Butkiewicz
and Yanikkaya, 2005).
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way in countries with ‘good governance’.
The theoretical model that M&U use for justifying their regression approach starts
from the assumption that foreign investors may insulate domestic investors from
‘capital unfriendly’ regimes. FDI may thus (partly) offset the negative effect of bad
governance on (domestic) investment. While this may be a valid theoretical starting
point, there are also other effects that FDI may have on (domestic) investment. Rent
seeking (which is typically associated with ‘bad governance’) may play a role, with
asymmetric effects between FDI and domestic investment. Or, one may hypothesize
that FDI spillovers are likely to be stronger in countries with more developed
institutions, because such countries offer better protection of intellectual property.
If this effect is strong, institutions have a positive mediating effect on the relation
between FDI and domestic investment. For example, Fu et al. (2011) find that
benefits from technology spillovers are dependent on domestic market development
as well as institutional development. This suggests that developing countries with
relatively poor institutions and governance may lack the absorption capacity for
domestic industry to benefit from FDI inflow.
The role that institutions play in mediating the effect of FDI on domestic
investment (crowding in or crowding out) is the primary topic of this paper. We
seek to investigate whether such a mediating effect exists, and whether, in our sample
of developing and emerging economies, crowding in or crowding out dominates. We do
not seek to develop new theory on this matter, but instead will briefly summarize the
empirical perspectives that are found in the literature, and subsequently interrogate
the data to find out which of the effects that are identified in the literature dominates.
In formulating our regressions models, we will also ask critical questions about the
variable definitions that have been used in the empirical literature. We especially
question some of the definitions that have been used for domestic private investment,
and experiment with alternative definitions to investigate whether the results in the
literature are robust to such definitional changes. Finally, we question the way in
which some studies in the field implement estimation methods, especially GMM, and
experiment with alternative implementations, again with the aim to test robustness
of the results found in the literature.
Overall, our results suggest that the accuracy of the results in the literature (in
particular the work of M&U) are severely compromised by the empirical difficulty
in disentangling foreign capital formation from domestic capital formation, and by
methodological problems related to the implementation of the GMM method. Using
alternative definitions and estimation methods, we find no robust evidence that FDI
crowds out private investment. Instead we conclude that foreign investment has a
positive effect on investment. In addition, we find weak evidence indicating that
‘good governance’ is positively related to private investment. And, on the basis
of an interaction between ‘good governance’ and FDI, we find some evidence that
there is a negative mediating effect on investment. We interpret this finding as
an indication that the negative effect of rent seeking interests in the provision of
preferential treatment of foreign investors on investment is stronger than the positive
spillover effect on investment and/or is stronger than the effect of rent seeking interests
that deter foreign investors from entering markets.
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4.2 Institutions, FDI and Domestic Investment
Mauro (1995) found that corruption has a negative effect on private investment
and that therefore corruption reduces growth. Subsequently, several studies have
found a significant effect of institutional characteristics on investment as well as
on FDI. Several scholars find evidence of a positive relation between foreign direct
investment (FDI) on the one hand and institutions on the other hand, e.g. legal
protection, rule of law, investment treaties, and trade agreements, political stability,
government efficiency, control of corruption, and financial supervision (see Buchanan
et al., 2012; Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol, 2012; Ali et al., 2010; Javorcik and
Wei, 2009; Daude and Fratzscher, 2008; Daude and Stein, 2007; Busse and Hefeker,
2007; Benassy-Quere et al., 2007).
However, in empirical work looking at the effect of FDI on domestic investment, it
is not customary to take into account the effect of institutions. Only some researchers
in this field control for the relation between institutions and investment. For example,
Ndikumana and Verick (2008) analyze correlations between FDI and democracy and
autocracy on the basis of data from Marshall and Jaggers (2009). These authors
find a significant relation between democracy and domestic investment, but, because
the coefficient is relatively small, Ndikumana and Verick (2008, pp. 720) conclude
that “there is little evidence that FDI inflows are higher in countries that are more
democratic”. Adams (2009) and Borensztein et al. (1998) control for the effect of
institutions on domestic investment (both using data describing political risk from
ICRG) and find positive and significant effects. Blonigen (2005) explains that the
lack of focus on the institutional dimension is a result of the difficulty in measuring
institutions and/or corruption. If institutions and good governance are an important
explanatory factor of FDI and the FDI domestic investment relation, failure to control
for the effect of institutions causes omitted variable bias.
A major step forward in this respect is the analysis by M&U. These authors
attempt to empirically study the institutional dimension as an explanatory factor
in the relation between FDI and investment. They follow the theoretical model of
Dalmazzo and Marini (2000), which starts from the idea that governance impacts
domestic investment. Thus, an “investment unfriendly regime” will tend to discourage
investment from domestic sources. Although M&U do not specify exactly what
constitutes an “investment unfriendly regime”, it is clear that this encompasses a
range of indicators on governance and institutions, and that “investment (un)friendly”
can be seen“as good (bad) governance”.
The theory then assumes that the effect of investment unfriendly regimes can
be mitigated by foreign investors. Foreign investors are assumed to be able to use
political leverage (e.g., through their home governments). If a domestic investor turns
to a foreign partner, i.e., seeks FDI to support her investment project, the project can
be protected from the effects of bad governance. Should a corrupt regime attempt
to seize investments, foreign ownership can protect against this by international
trade agreements. In terms of the regression that M&U estimate, this leads to an
interaction term between FDI and governance. Their dependent variable is domestic
private investment (i.e., excluding FDI). Obviously, governance is one explanatory
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variable (to test the investment - governance relationship), and FDI is another one
(to test crowding in or crowding out). While the expected effect of ‘good governance’
on investment is positive, (i.e., the effect of bad governance is negative), FDI will
(partially) offset this effect, thus the interaction term is expected to be negative.
Obviously, the interaction term adds both to the (marginal) effect of governance on
investment, and to the (marginal) effect of FDI on investment, hence it also affects the
conclusions on crowding in or crowding out. A negative (positive) interaction term
between FDI and governance would make crowding out (in) stronger in countries with
‘good governance’.
Overall, M&U conclude that crowding out is greater in countries with better
governance and higher political stability, i.e., the interaction term between FDI
and (good) governance is negative. This is not a surprising result in light of the
theoretical model that is the starting point of their analysis, because this model treats
domestic and foreign investment sources as substitutes, and identifies governance and
institutions as the factor that steers the substitution trade-off.
The theoretical starting point of M&U, although in principle interesting, appears
to us as slightly limited. Other factors may influence the relationship between
domestic investment, FDI and institutions and governance, and possibly there are
effects that are adverse to the ones hypothesized by M&U. One additional theoretical
approach lies in the theory on political elite rent seeking, which can provide additional
explanation for cross-country differences in the degree to which domestic private
sectors’ opportunities are different than foreign investors’ opportunities. Rent seeking
is broadly defined as the use of elite relations with the aim to generate rents and/or
to distribute rents for personal gain. Rent seeking behaviour is practiced by both
political and economic elite.2 Whereas the impact of political elite rent seeking has
been studied in relation to e.g. foreign aid (Asiedu et al., 2009; Svensson, 2000),
efficiency in the banking sector (Morck et al., 2011), and the onset of financial crisis
(Wei and Wu, 2002; Johnson, 2009; Mishkin, 1996; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), the
impact of rent seeking behaviour on investment has not been extensively explored
using cross-country analysis.3
A revived interest on the impact of elite rent seeking in explaining the variation
of economic growth is due to the contribution of North et al. (2009) who investigate
the role of elite behaviour in regulating economic activity and social structure. North
et al. characterize the ‘Limited Access Order’ (LAO) as a developmental state in which
elite capture rents by reducing competition, differentiating rights, limiting access to
trade and access to resources, and by restricting the entry and exit to organizations.
Furthermore, the elite are described as protecting social order in order to accumulate
2 E.g. see La Porta et al., 1999 on the dominance of economic elite in the corporate sector
and Johnson et al. (2000) on rent seeking behaviour (the diversion of corporate resources such as
expropriation and transfer pricing) in the corporate sector. Rent seeking by the political elite can also
be referred to as crony capitalism. Wei (2001, pp. 21) describe crony capitalism as following: “an
economic environment in which relatives and friends of government officials are placed in positions of
power and government decisions on the allocation of resources and judicial judgment on commercial
disputes are distorted to favour these friends and relatives.”
3 For example, Morck et al. (2011) find that, because of rent seeking costs, economic elite
controlled banking and state controlled banking both create relatively larger efficiency losses than
widely-held banks.
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future rents. Case studies on the application of LAO framework provide evidence
of several channels elite use to collect economic rents: i.e. countries’ regulatory
framework in controlling competition and assuring dominance of firms and unions,
the financial system, natural resources, foreign aid flows, political participation, and
policies including land and property rights reform, privatization, and preferential
taxation (North et al., 2009) Also, Keefer and Knack (2007) find public investment a
powerful channel for rent seeking.4
Rent seeking may have a stronger negative effect on either domestic investors or
on foreign investors. A tentative explanation of why rent seeking may have a stronger
negative effect on domestic investors runs as follows. Domestic elite interest groups
may have reasons to grant foreign investors preferential market access. Amsden (2007)
finds that foreign firms operating in developing countries with resource intensive
industries have a high degree of market power as well as political power. As a result,
domestic investors who do not have access to dominant political elites are excluded
and may be crowded out. In particular, domestic market potential can be rapidly
destroyed when foreign firms operate in extractive industries or seize large amounts
of land. Financial repression caused by elite rent seeking behaviour may also impede
domestic investors. For example, as found in the work of Diaz-Cayeros (2013), elites
in Mexico use personal connections to regulate economic activity and entrepreneurs
and medium-sized companies have limited access to financial markets because capital
allocation is skewed in favour of the dominant elite. If rent seeking behaviour is
positively related to FDI inflow, rent seeking can have a positive mediating effect on
the relation between FDI inflow and domestic investment. As a consequence, the
negative effect of bad governance on total investment is lessened by the positive
interaction between high rent seeking and FDI at the cost of domestic market
development.
On the contrary, domestic elite interest groups may also have reasons to oppose
financial globalization and foreign investors from entering markets. Countries with
high levels of rent seeking may have stronger restrictions on foreign ownership in
industries where elites collect large rents. This implies that (in certain industries)
high rent seeking may be negatively related to FDI and that the interaction between
governance and FDI inflow has a positive effect on countries’ level of investment. If
rent seeking has both a positive and a negative relation with FDI, and if rent seeking
is related to institutions and governance, it will be hard to disentangle the empirical
relations between domestic investment, governance and FDI.
An additional theoretical perspective on the role of institutions in the relationship
between domestic investment and FDI is found in the literature on spillovers of FDI.
Large spillovers from FDI to domestic producers suggest higher domestic investment,
because they raise the rate of return to (domestic) investment. Thus, if spillovers are
high, we may expect that FDI crowds in rather than crowds out domestic investment.
Whether FDI generates large spillovers may depend on institutions and governance.
Weak intellectual property rights protection may be associated with an overall lower
4 Alternatively, Keefer and Knack (2007) do not exclude the possibility that public investment
is higher in countries with weak institutions because government seeks to compensate for poor
investment climate.
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level of FDI inflow and with a relatively lower level of high technology investments
(Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). For example, if intellectual property rights are not
protected well, foreign firms may choose to not involve their R&D or high-tech
manufacturing activities in FDI. The resulting FDI is then likely to imply fewer
spillovers, and hence the crowding in effect will be weaker. This suggests that an
interaction term of the type that M&U use would have a positive sign, instead of the
negative one that they assume.
Thus, we argue that there are arguments supporting both a possible negative and
positive effect of institutions and governance on the crowding out or crowding in
effect of FDI on domestic investment. M&U find that there is a negative interaction
effect between institutions and FDI on domestic investment, which suggests crowding
out. On the basis of rent seeking theory, we argue that if there is a negative
interaction effect between FDI and the development of institutions, this effect can
be interpreted as a sign that FDI is motivated (partly) by rent seeking and deters
domestic investment. On the other hand, and also on the basis of rent seeking theory,
we argue that a positive interaction between ‘good governance’ and FDI may be
interpreted as a sign that, especially in countries with weak institutions, rent seeking
interests deter foreign investors from entering markets. And, looking from the point
of view of FDI spillovers, we would expect a positive sign on the interaction term
between FDI and governance, leading to crowding in. With these contradictory effects
associated with various theoretical arguments, whether the sign on the interaction
terms is positive or negative is a matter of which effect is stronger than the other.
This is what we set out to investigate using a regression framework for a sample of
developing and emerging countries in the next section.
4.3 Macroeconomic Evidence on Crowding in and
Crowding out
Table 4.17 in the Appendix provides an overview of existing research on the effect of
FDI on investment. The last column in the table presents the overall conclusion on
whether FDI crowds in (CI) or crowds out (CO) investment.5 In order to implement
our empirical estimations, we start from the empirical approach of M&U, who use
GMM to estimate the following model:
DPIi,t = β0 + β1DPIi,t−1 + β2FDIi,t + β3GROWTHi,t + β4PUBLICi,t
+β5WGIi,t + β6WGIi,t × FDIi,t + i,t
Here, DPI is domestic private investment as a fraction of GDP, FDI is FDI as
a percentage of GDP, PUBLIC is public investment as a percentage of GDP,
GROWTH is past GDP growth, and WGI is one of several indicators on governance
and institutions. The βs are parameters (to be estimated), and  is a disturbance term
with the usual characteristics. Our main interest is in the β2 parameter (positive
5 Table 4.17 in the Appendix is completed to the best of our knowledge. Some studies did not
specify the definition of investment data and method.
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for crowding in and negative for crowding out), the β5 parameter (expected to be
positive, indicating a relation between investment and ‘good governance’), and the β6
parameter (expected to be either negative of positive, depending on the nature of the
mediating effect). We use the dataset that was constructed by M&U, and which was
kindly provided to us by these authors.
We start, below, by providing an overview of some estimation issues related to
the above equation, and related approaches found in the literature. We then discuss
some issues related to the data, including definitional issues that lead us to propose
several new dependent variables. Finally, we present the empirical estimations.
Methodology
Several different methods are implemented in the literature on FDI crowding out or
crowding in investment: one-step general method of moments (GMM) (Arellano and
Bond, 1991), system general method of moments (GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998),
pooled estimations of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), fixed-effect estimations,
OLS, instrumental variable regression, VAR system with error correction model, and
fully modified OLS. Some methods of estimation are more adept for dealing with
a dynamic model. The advantage of GMM over fixed-effects estimations is that
successful implementation of the dynamic model allows controlling for dynamic panel
bias.
GMM is a technique aimed at data samples with a large number of ‘individuals’,
here countries, and a small time dimension (Roodman, 2009a). The dataset
constructed by M&U, and used again here, consists of a balanced 12 year panel and
46 countries, which is a relatively small number of countries for GMM. In addition,
M&U use system GMM, which requires additional moment conditions. M&U (2012,
pp.5) stress that “system GMM can exhibit the problem of too many instruments if
the number of instruments is greater than the number of cross-section observations.”
This is consistent with the discussion in (Roodman, 2009b, pp. 140), leading to a rule
of thumb that the number of instruments used in GMM estimation should be lower
than N (in our case 46).
M&U do not report the exact number of instruments used in their estimations, and
neither do Agosin and Machado (2005), who use one-step difference GMM analysis
with the robust estimator of the covariance matrix on the basis of data for the years
1971-2000 and 12 countries. Moreover, the latter authors do not report Hansen
statistics for validity (exogeneity) of instruments, which is more appropriate under
heteroskedasticity than the Sargan statistics that they do report.6 We replicate the
M&U estimations, using two-step system GMM. The variables FDI, GROWTH, and
PUBLIC are treated as endogenous, only the second lags are used as instruments
in the transformed equation and only the first differences are used as instruments
in the levels equation. The WGIs and the interaction terms are assumed strictly
exogenous and therefore serve as standard instruments in the GMM estimations.
These assumptions may be incorrect. Although M&U limit the number of lags
6 The Sargan test statistic is inconsistent when non-sphericity in the errors is suspected as is the
case in multi-country data Roodman (2009b).
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used for the instrumental variables to two, the instrument count remains high. In
particular, in our replication of the M&U estimations, the instrument count runs
up to around 90, which is clearly higher than the number of countries (46). Also,
the two covariance matrices of moment conditions for our replications (reproduced in
tables 4.2 and 4.3) are singular.7 This evidence is in contradiction with the authors’
argument that “the number of instruments is larger than the cross-section dimension
so the excess instruments problem does not apply” (M&U, 2012, pp.2). Moreover,
the Hansen test statistics reported by the authors and those documented on the
basis of our replication exercise below have a p-value of 1, which indicates that the
results suffer from instrument proliferation which M&U do not identify. Following
Roodman (2009b), numerous instruments - instrument proliferation - can cause the
instrumented variables to be over-fitted. This biases the coefficient “estimates towards
those from non-instrumenting estimators” (Roodman, 2009b, pp. 139).
A next methodological issue lies in the fact that M&U use the two-step system
GMM estimator, which uses a weighting matrix that is more asymptotically efficient
than the one-step estimator but the coefficient standard errors “tend to be severely
downward biased when the instrument count is high” (Roodman, 2009b, pp.141).
Although Windmeijer (2005) proposes a correction for this problem, as far as we can
see, this correction was not used by M&U. Finally, as described by Roodman (2009b,
pp. 128), “the autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard
errors assume no correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances.” By
including time dummies in the estimation, this assumption becomes more plausible.
Yet M&U omit time dummies in their estimations. As a result, however precise the
conclusions of M&U are formulated, we fear that these are drawn on the basis of
biased results.
In order to overcome these methodological problems, we propose several
modifications to the system GMM specification. First, in order to avoid
contemporaneous correlation, time dummies are included to remove the time-related
shocks from errors in GMM analysis. Next, we use the Windmeijer robust estimator
for the two-step covariance matrix. Because M&U assume that FDI is endogenous
and treat FDI as endogenous in the GMM regression analysis we also treat the
interaction term between FDI and WGI as endogenous.8 Finally, in addition to
capping the lags of the instrumental variables, the instrument matrix is collapsed to
reduce instrument proliferation. As a result, the instrument count is reduced to 21
or slightly more (depending on the specific model), which is well below the number
of countries (46). We also compare the results of GMM estimations to the results of
fixed-effect estimations (FE), and to the results of pooled OLS (POLS) estimations.9
The FE and POLS results include cluster-robust variance estimates.
7 Following Roodman (2009b), the matrix of moments becomes singular when data is limited and
the number of instruments approaches N.
8 We maintain the assumption that WGI is exogenous in order to preserve comparability with
the analysis of M&U.
9 In a simple autoregressive (AR) model, the fixed-effect and POLS estimates provide an estimated
lower and upper bound, respectively, for the autoregressive coefficient. Although the present context
is more complicated, since the AR model is extended with a regressor that may not be strictly
exogenous, we still propose to use those two estimates as rough benchmarks, giving a likely range
for consistent estimates.
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Data
Most scholars acknowledge that the estimations of the effect of FDI on domestic
investment are severely troubled by the challenges related to separating foreign
domestic investment from private domestic investment.10 M&U (2012) separate
foreign investment from domestic private investment by subtracting net FDI inflow
and public investment from gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Adams (2009) takes
a similar approach to that of M&U and subtracts FDI inflow from GFCF to measure
domestic investment. However, the comparison of foreign investment and domestic
investment on the basis of data on FDI and data in GFCF is problematic.
As noted by Agosin and Machado (2005), FDI is a financial balance of payments
concept whereas GFCF is a concept that is part of countries’ national accounts,
which implies that these two types of data are constructed using different conceptual
frameworks. In fact, while the notion of GFCF starts from the idea of measuring how
much new capital is added to the production capacity of a country, FDI does not start
from such a notion. FDI measures investments of foreign firms in domestic productive
capacity, and this includes existing capacity as well as newly installed capacity. This
is related to the notion of greenfield FDI, which is, roughly, defined as setting up
previously non-existing production capacity. Non-greenfield FDI means that foreign
firms take ownership (either fully or partially) of existing domestic firms, and hence
take control over existing capacity. In other words, non-greenfield FDI is not part of
GFCF.
On the other hand, greenfield FDI is conceptually part of GFCF, but it is not the
only part of GFCF that is under control of foreign ownership. If a firm that is foreign
owned invests, this investment is part of GFCF, but not part of greenfield FDI. The
latter point touches upon the issue of whether a stock or a flow variable of FDI needs
to be used. While the idea of a stock of FDI is obviously not consistent with the idea
of the (flow of) GFCF it is still likely that when the stock of FDI is large (relative to
the domestic capital stock), a larger part of GFCF will be under foreign control.
As a result of these definitional problems, the measurements for domestic private
investment that M&U construct contain negative observations, which are obviously
difficult to interpret.11 This view is also shared by Ndikumana and Verick (2008,
pp. 719) who argue that subtracting FDI from domestic private investment does not
yield a more accurate measurement and that, by construction, such measure “would
be negatively correlated with FDI”. The latter observation relates to the fact that, in
terms of the variables in our model, DPI ≡ GFCF - PUBLIC - FDI. Since FDI
and PUBLIC appear as explanatory variables, subtracting them on the left hand
side of the equation will tend to subtract 1 from the respective coefficients (β1and β2)
10 An exception is the work of Tang et al. (2008, pp. 1302) who study the Chinese economy and
argue that their measure of domestic investment does not include any type of foreign investment.
As such, for some countries it may be possible to separate FDI from private domestic investment.
Nevertheless, cross-country studies are limited in this respect. Another exception is the research by
Titarenko (2005); Misun and Tomsik (2002) where the dependent variable is represented by the sum
of domestic investment and FDI. Whether the authors construct the dependent variable by adding
domestic investment and FDI inflows remains unclear.
11 Following the summary statistics of M&U, the minimum amount of domestic private investment
over GDP is -37.4. The authors offer no interpretation of this negative value.
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on the right hand side, thus biasing these coefficients towards the negative domain.
If FDI is relatively highly volatile, this may lead to an extreme downward bias in the
estimated effect.
Because M&U (2012) subtract net FDI inflow and public investment from
GFCF (instead of subtracting FDI inflow), they conceptually aggravate the problem
with the measure for private investment because this measure now also contains
private disinvestments that are transfers of ownership from domestically owned
establishments to foreign investors. Following the summary statistics of the authors,
the minimum amount of net FDI is -14.4 and the overall effect of net FDI outflow
on private domestic investment within the context of crowding out and crowding
in remains unexplained. As a result, we suspect that the dependent variable used
by M&U is a poor measure for total private domestic investment. Therefore, we
will experiment with different dependent variables. We will add FDI, and later on
PUBLIC, to the dependent variable of M&U, thereby obtaining again, respectively,
total private foreign controlled and domestic) and total investment (GFCF). This
does not change the expected sign of the estimated coefficients (e.g., a negative sign
on FDI would still indicate crowding out).
The explanatory variables used in the study of M&U (2012) are lagged domestic
private investment (the dependent variable), FDI, growth (GROWTH), public
investment (PUBLIC), and governance. M&U measure governance using data from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (hence the variable name WGI) collected by
Kaufmann et al. (2009). The governance indicators are the following: voice and
accountability (V A), political stability and absence of violence (PS), government
effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), and control of
corruption (CC). M&U do not report results for the effect of government effectiveness
on investment. The WGIs have missing data for the years 1997, 1999, and 2001. But,
as reported in the appendix of M&U, the authors use an unobserved components
model to calculate estimates for the years 1997-2009 using data from 1996-2009. On
the basis of the revised WGIs, the authors construct dummies for each governance
indicator representing whether a country has either high (1) or low (0) governance.
This classification is determined by whether a country scores higher than the 50th
percentile on the governance indicator. The dataset used by M&U consists of 46
countries and a balanced 12 year panel.12 The first section of Table 4.1 provides an
overview of the data used by M&U.
12 The following countries are included in the analysis: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, India, Kenya, Lithuania,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Seychelles, South Africa St.
Lucia, St.Vincent, Thailand, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Table 4.1: Data
Label Variable Construction Source
Section 1
DPI Domestic private investment M&U
PUBLIC Public investment M&U
GROWTH Growth of real output M&U
FDI Net foreign direct investment M&U
WGIs VA, RQ, RL, PS, CC M&U
Section 2
WGI 1st factor of WGIs Factor analysis M&U
PI Private investment DPI + FDI M&U
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation PI + PUBLIC M&U
GFCF* Gross fixed capital formation WDI
GCF Gross capital formation PWT
STOCK Stock of FDI UNCTAD
In order to provide a broader overview of the determinants of investment we
complement the data from M&U with alternative data. First, as explained above,
we construct a measurement for private investment (PI) and for GFCF on the basis
of data from M&U. We add FDI to the measure for private domestic investment to
capture the original measure for ‘private investment’, i.e., PI = DPI + FDI. Then
we add public investment to PI to measure GFCF , i.e., GFCF = DPI + FDI +
PUBLIC. The results of analysis using GFCF are also compared with the results
of analysis using data on GFCF from the World Development Indicators database,
which is also the primary source for M&U.13 We refer to the data on GFCF (as a
percentage of GDP) from the WDI as ‘GFCF ∗’. In addition, we use investment data
from the Penn World Table (PWT 7.1) (Heston et al., 2012). This variable is denoted
GCF .14
The WGIs are broad measures of highly correlated governance indicators,
especially considering the purpose of the study, which does not specify a very precise
notion of governance.15 As an alternative to testing the sensitivity of the effect of
the individual governance indicators on investment, we use the Kaufmann et al.
data which M&U treated using an unobserved components model and construct a
composite governance indicator. In the regression results, this will be denoted as
WGI, whereas the individual variables of which this is made up will be denoted by
their names as introduced above (V A, PS, RQ, RL, CC). WGI is constructed by
estimating the first principal component of the governance indicators used by M&U
prior to the authors’ data conversion to dummies. This approach is similar to that
13 These data have missing observations for Haiti (all years), Belize (2009) and Malawi (2002).
14 GCF is defined as the investment Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita and is measured
on the basis of 2005 constant prices.
15 The WGI of Kaufmann et al. are based on data from 33 sources and 30 institutes. In order to
construct the indicators Kaufmann et al. (2009) aggregate the underlying data giving more weight
to data sources that have a closer correlation based on the premise that this data is more reliable.
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of e.g Faria and Mauro (2009) who calculate a simple average of the governance
indicators.
The principal component is denoted WGIPC, and, as M&U, we construct a
dummy variable that has the value 1 when a given country scores higher than the
50th percentile on WGIPC (in every year). The dummy variable is denoted WGI.
Although not always clearly indicated, the literature uses a wide range of
definitions of foreign direct investment in order to measure the effect of foreign
investment on domestic investment: FDI stock, FDI inflow, and net inflows of FDI.
Furthermore, Ramirez (2011, pp. 39) ‘deflates’ gross FDI inflows by subtracting
repatriation of profits and dividends with the aim to measure the effect of the “net
contribution of FDI to the financing of private capital formation.”We control for the
sensitivity of the definition of FDI by substituting the data on net FDI inflows by
data of the stock of FDI as a ratio to GDP (STOCK). These data are taken from
UNCTAD.16
Replicating and checking robustness of the M&U estimations
We start by replicating the estimations by M&U. Table 4.2 presents the results
without the interaction terms between FDI and the governance variables. Table
4.3 presents the results with the interaction terms. These results are obtained by the
GMM estimation method that is closest to M&U, which suffers from the problems that
we identified above. We have similar findings as M&U, i.e., FDI crowds out domestic
private investment (a negative and highly significant sign on FDI). Moreover, overall,
the coefficients intended to measure the direct effect of governance on domestic
investment are positive, with the exception of CC. In table 4.3, these results are
essentially unchanged, and the coefficients of the interaction terms between FDI and
the governance indicators are also generally significant (with the exception of RL).
The interaction terms for voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and control of
corruption are negative and the coefficients for the interaction term with rule of law
and political stability are positive.
In Table 4.4, we experiment with alternative estimation methods. We drop the
separate governance indicators in order to save space, and substitute them with the
single WGI dummy variable. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.4 present the results of the
GMM analysis that is closest to the method used by M&U (i.e., the same method
as in the previous two tables), but using WGI instead of the individual governance
indicators. Here, we find that both the coefficient of WGI and the coefficient of
the interaction term between WGI and FDI are positive. The coefficient of FDI
is negative. Hence, the results in these two columns are close to the results in the
previous two tables, and in M&U.
The other columns in Table 4.4 investigate how robust these findings are to changes
in the estimation method. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.4 present the analysis using the
alternative system GMM method (GMM*) as outlined in section 4.3. In comparison
16 Following UNCTAD statistics the stock of FDI for the Dominican Republic for 1998 amounts
to a negative accumulation of inflows (the exact level of FDI stock was not reported). We recode
this observation to zero. Observations for Indonesia prior to 2003 include data on the stock of FDI
in Timor-Leste.
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to the results presented in columns 1 and 2, the significance level of the estimations is
lower, although the sign of the estimations does not change (except for the coefficient
of WGI, column 4 which is insignificant). The significance of both lagged dependent
variables decreases and the lagged dependent variable turns insignificant in column
3. Moreover, we no longer find a significant effect of GROWTH, the direct effect of
governance and of the interaction term (the latter only in the equation with the
interaction term). As expected, there is evidence of first-order serial correlation
(AR1) (in column 2 only). However, we find no evidence of second-order serial
correlation (AR2). The p-value of the Hansen test statistic remains insignificant,
although now at more reasonable levels than the 1 in columns 1 and 2. For model 3
and 4, the difference-in-Hansen test statistic, which provides additional information
on the validity of instruments for the endogenous variable sub-group (D-in Hansen
(levels)), yields a test statistic of zero because the model is exactly identified. As a
result, we cannot detect invalid instruments based on this test statistic. Overall, the
difference-in-Hansen test statistics for each of the endogenous variables’ instrument
subset, e.g. D-in Hansen (DPIt−1), indicate no further problems. Even though these
diagnostics look much better than those in columns 1 and 2, we still want to check
how the results hold up if we resort to fixed-effect estimations (despite the weakness
of this method in the estimation of a dynamic model).
The fixed-effect results are displayed in columns 5 and 6 and indicate that FDI
is negatively related to DPI. And, in contrast to the results displayed in columns
3 and 4, both coefficients of WGI are positive. The interaction term (column 6)
is significant and negative. All other explanatory variables are not significant. An
interesting feature of the FE estimations is that the R2 is close to 1. We take this
as potential evidence of spurious correlation due to the definitional issues related
to the dependent variable DPI that were outlined above. The results of the POLS
estimations methods are displayed in columns 7 and 8. On the basis of this method we
find that all explanatory variables are significantly related to DPI, except PUBLIC
in model 7 and 8, GROWTH in model 7, WGI in model 8 and the interaction variable
in model 8.
Robustness analysis with alternative dependent variables
So far, using the dependent variable DPI, we consistently find a negative effect of
net FDI on domestic private investment. In this section, we investigate whether this
result is robust to using other dependent variables. As already stressed before, in
terms of the effect of governance on investment, and either crowding in or crowding
out of domestic investment by FDI, we do not expect that these definitional changes
lead to any different signs of the explanatory variables. The results of the estimations
using PI, GFCF , GFCF ∗, and GCF as the dependent variables are presented in
Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8, respectively.
The conclusion on crowding in or crowding out changes drastically with PI as
the dependent variable (Table 4.5). The coefficient of FDI turns positive, pointing
to crowding in rather than crowding out. This coefficient is significant is the case
in the GMM specification that is most closely to that of M&U (columns 1 and 2)
and with fixed-effects (columns 5 and 6). The results for other variables also change,
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but these are less systematic. We do find that the GMM method of M&U is most
optimistic on the general significance level, and that the other methods together do
not provide strong support for any other variable affecting PI, except GROWTH,
which is significantly positive in GMM, GMM*, and POLS estimations. Following
analysis with fixed-effects WGI is significant and positive and the interaction term is
negative and significant. The p-values of the Hansen test statistics remain implausibly
‘perfect’ for the GMM models reported in columns 1 and 2, and are lower for the
models reported in columns 3 and 4. The p-values of the Hansen test statistic
reported in column 3 and 4 are 0.29 and 0.16 which suggests that the instruments are
appropriately uncorrelated with the errors. However, the difference-in-Hansen test
statistics of the lagged dependent variable instrument subset (D-in Hansen PIt−1)
reported in column 3 and 4 reveal that these instruments are not valid. Likewise, the
difference-in-Hansen test statistics for FDI and FDI WGI are significant.
When using GFCF as the dependent variable (Table 4.6) we find similar results as
with the analysis using PI as the dependent variable, with the exception of PUBLIC.
While the coefficient on this variable was consistently negative before, we now find
a positive and significant coefficient following analysis with FE, POLS, and M&U’s
GMM specification without interaction effect (column 1). GMM analysis including
the interaction terms (column 2 and 4) reveals that the coefficients of PUBLIC are
insignificant and remain negative but their order of magnitude is relatively lower.
This is clearly related to the fact that with GFCF as the dependent variable, we do
not deduct PUBLIC on the left hand side, and hence do not have a downward bias on
the coefficient of this variable on the right hand side of the equation. The coefficient
of FDI is positive and significant in the GMM specification of M&U and with fixed
effects. The other estimations find no significant effect of FDI on this dependent
variable. WGI is positive and significant when using fixed effects and M&U’s GMM
specification (column 1 only). The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and
significant but only when using fixed effect analysis.
Table 4.7 presents the results of the analysis using data on GFCF retrieved from
the WDI, i.e., the dependent variable GFCF ∗. Although this should not make a
real difference (M&U’s source for GFCF is also WDI), it turns out that there is
a clear difference.17 The coefficient of FDI is now positive and significant in all
estimation methods, i.e., we find strong evidence for crowding in with this variable.
Moreover, on the basis of the fixed-effect estimations and POLS estimations displayed
in columns 6 and 8, we find that the variable WGI is positive and significant and the
interaction term between FDI and WGI is negative and significant. Thus, for fixed
effects and POLS, we find that ‘good governance’ encourages investment, but this
holds to a lesser extent for FDI, i.e., the effect of rent seeking on GFCF seems larger
than the effect of technology spillovers. The order of magnitude of the coefficient of
WGI is considerably larger than the coefficient of the interaction term. In model 5
we also find a positive effect of WGI on GFCF ∗ although this coefficient is lower
than the coefficient of WGI in model 6. And, when using POLS and when not
controlling for the interaction between FDI and WGI, we find no direct effect of
17 We need to investigate further how this change may have occurred. Possibly, a revision of the
data in WDI has taken place.
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governance on investment (column 7). Thus, the positive effect of ‘good governance’
may be underestimated when not controlling for the interaction between governance
and foreign investment. The coefficient of WGI of the GMM analysis presented in
columns 1-2 has a negative sign in column 1 and has a positive sign in column 2
which includes the interaction term. Model 2 also suggests that the interaction term
FDI WGI is negatively related to investment. The results of the analysis using
GMM* (columns 3 and 4) only partially confirm these results: the coefficient of
the interaction term is significant and negative but the coefficients of WGI remain
insignificant in these models.
Finally, because of the sensitivity to the exact source of the data on GFCF, we
decided to use another source, i.e., the PWT. This is the dependent variable GCF ,
for which the results are presented in Table 4.8. These results are somewhat similar
to those of the analysis using GFCF ∗ as the dependent variable. On the basis of
all methods we find that FDI crowds in investment. Moreover, following the results
displayed in Table 4.8, when using the dependent variable GCF we find a significant
positive direct effect of ‘good governance’ in models 1, 2, 6 and 8. By comparing model
5 and model 6 (fixed effects) and by comparing model 7 and 8 (POLS) we find that
the relation between WGI and investment only turns significant when controlling
for the interaction term between WGI and FDI. Furthermore, whereas in Table
4.7 the coefficient of the interaction term was always significant and negative, when
using GCF as the dependent variable variable this is no longer the case. We only
find evidence that the interaction term between FDI and WGI is significantly and
negatively related to investment when using M&U’s GMM specification. However,
we suspect that the results of this GMM analysis are biased as a result of instrument
proliferation. The fixed-effect models using GFCF ∗ and GCF yield a R2 that ranges
from 0.62 to 0.67 which is high but no indication of further complications.
The results of GMM* analysis using both GFCF ∗ and GCF as the dependent
variables support the theory on FDI crowding in investment and, in addition, provide
some evidence for the mediating relation between FDI and WGI on investment.
Nevertheless, these models do not suggest that governance matters for investment.
The p-values of the Hansen test statistics for models 3-4 of Table 4.7 are 0.67 and
0.28 suggesting that the instruments are valid. Also none of the difference-in-Hansen
test statistics for the endogenous variables are significant and thereby do not reject
the validity of the additional moment conditions. The p-values of the Hansen test
statistics for models 3-4 of Table 4.8 are reasonable in magnitude and these tests do
not raise suspicion about the validity of instrument subsets. Again, the difference-in-
Hansen test statistics for the levels equation cannot be computed for the GMM*
models (Tables 4.7 and 4.8) because the models are exactly identified. We do
report the difference-in-Hansen test statistics for each of the endogenous variables’
instrument subset. And, some of these tests statistics (D-in Hansen (GFCFt−1)
and D-in Hansen (FDI)) indicate that the instruments are invalid because they are
correlated with the error term.
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Robustness analysis with FDI stocks
Tables 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, present the results using the stock of FDI as a ratio
of GDP as a proxy for the effect of foreign investment on domestic investment. As in
the previous section, we replicate the analysis using the different dependent variables:
DPI, PI, GFCF , GFCF ∗, and GCF .
As before, we conclude that only on the basis of the dependent variable DPI
we can find significant indication of a negative relation between FDI (in this case
represented by STOCK) and a country’s level of investment. For DPI as the
dependent variable (Table 4.9), we find negative and significant signs for STOCK for
all estimation methods except our own preferred GMM specification (columns 3 and
4) and POLS (columns 7 and 8). Also, column 2 in Table 4.11 shows a significant and
negative coefficient of STOCK. The relation between STOCK and the dependent
variables GFCF ∗ and GCF is positive and significant following all methodology
except the results displayed in Table 4.12 column 5, (FE) 7 and 8 (POLS) and the
results displayed in Table 4.13 column 3 and 4 (GMM*) and column 7 and 8 (POLS).
Overall, the choice of a different foreign investment proxy has some effect on
the coefficient of WGI and on the coefficient of the interaction term. Whereas the
coefficient of the interaction term was significant and negative in column 8 Table 4.7
we find that this coefficient is no longer significant in column 8 in Table 4.12 using
GFCF ∗ as the dependent variable. The other results displayed in Tables 4.12 are
similar to those displayed in Table 4.7 and also indicate that the positive effect of
‘good governance’ becomes more apparent when controlling for the mediating effect
between WGI and STOCK. Following Table 4.13, which presents the analysis using
GCF as the dependent variable, both GMM using M&U’s specification and FE finds
a significant and negative coefficient of the interaction term. This result is not found
when using GMM* and POLS estimations.
We maintain that FDI is positively related to investment and that the negative
effect of rent seeking dominates the positive effect of technology spillovers.18 On the
basis of GMM* results we find no clear evidence that ‘good governance’ is positively
related to investment.
The p-values of the Hansen statistics remain high in most models and appear
sensitive to the choice of dependent variable. As before, following the estimations
18 We further test the robustness of these results using a proxy for greenfield investment. This
proxy is constructed using data on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and FDI inflow from the World
Investment Report 2011 (UNCTAD, 2011). A significant amount of observations for (M&A) and
FDI inflow are coded as ‘zero or negligible’. We recode these observations to zero. Both data
on FDI inflow and M&A contain negative values. Subtracting the indicator for M&A from that
of FDI inflow produces additional negative values for our indicator on greenfield investment. The
greenfield data is converted from US dollar amount to a ratio of GDP using data on GDP from
WDI. The greenfield data has missing observations for Comoros, Domenica, Grenada, Namibia, and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Albeit the proxy for greenfield investment may be considered
crude, FE and POLS estimations using this proxy support the conclusions drawn on the basis of
the analysis using FDI and STOCK as explanatory variables. In particular, the regression results
using the dependent variables GFCF ∗ and GCF and ‘greenfield’ instead of the variables STOCK
and FDI are somewhat similar to the results presented in Tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.12, and 4.13. When
using the dependent variables GFCF ∗ and GCF and GMM* estimations we find a positive effect
of ‘greenfield’ on investment but no significant effect of the coefficients of WGI and the interaction
term. This GMM* analysis is fragile as a result of invalid instruments.
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using the GMM* method, the difference-in-Hansen test statistics for the endogenous
variable subset are based on an exactly identified model and as such we cannot assess
the validity of this instrument subsets. Yet, for Table 4.12 columns 3 and 4, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of the difference-in-Hansen test statistics that assess
the validity of the instruments for the endogenous variables separately; this supports
the models. For Table 4.13 columns 3, the difference in Hansen test statistic for the
instrument subset of GROWTH is significant. Because we can not fully exclude the
possibility that the instruments are endogenous we also put some trust in the fixed
effect analysis.
Robustness analysis with rent seeking proxy’s
In this final robustness analysis we construct a measure for rent seeking behaviour. We
relax the assumption that the WGI is a comprehensive set of proxies which describes
‘good governance’ and that, as a result, the WGI can indirectly capture the effect of
rent seeking behaviour. Scholars have used a wide range of measures for rent seeking;
including corruption indexes, trade restrictions, and volatility in public budget.19
With the objective of constructing a more direct measure for rent seeking behaviour
we use perception based indicators from the Global Competitiveness Index (WCI)
which is collected by the (World Economic Forum). The WCI perception data use a
scale from 1-7 where higher values correspond to e.g. an absence of or low concern for
rent seeking. The WCI data allows constructing a short panel for the years 2005-2010
using data for 68 developing countries.20
We measure political elite rent seeking behaviour on the basis of four survey
questions: (1) the diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or groups
due to corruption, (2) favouritism by government officials to well-connected firms and
individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts, (3) the wastefulness (efficiency)
in the composition of public spending in providing necessary goods and services, and
(4) the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy in promoting competition. We construct
a simple average of the above variables and refer to this rent seeking proxy as RENTp
(rent seeking in the public sector). In addition, because rent seeking behaviour is
expected to be more prevalent in countries that lack market competition we construct
a second rent seeking proxy using two survey questions. This second rent seeking
proxy is measured by (1) countries’ degree of intensity of competition in the local
markets and by (2) the extent of domination of corporate activity by few business
groups. As before, we construct an average of these variables and refer to this rent
seeking proxy as RENTm (rent seeking in the private sector). We complement the
19 See Del Rosal, 2011 for a summary on the empirical literature on rent seeking.
20 The following countries are included in the analysis: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Chad, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia,
Guyana, Honduras, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho,
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia,
Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Due to
missing observations this sample excludes some countries that were included in the previous analysis.
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WCI dataset with data on GFCF, net FDI, public investment, and GDP growth from
the World Bank (2012).21
The results using the rent seeking proxy RENTp are displayed in Table 4.14 and
the results using the rent seeking proxy RENTm are displayed in Table 4.15. Columns
1 and 2 present the GMM estimations using our preferred GMM specification with
one modification. Because the number of countries in this sample is relatively larger
we do not limit the number of available lags to be used as instruments. Depending on
the model, the instrument count is 26 or 31. The p-values of the Hansen test statistic
range from 0.26 to 0.64 and as such suggest the instruments are valid. However, the
difference-in-Hansen test statistic which tests the validity of additional instruments
for the levels equation is significant in model 1 and 2 of Table 4.14 and model 1 of
Table 4.15. This test, as well as the other difference-in-Hansen tests indicate that
some of our instruments are not valid. Additionally, the difference-in-Hansen test
statistic for instrument validity of PUBLIC in model 2 of Table 4.15 is significant.
Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 4.14 and 4.15 present FE estimations and columns 5 and
6 present POLS estimations. As before, the p-values of the FE and POLS results are
based on cluster-robust variance estimates.
Following Table 4.14 and Table 4.15 and GMM*, FE, and POLS estimations,
the coefficient of FDI is positive and significant suggesting that FDI positively
contributes to GFCF. The exceptions are the coefficients of FDI following POLS
estimations which are insignificant as is indicated in the columns 5 of both Table 4.14
and 4.15. Furthermore, we find that the choice of rent seeking proxy (RENTp or
RENTm) generate similar results in terms of sign and significance of the variables.
The coefficient of RENTp is positive and significant in column 2,3,4, and 6 and
the coefficient of RENTm is positive and significant in column 1, 2,3,4, and 6. We
conduct a final robustness analysis using the data on 68 countries and a governance
proxy (WGI) using a simple average of the 6 Worldwide Governance Indicators
i.e. including ‘government effectiveness’ (Kaufmann et al., 2009) (see Table 4.16).
These results confirm that on the basis of this sample WGI has a positive and
significant effect on investment but only for GMM* and POLS estimations when
including the interaction term FDI WGI. Hence, both the results using WGI and
the rent seeking proxies show that the direct ‘good governance’/‘rent seeking’ effect
on private investment ‘increases in significance’ when controlling for the interaction
between ‘good governance’/‘rent seeking’ and FDI. Because the coefficients of our
rent seeking proxies behave similar to the coefficients of WGI it is likely that (control
of) rent seeking and ‘good governance’ are related. The coefficients of the interaction
terms FDI RENTp, FDI RENTm, and also FDI WGI are negative and significant
following estimations with GMM*, FE, and POLS and therefore these results provide
additional support for the hypothesis that foreign investors may benefit from rent
seeking behaviour at the expense of domestic market development.
21 PUBLIC = GFCF - GFCF to the private sector.
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4.4 Conclusion
We critically reviewed the results of the empirical macroeconomic literature on the
impact of foreign investment on domestic investment, and the role of institutions
and governance in this relationship. We conclude that the results of estimations
depend both on the exact dependent variable used (proxy for investment) and on
the estimation method. In terms of our preferred methods (properly specified GMM,
or fixed effects) and dependent variables (total GFCF), we find that foreign direct
investment positively influences a country’s overall level of investment. Thus, we
find evidence for crowding in, rather than for crowding out. This result strongly
contradicts that of M&U, which in many ways has been a benchmark for our methods.
Nevertheless, because of the difficulty to separate foreign investment from private
investment using macroeconomic data, we suggest that cross-country analysis on the
basis of microeconomic data could yield more robust evidence describing the influence
of foreign ownership on domestic investment behaviour. Although Koo and Maeng
(2006) do this for Korean firms, to the best of our knowledge no cross-country study
uses micro data to ask whether foreign investment crowds in or crowds out domestic
investment.
We find weak evidence of a positive relation between ‘good governance’ and higher
levels of investment and we find some evidence indicating that the interaction between
foreign investment and governance has a negative mediating effect on investment.
Unlike M&U, we interpret this negative relationship as evidence that foreign investors
have preferential access to industry as a result of elite rent seeking interests. This
negative effect of rent seeking may have serious long-term consequences on domestic
industry development. Because both FDI spillover and rent seeking are possible
determinants of investment behaviour we can not exclude the possibility that the
negative effect of rent seeking on investment may be underestimated, or that the
positive effect of spillovers may be underestimated. Our results suggest that the
negative effect of rent seeking dominates the positive effect of spillovers. In order to
assess the overall costs of rent seeking, or the overall benefits of spillovers, further
research is needed to distinguish the opposing effects of rent seeking and technology
spillovers on investment behaviour. Finally, studying the aggregate effect of rent
seeking and technology spillovers on domestic investment remains challenging because
rent seeking and technology spillovers may only have a positive (negative) impact on
a subset of firms (see also Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). Microeconomic analysis may
help to identify which firms are vulnerable to FDI inflow and/or which firms benefit
from FDI inflow.
This study does not focus on the role of market dynamics in foreign investment
behaviour. Yet, in line with research by Kosova` (2010); Liu (2008); Aitken and
Harrison (1999), we expect that the relations between foreign firm market entry,
competition, productivity, and technology spillovers are dynamic in nature. Cross-
country research based on microeconomic data may provide more insight into the
short-run and long-run impact of foreign investment on domestic investment. In
particular cross-country micro analysis may provide insight on whether positive
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spillover effects in the long-term outweigh possible short run negative effects of foreign
firm entry.
An additional open question is whether policy interventions are successful in
preventing domestic firms from being crowded-out by foreign firm entry. Further
analysis is needed to understand the degree to which policy (at the industry or macro
level) has influenced the relation between foreign investment and domestic investment.
4.5 Appendix 4A
Table 4.2: Replicating M&U (no interaction terms), dependent variable DPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VA PS RQ RL CC
DPIt−1 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.42***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI -0.49*** -0.50*** -0.51*** -0.48*** -0.50*** -0.48***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PUBLIC -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.01
(0.26) (0.21) (0.49) (0.53) (0.38) (0.86)
GROWTH 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
WGIs 1.15*** 0.94*** 1.02*** 0.80*** -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 7.75*** 6.61*** 7.47*** 6.48*** 7.41*** 7.18***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
# of instruments 89 90 90 90 90 90
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.28
p-values in parentheses; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.3: Replicating M&U (with interaction terms), dependent variable DPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VA PS RQ RL CC
DPIt−1 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.38***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI -0.54*** -0.62*** -0.50*** -0.58*** -0.53***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PUBLIC -0.14* -0.16*** -0.08* -0.08+ -0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.07) (0.94)
GROWTH 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
WGIs 1.37*** 0.56*** 1.64*** 1.20*** 0.34
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11)
FDI WGIs -0.06*** 0.07*** -0.13*** 0.00 -0.05**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.83) (0.00)
Constant 8.81*** 9.12*** 7.66*** 8.24*** 7.79***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 552 552 552 552 552
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
# of instruments 91 91 91 91 91
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.29
p-values in parentheses; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
95
Table 4.4: Alternative estimation methods. Dependent variable: DPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
DPIt−1 0.42*** 0.37*** 0.38 0.40+ 0.00 0.00 0.66*** 0.66***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.10) (0.87) (0.88) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI -0.50*** -0.62*** -0.64+ -0.48* -0.99*** -0.98*** -0.41*** -0.47***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PUBLIC 0.06 -0.05 0.48 -0.59 -0.35 -0.35 -0.00 -0.01
(0.42) (0.29) (0.53) (0.34) (0.23) (0.23) (0.95) (0.91)
GROWTH 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.28 0.22 -0.00 -0.00 0.19 0.20+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.15) (0.78) (0.79) (0.10) (0.09)
WGI 1.14*** 0.92*** 1.40 -0.03 0.41* 0.49* 0.97+ 0.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.98) (0.05) (0.03) (0.10) (0.42)
FDI WGI 0.05*** 0.16 -0.02+ 0.11
(0.00) (0.42) (0.10) (0.31)
CONSTANT 6.39*** 8.21*** 5.08 12.51+ 17.07*** 17.08*** 6.08*** 6.26***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.971 0.971 0.780 0.782
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.36 0.50
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (DPIt−1) 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.49
D-in Hansen (FDI) 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.64
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.71
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.28 0.43
D-in Hansen (FDI WGI) 0.47
D-in Hansen (iv) 0.04 0.52
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.08
AR(2) 0.29 0.35 0.50 0.38
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.5: Dependent variable: PI, all estimation methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
PIt−1 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.51+ 0.65*** 0.11* 0.11* 0.94*** 0.94***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.07 0.01+ 0.02* 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.22) (0.09) (0.02) (0.14) (0.31)
PUBLIC -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.00 -0.68+ -0.38 -0.39 -0.02 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.06) (0.20) (0.20) (0.32) (0.31)
GROWTH 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.30** 0.16+ 0.01 0.01 0.07** 0.07**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.37) (0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
WGI 0.09* 0.02 0.97 0.29 0.35+ 0.43* 0.11 0.02
(0.02) (0.46) (0.42) (0.70) (0.06) (0.03) (0.38) (0.88)
FDI WGI 0.02*** -0.02 -0.02+ 0.02
(0.00) (0.87) (0.09) (0.31)
CONSTANT 1.25*** 1.43*** 6.56 9.68* 15.74*** 15.76*** 0.86+ 0.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.17)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.151 0.154 0.939 0.939
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.29 0.16
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (PIt−1) 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.04
D-in Hansen (FDI) 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.09
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.54
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.41 0.26
D-in Hansen (FDI WGI) 0.09
D-in Hansen (iv) 0.66 1.00
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.68 0.69 0.97 0.92
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.6: Dependent variable: GFCF , all estimation methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
GFCFt−1 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.57** 0.71*** 0.10+ 0.10+ 0.94*** 0.94***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.03 0.06 0.01+ 0.02* 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.33) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12) (0.31)
PUBLIC 0.02*** -0.00 0.17 -0.48 0.62* 0.62* 0.06* 0.06*
(0.00) (0.91) (0.87) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
GROWTH 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.26* 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.08** 0.08**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.12) (0.38) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00)
WGI 0.07** -0.01 0.90 0.24 0.34+ 0.42* 0.10 0.02
(0.01) (0.56) (0.40) (0.80) (0.08) (0.04) (0.45) (0.92)
FDI WGI 0.02*** -0.00 -0.02+ 0.02
(0.00) (0.98) (0.08) (0.36)
CONSTANT 1.21*** 1.48*** 7.32 9.35+ 15.19*** 15.20*** 0.27 0.77+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.08)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.217 0.220 0.954 0.954
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.15 0.09
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (GFCFt−1) 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.30
D-in Hansen (FDI) 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.03
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.12 0.27
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.47 0.30
D-in Hansen (FDI WGI) 0.10
D-in Hansen (iv) 1.00 0.89 0.03
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
AR(2) 0.24 0.24 0.94 0.83
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.7: Dependent variable: GFCF∗, all estimation methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
GFCF∗t−1 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.67*** 0.65***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI 0.40*** 0.62*** 0.43** 0.61** 0.39** 0.57*** 0.23* 0.39***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
PUBLIC -0.12** 0.03 -0.54 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.15* 0.18*
(0.01) (0.63) (0.29) (0.95) (0.49) (0.63) (0.04) (0.04)
GROWTH 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.72*** 0.79*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.22**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
WGI -0.59*** 1.46*** 0.12 1.96 1.05+ 2.85*** -0.14 1.23*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.88) (0.11) (0.07) (0.00) (0.70) (0.03)
FDI WGI -0.42*** -0.47+ -0.42*** -0.28**
(0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)
CONSTANT 9.00*** 7.71*** 10.73** 8.04 5.94* 7.75** 3.76** 4.14**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
N 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537
R2 0.622 0.666 0.779 0.795
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.28
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (GFCF∗t−1) 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.13
D-in Hansen (FDI) 1.00 1.00 0.36 0.41
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.11
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.49
D-in Hansen (FDI WGI) 0.25
D-in Hansen (iv) 0.40 1.00
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
AR(2) 0.35 0.87 0.89 0.83
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.8: Dependent variable: GCF , all estimation methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
GCFt−1 0.62*** 0.65*** 0.72*** 0.68*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.78*** 0.78***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI 0.28*** 0.37*** 0.24** 0.22** 0.31*** 0.39** 0.17* 0.24+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05)
PUBLIC 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.14 0.64 0.05 0.02 0.13+ 0.14+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.23) (0.82) (0.93) (0.06) (0.07)
GROWTH 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.17 0.31** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.30** 0.29**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
WGI 0.60*** 1.57*** 0.60 1.09 0.64 1.49** 0.45 1.09+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.19) (0.34) (0.01) (0.30) (0.06)
FDI WGI -0.20*** -0.10 -0.20 -0.13
(0.00) (0.38) (0.13) (0.26)
CONSTANT 3.78*** 3.38*** 1.28 -1.00 6.53** 6.64** 0.47 0.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.73) (0.73) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.76)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.634 0.643 0.828 0.830
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.21
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (GCFt−1) 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.05
D-in Hansen (FDI) 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.04
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.33
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.30
D-in Hansen (FDI WGI) 0.43
D-in Hansen (iv) 0.04 1.00
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
AR(2) 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.22
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.9: Dependent variable: DPI, all estimation methods, stock FDI variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
DPIt−1 0.69*** 0.68*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.79*** 0.79***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
STOCK -0.01*** -0.05*** 0.06 0.08 -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.35)
PUBLIC -0.38*** -0.40*** -0.09 -0.34 -0.56 -0.48 -0.11+ -0.11+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.94) (0.41) (0.10) (0.19) (0.05) (0.06)
GROWTH 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.39+ 0.40* 0.02 0.02 0.18* 0.18+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.04) (0.83) (0.82) (0.04) (0.06)
WGI -0.36 -1.55*** -1.16 -0.81 -0.55 -2.26 -0.16 -0.38
(0.17) (0.00) (0.23) (0.61) (0.37) (0.14) (0.65) (0.43)
STOCK WGI 0.05*** -0.02 0.06 0.01
(0.00) (0.80) (0.22) (0.58)
CONSTANT 6.22*** 7.44*** -0.52 0.63 16.14*** 16.69*** 1.59 1.75
(0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.90) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.22)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.450 0.459 0.693 0.693
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.94
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (DPIt−1) 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.89
D-in Hansen (STOCK) 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.94
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.74
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.73
D-in Hansen (STOCK WGI) 0.95
D-in Hansen (iv) 1.00 1.00
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.31
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.10: Dependent variable: PI, all estimation methods, stock FDI variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
PIt−1 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.49** 0.49** 0.11* 0.11* 0.94*** 0.94***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
STOCK 0.00*** -0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.00+ 0.00
(0.00) (0.52) (0.21) (0.18) (0.94) (0.71) (0.07) (0.91)
PUBLIC -0.07*** -0.05** -0.51 -0.68* -0.38 -0.38 -0.03 -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.03) (0.20) (0.20) (0.28) (0.29)
GROWTH 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.21 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.07** 0.07**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.10) (0.52) (0.51) (0.01) (0.01)
WGI 0.07 -0.13 0.51 0.23 0.35+ 0.32 0.08 -0.05
(0.14) (0.11) (0.57) (0.80) (0.07) (0.11) (0.52) (0.76)
STOCK WGI 0.01*** 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.78) (0.74) (0.23)
CONSTANT 1.42*** 1.41*** 9.73** 10.53*** 15.77*** 15.77*** 0.87* 0.94*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.147 0.148 0.939 0.939
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.63
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (PIt−1) 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.67
D-in Hansen (STOCK) 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.21
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.82
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.42
D-in Hansen (STOCK WGI) 0.49
D-in Hansen (iv) 1.00 1.00
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
AR(2) 0.69 0.70 0.86 0.82
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.11: Dependent variable: GFCF , all estimation methods, stock FDI variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
GFCFt−1 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.55** 0.52** 0.10* 0.10* 0.93*** 0.93***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
STOCK 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.05 0.05+ -0.00 -0.00 0.00* -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.07) (0.97) (0.64) (0.05) (0.86)
PUBLIC 0.03*** 0.02 -0.69 -0.46 0.62* 0.62* 0.06* 0.06*
(0.00) (0.25) (0.44) (0.23) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
GROWTH 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.36 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.08** 0.08**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.10) (0.54) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00)
WGI 0.08* -0.19*** -0.11 0.60 0.34+ 0.32 0.08 -0.07
(0.01) (0.00) (0.94) (0.62) (0.08) (0.11) (0.56) (0.66)
STOCK WGI 0.01*** -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.75) (0.75) (0.12)
CONSTANT 1.30*** 1.39*** 12.35** 11.20*** 15.21*** 15.21*** 0.30 0.38
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.27)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.214 0.214 0.954 0.954
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.71
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (GFCFt−1) 1.00 1.00 0.77 0.65
D-in Hansen (STOCK) 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.56
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.44
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.95
D-in Hansen (STOCK WGI) 0.75
D-in Hansen (iv) 1.00 1.00
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
AR(2) 0.24 0.25 0.60 0.68
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.12: Dependent variable: GFCF ∗, all estimation methods, stock FDI variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
GFCF∗t−1 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.68* 0.56** 0.56*** 0.49*** 0.74*** 0.72***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
STOCK 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.06+ 0.21* 0.05 0.13* 0.01 0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.34) (0.27)
PUBLIC -0.12* -0.05 -0.84 -1.43* 0.20 0.09 0.18** 0.18**
(0.02) (0.39) (0.56) (0.02) (0.47) (0.72) (0.00) (0.00)
GROWTH 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.97** 1.03*** 0.22** 0.22** 0.21** 0.21*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
WGI -0.14+ 2.27*** -0.38 2.71 1.33* 4.51** 0.34 1.06
(0.10) (0.00) (0.73) (0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28) (0.13)
STOCK WGI -0.08*** -0.14+ -0.11* -0.02
(0.00) (0.09) (0.03) (0.31)
CONSTANT 5.08*** 3.58*** 9.30 12.95* 5.46** 6.26** 2.93** 2.64**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537
R2 0.501 0.533 0.743 0.746
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.53
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (GFCF∗t−1) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.37
D-in Hansen (STOCK) 1.00 1.00 0.39 0.67
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.46
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.85
D-in Hansen (STOCK WGI) 0.70
D-in Hansen (iv) 1.00 1.00
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02
AR(2) 0.33 0.33 0.60 0.62
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.13: Dependent variable: GCF , all estimation methods, stock FDI variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GMM GMM GMM* GMM* FE FE POLS POLS
GCFt−1 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.73*** 0.77*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.80*** 0.80***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
STOCK 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.08 0.12 0.04+ 0.08* 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.33) (0.05) (0.02) (0.32) (0.54)
PUBLIC 0.37*** 0.29*** -1.47 -1.04 0.07 0.01 0.16* 0.16*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.12) (0.74) (0.95) (0.01) (0.01)
GROWTH 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.78 0.47 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
WGI 0.65*** 1.32*** -0.93 1.58 0.91 2.44** 0.75* 0.75
(0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.55) (0.13) (0.01) (0.04) (0.12)
STOCK WGI -0.02*** -0.08 -0.06+ 0.00
(0.00) (0.41) (0.09) (1.00)
CONSTANT 0.33 0.37 10.78 6.53 4.93* 6.56*** 0.09 0.09
(0.60) (0.49) (0.29) (0.25) (0.02) (0.00) (0.90) (0.90)
N 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.562 0.569 0.815 0.815
Hansen J 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.38
D-in Hansen (levels) 1.00 1.00
D-in Hansen (GCFt−1) 1.00 1.00 0.31 0.22
D-in Hansen (STOCK) 1.00 1.00 0.23 0.53
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.22
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.87
D-in Hansen (STOCK WGI) 0.67
D-in Hansen (iv) 1.00 1.00
# of instruments 90 91 21 23
# of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
AR(2) 0.18 0.18 0.34 0.30
p-values in parentheses; models 3-8 contain year dummies; AR(1), AR(2), and Hansen J test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.14: Dependent variable: GFCF ∗
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GMM** GMM** FE FE POLS POLS
GFCFt−1 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.80*** 0.79***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI 0.33* 2.47** 0.15+ 1.01* 0.09 0.86***
(0.03) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.22) (0.00)
PUBLIC 0.05 0.13 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.13** 0.14**
(0.78) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
GROWTH 0.13 0.21+ 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.10 0.08
(0.36) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.40)
Rentp 0.37 2.53** 1.35+ 2.73*** -0.06 1.11**
(0.48) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00)
FDI RENTp -0.64** -0.28* -0.24***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
CONSTANT 6.17** -1.68 3.39 -0.78 3.41** 0.12
(0.00) (0.68) (0.16) (0.74) (0.00) (0.91)
N 318 318 318 318 318 318
R2 0.544 0.575 0.789 0.804
Hansen J 0.26 0.47
D-in Hansen (levels) 0.07 0.08
D-in Hansen (GFCFt−1) 0.02 0.02
D-in Hansen (FDI) 0.90 0.16
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 0.68 0.86
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 0.04 0.04
D-in Hansen (FDI RENTp) 0.17
D-in Hansen (iv) 0.34 0.68
# of instruments 26 31
# of countries 68 68 68 68 68 68
AR(1) 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.21 0.34
p-values in parentheses; all models contain year dummies;
AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J, and difference-in-Hansen test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.15: Dependent variable: GFCF ∗
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GMM** GMM** FE FE POLS POLS
GFCFt−1 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.79*** 0.78***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI 0.34* 2.26* 0.15+ 1.42** 0.09 1.02**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00)
PUBLIC 0.09 0.15 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.14** 0.14**
(0.54) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GROWTH 0.11 0.16 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.09 0.10
(0.35) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.29)
RENTm 1.07+ 2.50** 2.32** 4.12*** 0.41 1.40**
(0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.29) (0.01)
FDI RENTm -0.48+ -0.33** -0.24**
(0.06) (0.01) (0.00)
CONSTANT 3.02 -3.71 -1.18 -8.02* 1.76 -2.03
(0.23) (0.41) (0.69) (0.02) (0.22) (0.25)
N 318 318 318 318 318 318
R2 0.557 0.588 0.790 0.799
Hansen J 0.30 0.64
D-in Hansen (levels) 0.09 0.16
D-in Hansen (GFCFt−1) 0.02 0.10
D-in Hansen (FDI) 0.81 0.94
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 0.67 0.71
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 0.05 0.08
D-in Hansen (FDI RENTm) 0.92
D-in Hansen (iv) 0.32 0.34
# of instruments 26 31
# of countries 68 68 68 68 68 68
AR(1) 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.22 0.26
p-values in parentheses; all models contain year dummies;
AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J, and difference-in-Hansen test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.16: Dependent variable: GFCF ∗
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GMM** GMM** FE FE POLS POLS
GFCFt−1 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.79*** 0.78***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDI 0.34* 0.24** 0.15+ 0.06 0.08 0.04
(0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.33) (0.27) (0.54)
PUBLIC 0.06 0.18 0.63*** 0.67*** 0.14** 0.14**
(0.70) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GROWTH 0.12 0.25** 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.10 0.11
(0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.22)
WGI 0.48 2.46*** 1.29 2.06 0.43 1.22*
(0.43) (0.00) (0.58) (0.34) (0.23) (0.03)
FDI WGI -0.54*** -0.33** -0.21+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
CONSTANT 7.25** 6.33* 7.65*** 8.14*** 3.55*** 3.84***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 318 318 318 318 318 318
R2 0.536 0.568 0.790 0.797
Hansen J 0.23 0.50
D-in Hansen (levels) 0.06 0.17
D-in Hansen (GFCFt−1) 0.01 0.47
D-in Hansen (FDI) 0.80 0.44
D-in Hansen (GROWTH) 0.64 0.79
D-in Hansen (PUBLIC) 0.04 0.20
D-in Hansen (FDI WGI) 0.66
D-in Hansen (iv) 0.24 0.40
# of instruments 26 31
# of countries 68 68 68 68 68 68
AR(1) 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.21 0.37
p-values in parentheses; all models contain year dummies;
AR(1), AR(2), Hansen J, and difference-in-Hansen test statistics report the respective p-values
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Chapter 5
Determinants of Firms’ Investment
Behaviour: a multilevel approach
114
5.1 Introduction
Investors’ confidence in making a profit is fundamentally important to economic
success and long-term development. There is a large literature that investigates the
role of risk in determining investors’ willingness to invest and both the empirical
literature as well as theory concludes that uncertainty over future revenues influences
investment behaviour. Investment in fixed capital is particularly costly when
investment is highly irreversible, i.e. when investors are limited in their possibility to
resell such capital goods because of the firm-specific nature of investment or lacking
second-hand markets for capital (Pindyck, 1991). As a result of high irreversibility of
investment, uncertainty causes firms to delay investment (e.g. see Pattillo, 1998).
This study contributes to the literature by empirically exploring the extent to
which systemic uncertainties, e.g. related to countries’ institutional and political
environment, as well as other macroeconomic factors have an impact on firms’
investment behaviour. An extensive macroeconomic literature suggests a strong
relation between institutions and political stability and investment (e.g. Everhart
et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Mauro, 1995). We assess the relative
impact of these and other macroeconomic factors on both the likelihood of investment
and on firms’ investment to sales ratio.
In addition, this study aims at contributing to the literature by investigating
the extent to which private sector investment is influenced by firm-specific factors.
We primarily focus on determining the degree to which there may be advantages
associated with foreign equity ownership. If foreign investors have better access to
finance, attracting foreign investors (i.e. in terms of equity ownership shares) can
be an important source for the accumulation of capital. Yet, because cross-country
microeconomic studies of the effect of foreign equity ownership on investment are
scarce, there is no or limited evidence that provides an understanding of the extent
to which firms with foreign ownership invest relatively more or relatively less. On
the one hand, foreign equity ownership may decrease financing constraints and risks
associated with investment and hence, foreign ownership may be related to relatively
high investment in fixed capital. On the other hand, foreign investors may operate
relatively more intensely in industries that require less long-term commitments.1 And,
if this hypothesis holds, we expect to see a negative relation between foreign ownership
and investment. Additionally, we investigate whether there is a mediating effect of
institutions on the relationship between foreign ownership and investment. Again, we
assess both the determinants of the likelihood of investment and the determinants of
firms’ investment to sales ratio. We expect that countries with stronger protection of
property rights and control of corruption are better able to attract foreign equity.
Whilst on the basis of macroeconomic studies, it is difficult to empirically separate
foreign investment from domestic investment (e.g. see Agosin and Machado, 2005 and
Chapter 4), the microeconomic literature has been more successful in determining
the relative benefit of foreign capital investment over investment under national
1 One possibility is that foreign investors are relatively more dominantly active in or alongside
extractive industries and/or high growth industries which require large initial investments but are less
capital intensive over time. This hypothesis is merely tentative and more industry specific expertise
is required to outline the dynamics of foreign investors’ behaviour.
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control. For example, Koo and Maeng (2006) finds that Korean firms with high
foreign ownership have relatively higher investment levels because foreign ownership
decreases cash-flow sensitivity.2 We are unaware of previous studies on the effect of
foreign ownership on investment in a cross-country (firm-level) setting. Yet, several
scholars do find a positive effect of foreign equity ownership on firms’ performance,
(Goedhuys and Srholec, 2010; Aitken and Harrison, 1999) and on firms’ innovative
behaviour (Srholec, 2010).
If firms’ behaviour is influenced by the countries’ institutional-policy mix, and
is also determined by firm specific characteristics, to what extent is the investment
level of a firm determined by a country’s institutional environment? Furthermore,
under what conditions is an increase in private sector investment associated with
foreign equity ownership and other firm specificities? In order to reconcile evidence
from the microeconomic investment literature with evidence from the macroeconomic
investment literature, this study aims to unbundle firm-level and macroeconomic
determinants of investment behaviour. We use a multilevel model to take into account
both the firm-level and macroeconomic variation. To the best of our knowledge, this
research is the first to use investment data from a large sample of developing countries
for this purpose.
In conformity with previous studies on investment in developing countries, we
find a high incidence of non-investment. As such, we resort to examine both the
determinants of a firm’s decision to invest and the determinants of a firm’s investment
to sales ratio in a multilevel context. On the basis of 101 countries and data for
45,580 firms and a probit model we find no clear evidence of a (positive or negative)
relationship between foreign ownership and a firms’ decision to invest. However, a
negative relation between foreign equity ownership and investment becomes clearly
visible following the results of a Heckman outcome model that examines the
determinants of a firm’s investment to sales ratio. A predictor of country-specific
effects is used to determine the effect of a country’s overall macroeconomic context on
investment behaviour. Our analysis indicates a significant but relatively small impact
of a country’s overall macroeconomic context on investment (i.e. the likelihood of
investment and the investment to sales ratio). This finding highlights that firms are
heterogeneous in nature and are relatively unconstrained, in terms of investment,
by a country’s macroeconomic context. We find a significant effect of some macro-
level variables on investment. For example, the likelihood of investment is higher in
countries with relatively stronger property rights protection and control of corruption.
Additionally we find a positive mediating effect of property rights protection and
control of corruption on the relation between foreign ownership and investment.
5.2 Literature Review
In this study we aim to assess specific micro and macro determinants of investment.
We focus on establishing the effect of foreign equity ownership and of institutions
2 Koo and Maeng (2006) use GMM and firm data from 1992-2002. Investment is measured as
the ratio of capital expenditure at the beginning of each year over the capital stock at the beginning
of each year.
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on firms’ investment behaviour. These factors contribute to explaining a firm’s
degree of investment related uncertainty to the extent that foreign equity ownership
and e.g. property rights protection may help reduce investment related risk. The
relation between investment and uncertainty is described in real option theory. Real
options investment theory generally predicts a negative relation between investment
and uncertainty because high uncertainty is associated with high risk and therefore
uncertainty causes investors to reduce investment in fixed capital (Pindyck, 1991).
Especially when investment is highly irreversible, uncertainty can cause firms to delay
investment. Overall, real options theory outlines a micro-mechanism by means of
which different factors that influence uncertainty are related to investment.
Aside from foreign equity ownership and institutions, there are several other
factors that influence the investment uncertainty relation: e.g. risk attitudes (Nickell,
1978), competition, financing constraints, and other macroeconomic factors. And,
some of these other factors may set-off a positive relation between investment and
uncertainty. Likewise on the basis of real options theory, Hartman (1972) argues
that investment increases with the marginal revenue product of capital. And, Abel
et al. (1996, pp 754) argue that “the future acquisition price of capital may be higher
than its current acquisition price” and thereby, under uncertainty, firms may be more
limited in their possibility to expand investment in the future. Several studies aim
at determining the overall effect of uncertainty on investment or seek to establish
the effect of macro-level uncertainties on investment. First, we proceed by providing
a brief overview of the micro literature on investment and uncertainty. Second, we
provide an overview of the macro literature that emphasizes the importance of the
development of institutions for investment.
Empirical evidence on the effect of uncertainty on investment is inconclusive on
the direction of this relationship but largely suggests that the negative investment
uncertainty relation dominates the positive investment uncertainty relation (e.g. Fuss
and Vermeulen, 2008; Lensink et al., 2005; Green et al., 2001; Guiso and Parigi, 1999
and see also the literature review by Carruth et al., 2000 and meta-analysis by Koetse
et al., 2009). In particular, most evidence on the investment uncertainty relationship
in developing countries suggests that uncertainty (as well as irreversibility) has a
negative effect on investment. Here, researchers follow two distinct approaches.
On the one hand, researchers measure uncertainty using micro data; for instance
Ninh et al. (2004), Darku (2000), and Pattillo (1998) proxy uncertainty using firms’
expectations of future sales, supply, and/or sales growth and Leefmans (2011),
Shiferaw (2009), and Bo and Zhang (2002) measure uncertainty using data on firms’
volatility of supply and/or demand and/or labour costs. On the other hand, Kumo
(2006), Aizenman and Marion (1999), Serven (1998), and Serven and Solimano (1993)
conduct a macroeconomic study where uncertainty measurements include volatility
of GDP growth, volatility of real effective exchange rate, term of trade volatility,
inflation.3 Alternatively, Bigsten et al. (2005) find evidence for irreversibility by
studying the dynamics of investment behaviour. Using investment data on African
3 Contrary to evidence on a negative uncertainty investment relation are the findings by Abdul-
Haque and Shaoping (2008) who measure uncertainty using data about Chinese stock market return
volatility and find that uncertainty positively effects investment.
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manufacturing firms, Bigsten et al. (2005, pp. 22) show that “firms refrain from
investing during extended periods of time, rarely sell off capital stock, and adjust
slowly to a new long-run equilibrium”.
In addition to firm-specific sources of risk, it is likely that a country’s institutional
and political environment also influences investment behaviour. The role of
macroeconomic factors in influencing firm-level investment behaviour has already
been discussed in the work of Bernanke (1983). Examples of macroeconomic factors
that drive investment include shocks from property markets, agriculture, trade,
and monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy (Bernanke, 1983). Several studies use
microeconomic data to capture the effect of firm idiosyncratic factors on investment
behaviour but do not specifically distinguish between idiosyncratic and systemic
factors of uncertainty. Such studies rely on controlling for macroeconomic effects
by means of time dummies and fixed effects in panel data analysis (for instance the
work of Fuss and Vermeulen, 2008). Otherwise, firm-level studies on investment are
limited to a cross-section analysis of a given country. For example, Darku (2000)
studies firm investment behaviour using a cross-section of firms located in Uganda
and interprets the negative uncertainty investment relation as partly stemming from
investors’ perceptions on macroeconomic policy i.e. privatization, trade liberalization,
taxation, and interest rates.
Aside from macroeconomic factors, a country’s institutional environment can
arguably play an important role in determining firms’ competitiveness and return to
investment and can potentially act as a major growth driver influencing investment,
R&D, innovation, and new business take-off. In developing countries where
institutions are weak and/or failing, investment risk is higher. If ‘bad’ institutions
are a source of uncertainty, a weak institutional development will negatively influence
firms’ choice to invest and possibly also firms’ investment level. In fact, the
macroeconomic literature concludes that favourable institutions and political stability
are positively related to a country’s level of (foreign and domestic) investment
(Everhart et al., 2009; Daude and Stein, 2007; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Mauro,
1995).
There are few attempts in the literature to investigate the impact of (cross-
country) institutional factors on domestic investment on the basis of firm-level data.
Asiedu and Freeman (2009); Batra et al. (2003); Gaviria (2002) find a negative effect
of corruption on firm-level investment growth. However, because the authors measure
investment growth as the percentage of growth of investment over a three year period
the data does not capture the underlying structure of investment, i.e. frequent non-
investment, low investment levels, as well as lumpy investments.
Literature on firm-level evidence on the relation between institutions and foreign
direct investment yields more robust evidence on investment behaviour (Ayca;
Javorcik and Wei, 2009; Kinda, 2010; Kesternich and Schnitzer, 2010; Henisz, 2000;
James R. Hines, 1995). One interesting study in this respect is the cross-country
study of Javorcik and Wei (2009), who specifically focus on the relation between
corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the authors’ theory,
FDI and ownership structure is influenced by corruption because corruption increases
the cost of obtaining licenses and permits. Javorcik and Wei (2009) also find that
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joint ventures can decrease transaction costs associated with corruption. The study
of Kinda (2010) likewise uses cross-country firm data and finds a negative relation
between some ‘institutional problems’ (e.g. firms’ perception on crime) and FDI.
5.3 Data
Micro Data
This study is primarily based on firm data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys
(ES).4 The firms included in the analysis are surveyed in the years 2006-2011 on the
basis of a comparable data collection method over countries. This ES data collection is
based on stratified random sampling with replacement where the strata are firm size,
geographic region, and sector; stratification reflects the non-agricultural economic
structure of each country.5 Our analysis (and overall the ES data) excludes firms
with 100% public ownership and firms operating in the following sectors: utilities,
financial intermediation, real estate, and renting activities. The number of regions
where surveys are conducted differs across countries. A relatively larger number of
surveys are conducted in regions and economies that are larger in size and have a
relatively high income level. Overall, firm size is stratified according to the number of
permanent employees: small (5-19 employees), medium (20-99 employees), and large
(100 or more employees).
Our dataset consists of 45,480 firms, 121 surveys, and data for 101 developing
and emerging economies (20 countries are surveyed twice). Table 5.7 in Appendix
A lists the countries considered in the analysis. By country, we also list the (fiscal)
year(s), the total number of firms and the number of firms that invest, the number
of firms defined as foreign owned, and the number of firms categorized by sector and
by firm size. Overall, the sample consists of a reasonable number of observations
given the limited availability of firm-level data that is fit for comparing developing
countries. Nevertheless, because the samples are relatively small we remain mindful
that the country samples are merely approximations for investment behaviour of each
respective economy. As a result of item non-response, miss-codifications and sampling
errors a total of 14,759 firms are excluded from the analysis.
Investment data collected in the surveys measure the total annual expenditure for
purchases of equipment and machinery during a given fiscal year. The definitions of
the firm-level variables are indicated in Table 5.8 in Appendix A. We code firms to
have zero investment whenever a firm indicated that it did not invest in fixed assets in
the last fiscal year and data on the amount of investment is also missing.6 Whenever
4 The data used in this study are collected from the ES ‘comprehensive’ dataset that combines
various country survey data sets.
5 The ES contain sampling weights but these weights were not used in the analysis mainly because
some of the weights are extreme, causing single observations to impact results.
6 From the sample of firms used in this study, 161 firms reported to not have invested but in
fact did report a positive level of investment. Another 232 firms reported to have invested (in either
machinery and equipment or land and buildings) but did not report the amount of investment
in machinery and equipment and neither invested in land and buildings. We expect that this
(possible) bias does not affect estimations because of the relative small number of occurrences. For
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investment is larger than zero, our dependent variable (Investment) is equal to the
natural logarithm of the investment to sales ratio and hence excludes all observations
with zero investment. As shown in the first histogram of Figure 5.3 in Appendix A,
Investment has a log-normal distribution. Alternative measures for firms’ investment
level used in the literature are the natural logarithm of investment, investment as a
ratio of the capital stock, and capital as a ratio of labour. Because of ES data
limitations we prefer the measure of investment to sales over the later two alternative
measures and prefer our scaled measure of investment over the non-scaled measure.
The dependent variable (i.e. investment and sales data) is the biggest culprit of item
non-response and causes the exclusion of 8,707 observations. Still, overall, we expect
that the item non-response follows a random process and does not inflict serious bias.
In agreement with the findings of Gebreeyesus (2009) and Bigsten et al. (2005) on
investment in Africa, a significant share of firms in our sample of developing countries
invest close to zero or do not invest. The total number of firms that do not invest is
21,829; 52% of the firms in our sample invest. The average percentage of firms located
in Africa that invest is 45%. This percentage is lower than the average percentage of
firms that invest in Latin and Central America which is 56% and in Eastern Europe
which is 60%. This pattern of non-investment is different from that documented by
Lensink et al. (2005) who use a sample of firms located in the Netherlands, out of
which about 87% have positive investment. In order to capture a firm’s decision to
invest we construct a binary dependent variable ‘Invest’. This variable is equal to 1
whenever a firm invests and otherwise is equal to 0.
As already mentioned, many firms in our sample invest close to zero. When
only taking into account the firms that invest, the median level of investment—
measured as the investment to sales ratio—is 3%. Overall, this suggests that firms
frequently postpone investment, possibly because investment is largely irreversible.
The distribution of investment as a ratio of sales is plotted in the second histogram
of Figure 5.3 in Appendix A. To improve data visualization, a ceiling is placed on
values where the investment to sales ratio is higher than 1. Still, it is clear that
the distribution is positively skewed and has a long right-tail. Mainly because this
distribution has such a strong degree of skewness we prefer to measure investment as
the natural logarithm of the investment to sales ratio.
We measure the effect of foreign ownership using dummy variables. Because
the effect of partial foreign ownership on investment may be different from that of
completely foreign equity ownership on investment we experiment with a dummy
which is equal to 1 if a firm has any level of foreign equity ownership but not a
100% ownership share (P Foreign, 2,739 firms). And, we construct a dummy which
captures the effect of whether a firm has a 100% share of foreign equity ownership
(Foreign100, 3,028 firms).7
We control for the effect of labour costs (wages, salaries, and bonuses) as a ratio
of sales revenue (Labour) and for the effect of a firm’s age (Age).8 Moreover, on
methodological reasons, countries (i.e. surveys) where none of the firms have positive investment are
not included in our sample. Also, the surveys for Nigeria-2007, Venezuela-2006, and Pakistan-2007
are not considered in the analysis because of missing variables.
7 The distribution of foreign equity shares is illustrated in Figure 5.4 in Appendix A.
8 Labour = ln(labour costs) - ln(sales); Age = ln(year in which the surveys were sampled - year of
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the one hand, we expect that the propensity of investment in fixed assets (including
investment in replacement equipment and machinery) is relatively higher for large
firms than for small firms. Large firms have a greater production capacity and are
more able to redistribute the cost of capital and adjustment costs over time. On the
other hand, we expect that the relative fixed cost of investment is higher for smaller
firms than for larger firms, for example because of scale effects. Therefore, in a given
year, we expect that on average smaller firms invest less in fixed assets than larger
firms. As a proxy for size we use the logarithm of the number of permanent full-time
employees (Size). Observations are excluded when the number of full-time permanent
employees of the firm is less than five.9 Additionally, we control for the effect of firms’
access to foreign markets using the variable Export. Export is a binary variable that
is equal to 1 when a least part of a firms’ sales are exported and that is equal to 0
when all the establishments’ sales are national.
The Enterprise Surveys are based on a range of difference industry classifications.
We adopt the following industry classification: (1) leather, garments and textiles,
(2) food, (3), metals and machinery, (4) chemicals and pharmaceuticals, (5)
other manufacturing, (6) retail and wholesale trade, (7) hotels, restaurants and
other services, and (8) construction and transportation and include these sector
classifications as additional dummy variables in the analysis.
Finally, three variables are used as controls for a firm’s decision to invest and
as selection variables required for the analysis on firms’ investment to sales ratio.
These variables measure the perception of a given firm/entrepreneur on obstacles
that could inhibit investment: access to land (Land), access to finance (Finance),
and informal sector competitors (Competitor). We expect that entrepreneurs that are
interested in investing are relatively more concerned with obstacles related to finance,
acquiring land and competitors. We recode these variables as dummy variables where
0 represents no obstacles, minor obstacles, or that the obstacle is not applicable to
the firm. And, the variables are coded 1 whenever a firm indicated the obstacles are
moderate, major, or very severe.
Macro Data
Why do firms invest less or less frequent in, for example, Angola than in Brazil? Why
do some countries attract more foreign equity than other countries do? In an attempt
to explain some of this cross-country variation in investment we explore the impact
of macro determinants on investment. We control for real GDP per capita (GDP ) in
constant prices, and growth measured as the logarithmic change in GDP with respect
to the previous year (Growth) from Heston et al. (2012) (chain series). Moreover,
we control for a country’s degree of de jure financial openness (Kaopen) using data
collected by Chinn and Ito (2008) (updated to 2010) and de facto trade openness
establishment + 1). A small number of firms were established in the year the survey was conducted.
9 As a result of stratification difficulties, the variable used to stratify firms according to size does
not always correspond to the number of full-time permanent employees reported on the basis of the
survey analysis. We only exclude observations that are outside our sample population of interest.
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(Openness) using data from Heston et al. (2012). In addition, we control for the
percentage of real interest rates (Interest) using data from World Bank (2012).10
A country’s institutional development is measured using two proxies. First,
property rights protection (Property) is measured using data from the Heritage
Foundation (2013).11 Second, data from Transparency International (2011) is used
to measure control of corruption (CPI).12 In agreement with the macroeconomic
literature on institutions, we expect that investment is positively related to property
rights protection and control of corruption. We additionally use a proxy for political
stability from Marshall and Jaggers (2009) (Polity) in the regression analysis. Polity2
measures the degree to which the political economy of a country approximates either
a democratic or an autocratic regime. Higher values of Polity2 correspond to more
democracy. Because property rights, corruption and political economy are closely
related we do include these variables in the same regression model.
Because of missing data the analysis with macro data excludes data on the
following countries: Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan,
Kosovo, Mali, Montenegro, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Timor Leste, Togo, Turkey,
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, and Zimbabwe. Analysis using Property additionally excludes
data on Iraq. Analysis using CPI additionally excludes data on Samoa and
Micronesia, and analysis using the Polity2 data additionally excludes data on the
following countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Micronesia, Samoa, Tonga, and
Trinidad and Tobago. Unless indicated otherwise, the micro data are matched with
the macro data on the basis of the last complete fiscal year in which investment and
sales data are recorded - 1.13 As such, we assume that (on average) when deciding
whether and how much to invest firms are sensitive to country-level signals from the
preceding year.
5.4 Method
At this point, it is unrealistic to assume that a firm’s observed investment is
independent of country effects given our observed covariates. In particular, we wish
to relax the assumption that the effect of foreign ownership on investment is the same
across countries. On the basis of a random-intercept model we account for the nested
structure of our dataset and identify the extent to which firms’ behaviour is influenced
by both firms’ specificities as well as by the macroeconomic and institutional structure
10 To avoid the exclusion of several firms from the analysis we replacing missing data on interest
rates in 2009 for Ecuador with data from 2006. And, we replace missing data on interest rates in
2010 for Ethiopia with data from 2008.
11 To avoid excluding several countries because of missing data on property rights, we replace
data on property rights from 2009 for the missing observations of the following counties: Bhutan,
Micronesia, Tonga, and Samoa. Additionally, we use data from 2006 to replace missing data for
Angola (2005 only) and Burundi.
12 To avoid excluding several countries as a result of missing observations, we replace Transparency
International (2011) data from 2005 or 2006 for the missing CPI data for 2005 for Burundi,
Mauritania, Rwanda, and Swaziland. Also, we use data from 2005 for the missing CPI data for
2008 for Fiji.
13 The last complete fiscal year of a firm is either one or two years prior to the data collection.
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of a firms’ country. The random-intercept model can also be referred to as a multilevel
model, a hierarchical model, or as a mixed effects model.14 The advantage of a
multilevel modelling approach is that we can estimate the degree of dependency of a
firm on a given country context. Also, the standard errors of multilevel models are
more accurate than those of a single-level model because they are dependent on the
number of countries on the basis of which we identify the country effects and they
are not dependent on the number of firms. A random-intercept model with level-one
(micro) and level-two (macro) covariates is given in equation 5.1.
y∗ij = β1 + β
′
2x1ij + β
′
3x2j + εij + υj
= (β1 + υj) + β
′
2x1ij + β
′
3x2j + εij (5.1)
Here the latent variable, investment, is denoted by y∗ij , where i represents a given
firm and j represents a given country. x1ij is a vector that contains the micro-level
covariates and x2j is a vector that contains the macro-level covariates. The total
residual error component contains a level-one residual and a level-two residual: ij
≡ υj + εij . We assume that E(υj |x1ij , x2j) = 0 and that E(εij |x1ij , x2j , υj) = 0.
Hereafter, the β1, β2, and β3 are also referred to as ‘fixed’ parameters and υj is
referred to as a ‘random’ parameter that remains constant within a country.
We produce a two-step Heckman selection model (type II Tobit) that takes into
account the non-linear nature of our investment variable that is caused by the high
level of non-investment as was discussed in section 5.3. The first step of the Heckman
selection model consist of a probit model that estimates the determinants of firms’
decision to invest. Here, the decision to invest is summed as a binary dependent
variable yij = 1[y
∗
ij > 0]. Following equation 5.1 and the probit model, the error
terms υj |x1ij , x2j and εij |x1ij , x2j , υj have a probabilistic distribution.
In the second step of the Heckman selection model we use a random-effect model
to estimate the determinants of firms’ investment to sales ratio. This second step of
the Heckman selection model is also referred to as the ‘outcome’ model. Here, yij =
y∗ij × 1[y∗ij > 0]. As such, the specification of y∗ij (equation 5.1) is different between
the probit and the outcome model (i.e. for step one and step two of the Heckman
selection model). In the second step, the Heckman selection model uses the so-called
inverse Mills ratio (λ) as an additional explanatory variable to correct for the fact that
the probability of investment is higher for certain types of firms. The inverse Mills
ratio is computed on the basis of the βˆ estimates of our probit model and corresponds
to the respective ratio of the standard normal density distribution function over the
cumulative standard normal distribution function: i.e. λ(z)= φ(z)
Φ(z)
.
In section 5.3 we already outlined three variables Land, Finance, and Competitor,
that may help control for the selection bias. These three variables are part of vector
x1ij in the probit selection model. Darku (2000), Bigsten et al. (1999) and Pattillo
(1998) also use a Heckman selection model to estimate investment levels. These
authors do not find a significant selection effect (of the coefficient of λ) in the outcome
model. To investigate the impact of the selection effect on our covariates of interest
we also produce random-effect models that do not include λ. Finally, in order to
14 See for example the work of Greenland (2000) for an introduction to multilevel modelling.
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improve our prediction of υij we use restricted maximum likelihood estimation, which
in contrast to unrestricted maximum likelihood estimation, corrects for the loss in
degrees of freedom and therefore does not suffer from downward bias in estimating
the between-country population variance (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008).
We are fairly comfortable assuming that, within the context of analysis, our
analysis on the effect of macroeconomic variables on investment does not suffer from
endogeneity problems. Specifically, it is unlikely that the investment behaviour of a
single firm has a significant influence on macro-level outcomes. However, as a result
of unobserved heterogeneity some of the firm-level explanatory variables may not
be strictly exogenous. For example, labour costs may be lower in underdeveloped
countries that lack protection in the form of formal labour rights and/or minimum
wages and have lower educational achievement. Moreover, some countries may
have regulations that are beneficial for start-ups and small enterprises which can
stimulate such firms to invest more. Some scholars find evidence that foreign equity
concentration can have a positive spillover effect on domestic firms (i.e. stimulating
investment) as well as crowd-out domestic firms (i.e. reducing investment). According
to Aitken and Harrison (1999), in Venezuela, foreign equity ownership negatively
influences the overall productivity of domestic firms. And, Kosova` (2010) studying
firms located in the Czech Republic and Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) studying
firms located in Belgium find that foreign firm presence increases domestic firms
sales growth and/or survival. However, both authors also find that foreign entry
is positively related to domestic firms exiting the market (indicating a short-term
crowding out effect). A Hausman test comparing a fixed and random effects model
typically (as in our case) yields a significant test statistic, thereby rejecting the
random-effect model over a fixed-effect model. In our case, we seek to identify
macroeconomic determinants of investment and we require a non-linear model in
the first step of the Heckman selection model and therefore a fixed-effect model is not
a feasible option. However, the endogeneity issue may be alleviated by the inclusion
of the macroeconomic variables. We follow the suggestion of Mundlak (1978) and
augment our model introducing country means of Labour, Size, Age, and of the
percentage of foreign equity ownership in our analysis (i.e. Labour, Size, Age, and
Foreign).15 Hereafter, these country mean firm-level variables are also referred to
as the ‘Mundlak’ covariates. The covariates are part of vector x2j . We expect that
the macro covariates and ‘Mundlak’ covariates can act as controls for the (possibly)
endogenous firm-level variables and contribute to the estimation of the corresponding
within-effects.
15 Mundlak (1978) provides proof for the equivalence of a linear random-effect model with
additional time-averaged covariates and a linear fixed-effect model. The assumptions of Mundlak
may not apply to our context of ‘firm-series’ on a cross-section of countries and non-linear models
and therefore we merely expect that the ‘Mundlak’ covariates help alleviate endogeneity issues.
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For both the Probit and Heckman selection model we also empirically examine
the (possible) effect of institutions and political economy on the relationship between
foreign ownership and investment. Formally, we express this model as following:
y∗ij = β1 + β
′
2x1ij + β
′
3x2j
+β4P Foreign×G ij + β5Foreign100×G ij
+ εij + υj (5.2)
P Foreign × G ij represents the interaction term between the binary variable
P Foreign (partially foreign owned) and either Property, CPI or Polity2.
Foreign100×G ij represents the interaction term between Foreign100 (100% foreign
owned) and either Property, CPI or Polity2.
Most of the analysis in this study is based on a conventional random-intercept
model as presented in equations 5.1 and 5.2. Yet, in the final section of this
study we augment the model outlined in equation 5.2. Two additional random
coefficients are included in the model with the aim of identifying the extent of cross-
country differences in the foreign ownership investment relation. Here, in addition
to the country specific-intercept, we produce country-specific slopes for the binary
variables P Foreign and Foreign100. The random coefficient model is presented in
equation 5.3. δ1j is the slope for P Foreignij and δ2j is the slope for Foreign100ij .
Empirically, the random effect parameters are expressed in units of standard deviation
and show the degree to which the intercept and the slope coefficients are distributed
around the estimated mean of each country.
y∗ij = β1 + β
′
2x1ij + β
′
3x2j
+β4P Foreign×G ij + β5Foreign100×G ij
+ εij + υj + δ1jP Foreignij + δ2jForeign100ij (5.3)
5.5 Results
We begin the analysis by studying the effect of micro-level factors on investment
behaviour. Thereafter, we gradually include more variables to the models. First,
presented in Table 5.1 are the results of a probit selection model (model 1), a random
effect (RE) regression (model 2), and the results of a two-step Heckman selection
outcome model (model 3—referred to as ‘Outcome’). These models take into account
the degree to which firms are clustered by countries, i.e. the models are multi-level
models. The RE and outcome models are based on the selection of firms which report
a level of investment that is higher than zero. The difference between the RE model
and the outcome model is that the later model includes λ which is computed on the
basis of the probit selection model (model 1).
The results show that several of the covariates are highly significant in the probit
selection model and in the RE and outcome models. P Foreign is not significant
in models 1-3 and Foreign100 is not significant in model 1. The coefficient of
Foreign100 has a negative sign and is significant in models 2 and 3. This result
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suggests that firms that are completely foreign owned invest less, relative to sales,
than domestic firms.16 Based on this contrasting evidence, it is clear that the effect
of foreign equity ownership on investment is dependent on the degree of foreign equity
ownership.
As expected, the coefficient of Age is negative, indicating that older firms invest
less in fixed capital. The coefficient of Export is positive and significant following
the probit selection model (firms that export invest more frequently). This coefficient
is not significant in model 2 and is positive and significant in model 3 (firms that
export invest relatively more). The coefficient of Labour has a negative sign and
is significant in the selection model but is significant and positive in model 2 and
model 3. The coefficient Size is significant in models 1-3; however the coefficient is
positive in the probit model and is negative in the models using Investment as the
dependent variable. This result means that larger firms invest more frequently than
smaller firms but when smaller firms invest, they invest more relative to their sales
volume. Two of the selection variables are significant and positive: the probability
of investment is higher for firms that indicate they face obstacles related to land and
informal competitors. These positive coefficients may indicate that firms that seek to
invest are confronted by restrictions with respect to access to land and market share.
Additionally, a possible interpretation for the positive coefficient of Competitor is
that competition stimulates investment. The coefficient of Finance is not significant.
Model 3 includes the inverse Mills ratio (λ) which is used to correct for the selection
bias. λ is computed on the basis of the estimations of the probit selection model in
model 1 and has a significant and positive effect on the level of investment indicating
that the additional covariate λ statistically improves the models fit. Following the
multilevel models, when correcting for selection bias the sign of the coefficient for
Export turns significant.
Finally, we are interested in the estimates for the ‘random’ (unobserved) part of
our models. The population variance σ2υ (indicated as standard deviation συ) denotes
the variance of υj , the country-level random-intercept.
17 The log restricted-likelihood
ratio (LR) test statistics which test H0: σ
2
υ = 0 against Ha: σ
2
υ > 0 are significant
for models 4-6 and thereby indicate the presence of country effects. The degree of
significance of the LR test statistics are reported next to the coefficients of συ.
ρ is an estimate of the residual between-country correlation such that ρ = σ
2
υ
(σ2υ+σ
2
ε)
where σ2ε is the variance of εij . We are particularly interested in the estimated
values of ρ which is an indicator of the degree of country dependency with possible
range of [0,1].18 Following the selection model 1, ρ̂ is 0.12 and following the RE
and outcome models the ρ̂ are 0.06. These results suggest that the variance at the
country-level is much less than the variance at the firm-level and thereby indicate
that firm heterogeneity is relatively independent of the country-specific context.
16 In Appendix B are provided additional estimations using alternative measures of investment.
Overall, these analysis confirm that firms that are completely foreign owned invest relatively less.
17 The significance of the ‘random effects’ is tested at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
18 ρ is also known as the variance partition coefficient and the measure of intraclass correlation.
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Table 5.1: Multilevel models with and without ‘Mundlak’ covariates
Dependent variable: Invest (models 1 & 4) and Investment (models 2, 3, 5 & 6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit RE Outcome Probit RE Outcome
selection selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Foreign100 -0.03 -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.03 -0.20*** -0.21***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Export 0.17*** 0.03 0.07* 0.17*** 0.03 0.06*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Labour -0.04*** 0.45*** 0.44*** -0.04*** 0.45*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.25*** -0.15*** -0.10** 0.25*** -0.15*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Land 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01)
Finance 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Competitor 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01)
Labour 0.17 -0.24* -0.21+
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Age -0.04 -0.40** -0.41**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Foreign 0.01** 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Size 0.17+ -0.11 -0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
λ 0.41* 0.33
(0.21) (0.20)
Constant -0.82*** -1.62*** -2.12*** -1.03* -0.78+ -1.23*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.26) (0.40) (0.41) (0.50)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.36** 0.38** 0.38** 0.34** 0.33** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
LR Chi2 2390.0 916.1 916.0 2142.9 608.3 609.4
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.05
# of firms 45480 23651 23651 45480 23651 23651
# of countries 101 101 101 101 101 101
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Up to now, we have assumed that macro-level covariates have an impact on the
‘random effect’ of a country and that these effects are captured by the intercept.
We further extend the analysis of the probit selection, RE, and outcome models
by including the variables Labour, Size, Age, and Foreign as additional controls.
As explained in section 5.4, adding the ‘Mundlak’ covariates to the models possibly
reduces endogeneity. These results are presented in models 4-6 of Table 5.1. Overall,
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we find that our variables of interest are not sensitive to the inclusion of the additional
variables. As a result of adding these country-level covariates the ρ̂ decrease from 0.12
to 0.11 and from 0.06 to 0.05 depending on the model. Regarding the probit selection
model, συ marginally decreases from 0.36 (model 1) to 0.34 (model 4). With respect
to the results discussed earlier, we find no systematic change in the sign or significance
of the other covariates presented in model 1. Adding the ‘Mundlak’ covariates changes
the coefficient of Foreign100 from -0.19 to -0.20 in the RE model but the coefficient
remains significant. Following the results of the outcome model, the coefficient of
P Foreign changes from 0.02 to 0.01 but remains insignificant. Additionally, for the
outcome model, we observe some marginal changes in the coefficients of Age, Export,
and Size.
Regarding the ‘Mundlak’ covariates, only the coefficients of Foreign and Size are
significant in the probit selection model. And, following the RE and outcome models
(5-6), only the coefficients of Labour and Age are significant. Here, perhaps the most
interesting is the coefficient of Age which in comparison to the coefficient Age is high
and negative. This result can be interpreted as an indication that countries with a
favourable investment climate have relatively more start-ups. The coefficient of λ,
whilst significant in model 3, is no longer significant in model 6. We find no major
discrepancies between the two models with the exception of the coefficient of Export
which is significant in the outcome model but is not significant in the RE model.
Following the results described above, country-level factors have a relatively
stronger effect on a firm’s decision to invest than on a firm’s decision on the relative
level of investment. Still, the estimated ρ are rather low suggesting a low country-
level dependency. As suggested by Hawawini et al. (2004) one possibility is that
country-effects are less pronounced because markets are to some extent economically
and politically integrated. Despite the relative low intraclass correlation, the LR
test statistics computed for the random-intercept models described above are all
significant at p < 0.01 and therefore are in favour of analysis including a country effect
component. Moreover, considering the context of analysis we still consider these ρ
relatively substantial in size. A 12% macro-level dependency on a firm’s decision to
invest and a 6% effect on a firm’s level of investment should not be understated when
considering that these factors may determine if a country chronically under-invests
(or over-invests). These considerations motivate further inquiry into the meaning of
συ.
Table 5.2 presents the correlations between the estimate of υj of model 3 and model
6 (Table 5.3) and our country-level variables of interest. We find that the correlations
between υ̂j of model 3 and the macro-level variables aside from Openness, Growth
and Interest are rather high. υ̂j of model 6 are predicted values following the outcome
model that includes Labour, Size, Age, and Foreign as additional covariates. On
average, the correlations between υ̂j model 6 and the macroeconomic and institutional
variables are lower. For example, the correlation between υ̂j model 3 and Property
is equal to -0.16 and the correlation between υ̂j model 6 and Property is equal to
-0.14. The correlation between υ̂j model 3 and Growth is low and negative but
the correlation between υ̂j model 6 and Growth is slightly higher and positive. In
conclusion, because the correlation between several of the macro-level variables and
128
υ̂j of model 3 and 6 are not close to zero, these descriptive results support including
the macro variables in the analysis as additional covariates.
Table 5.2: Pairwise Correlations between Countries
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υ̂j model 3 1
υ̂j model 6 0.88 1
Openness 0.03 0.05 1
Kaopen -0.30 -0.13 0.18 1
GDP -0.36 -0.13 0.36 0.50 1
Growth -0.01 0.04 0.16 0.11 0.37 1
Interest 0.04 0.03 -0.07 0.04 -0.17 -0.10 1
Property -0.16 -0.14 0.17 0.41 0.41 0.17 0.12 1
CPI -0.20 -0.08 0.24 0.42 0.54 0.23 -0.10 0.77 1
Polity2 -0.37 -0.20 -0.01 0.49 0.43 0.19 0.01 0.39 0.41 1
The number of countries (observations) used for each pairwise correlation ranges from 101 to 75.
Next, we include the additional macro-level variables Openness, Kaopen, GDP ,
Growth, Interest, Polity2, CPI and Property in the regression analysis. The
institutional and political indicators are entered separately in the analysis. We first
present the results of the probit selection models in Table 5.3. Model 1 presents
the results including Property, model 2 includes CPI and model 3 includes Polity2.
The effect of adding the macro-level variables to the model has little or no effect on
the significance and the magnitude of the coefficients of the micro-level regressors.
As before, we find no significant effect of foreign ownership on the probability of
investment. Several of the macro-variables are not significant. The coefficient of
Growth is significant and rather surprisingly negative. The coefficient of Interest
is positive and significant in models 2 and 3. Additionally, we find a positive
and significant effect of control of corruption (CPI) and property rights protection
(Property) on the probability of investment. The coefficient of Polity2 is not
significant. We test whether the coefficients of the country-level variables are zero
using a Wald test and reject this hypothesis for each of estimation results presented
in models 1, 2 and 3. Following model 3, the ρ is 0.10 which is lower than the ρ
documented in Table 5.1 model 4. We suspect that the decreasing effect of adding
additional macro-level covariates is not fully observable in models 1-3 of Table 5.3
because of the change in sample size.
In models 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5.3 we control for the effect of institutions (Property
and Corruption) and political economy on relation between foreign ownership and
the probability of investment. We find that property rights protection and control
of corruption have a positive mediating effect on the relation between completely
foreign owned firms and the probability of investment. This result can be interpreted
as evidence that foreign firms invest more frequently in countries that are (viewed as)
having better institutions. We find no significant effect of institutions and political
economy on the relation between partial foreign ownership and the probability of
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investment. The coefficient of Foreign100 turns significant and negative in the models
4, 5 and 6 that include the interaction terms. This indicates that the probability of
investment is lower for firms that are 100% foreign owned.
Table 5.3: Multilevel Probit selection equations with macro-level covariates
and with and without interaction terms
Dependent variable: Invest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Foreign100 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.23** -0.23** -0.10*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Export 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Labour -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Land 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Finance 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Competitor 0.05** 0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Openness -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kaopen -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Growth -0.02** -0.02** -0.01* -0.02** -0.02** -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00)
CPI 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.04) (0.04)
Polity2 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
P Foreign × Property 0.00
(0.00)
Foreign100 × Property 0.00**
(0.00)
P Foreign × CPI -0.00
(0.02)
Foreign100 × CPI 0.06**
(0.02)
P Foreign × Polity2 0.00
(0.01)
Foreign100 × Polity2 0.01*
(0.01)
Continued on next page
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Constant -1.48* -1.13+ -1.64* -1.46* -1.11+ -1.62*
(0.64) (0.61) (0.65) (0.64) (0.61) (0.65)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.37** 0.35** 0.34** 0.37** 0.35** 0.34**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
LR Chi2 1642.1 1582.3 1491.7 1642.5 1586.9 1494.7
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10
# of firms 37471 37997 36691 37471 37997 36691
# of countries 77 76 72 77 76 72
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Results for Labour, Age, Size and Foreign are available upon request
Table 5.4 presents the results of the RE and outcome models including the
macroeconomic and institutional variables. Again, Property, CPI, and Polity2 are
entered separately in the models. The various λ included in the outcome models are
based on the regression output of models 1-3 of Table 5.3. Unlike in Table 5.1 model 6,
where the coefficient of λ was not significant, the coefficient of λ is significant in Table
5.4 models 2, 4, and 6. As such, we give preference to the results presented in model
2 (including Property), model 4 (including CPI), and model 6 (including Polity2).
With the exception of λ, we find that the sign and significance of the coefficients of the
micro-level covariates are not sensitive to the addition of the macro-level covariates.
Export remains only positive and significant when correcting for sample selection
bias.
No significant effect is found of Openness and Kaopen on firms’ investment to
sales ratio. The coefficient of GDP is significant and negative in all models which
suggests that firms located in countries with a relatively lower level of GDP per capita
invest relatively more in fixed capital. The coefficient of Growth is significant and
positive in the RE models that do not control for selection bias (model 1, 3, and 5) and
is also significant when controlling for selection bias and using Polity2 (model 6). In
addition, Interest has a negative and significant effect on investment in RE model 3
but this covariate is insignificant in all other models. We do not find a significant effect
of institutions on investment when using the proxies CPI and Property. However,
the coefficient of Polity2 is significant (following both model 5 and 6) and, somewhat
contrary to expectations, is negative.19 According to the work of Mathur and Singh
(2013), one explanation is that investment is driven by economic freedoms and not by
political freedoms and that, as a result of competing political interest, countries with
emerging democratic institutions may lack the ability to enforce economic freedoms.20
19 Estimation results for Table 5.4 using robust standard errors computed using maximum
likelihood estimation (instead of restricted maximum likelihood estimation) yield similar results.
Wald tests based of the estimations presented in models 1-6 reject the hypothesis that the coefficients
of the country-level variables are zero.
20 Mathur and Singh (2013) studies determinants of FDI using a macroeconomic framework. The
authors’ theory may contribute to explain why, for example, China scores low on democracy and
high on property rights protection and is able to attract high flows of FDI.
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Table 5.4: Multilevel RE and outcome models with macro-level covariates
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE Outcome RE Outcome RE Outcome
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Foreign100 -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.20***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.15***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Export 0.02 0.10** 0.02 0.09** 0.02 0.08*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Labour 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size -0.15*** -0.04 -0.15*** -0.05+ -0.15*** -0.06*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Openness 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kaopen -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP -0.13* -0.14* -0.13* -0.16** -0.12* -0.11+
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Growth 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
CPI -0.03 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Polity2 -0.02+ -0.02+
(0.01) (0.01)
λ 0.86*** 0.78*** 0.68**
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Constant -0.15 -1.54* -0.39 -1.48* -0.60 -1.79*
(0.58) (0.67) (0.58) (0.65) (0.63) (0.73)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
LR Chi2 437.3 447.8 471.1 481.2 442.4 446.5
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
# of firms 19978 19978 20143 20143 19571 19571
# of countries 77 77 76 76 72 72
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Results for Labour, Age, Size and Foreign are available upon request
Table 5.5, models 1-6 present the results of the multilevel selection models that
include the macro variables and the interaction terms for foreign ownership and
institutions/political economy. The λ included in the outcome models are based on the
probit selection models 4-6 of Table 5.3. Adding the interaction terms to the models
has some effect on the coefficient of P Foreign but does not systematically change
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the other micro-level covariates. In contrast to the findings previously discussed, we
find that the coefficient of P Foreign is significant and negative in the RE model that
includes the interaction term for P Foreign and CPI. In the outcome model and
the models including Property and Polity2 as covariates we do not find any evidence
that partially foreign owned firms invest less relative to sales. The coefficient of
Foreign100 remains significant and negative in all models. Similar to the results
presented in Table 5.5 we find that, overall, growth is positively related to investment
and GDP is negatively related to investment. Moreover, the coefficient of Polity2
remains significant and negative in models 5-6 of Table 5.6 and the coefficients of
CPI and Property remain insignificant.
The interaction terms P Foreign × CPI (models 3 and 4) and Foreign100 ×
Property (model 2 only) are significant and positive but the other interaction terms
are not significant. Hence, in agreement with some scholars (Asiedu and Lien, 2011;
Kinda, 2010; Javorcik and Wei, 2009) that study the effect of governance on FDI, we
find some evidence which suggests that countries with low corruption can attract more
foreign capital. We also find weak evidence indicating that firms with 100 percent
foreign equity ownership avoid investing in countries with poor protection of property
rights. Based on our sample, countries that score relatively high on the variables CPI
and Property are Chile, Estonia and Uruguay and countries that score relatively low
on these variables are Angola, Chad and Venezuela.
Across country-level averages, what is the relation between foreign equity
ownership and investment? The analysis including the additional random slope
parameters are presented in models 1-6 of Table 5.6. The random slope effects are
expressed in units of standard deviation with respect to P Foreign and Foreign100.
We refer to these random effect estimates as σP Foreign and σForeign100. The random
effect estimates are distinctly estimated (i.e. we allow for covariance). The join LR
test statistics are significant (even though the resulting p-values are conservative) and
thereby indicate cross-country differences in σP Foreign and σForeign100. Models 2, 4,
and 6 build upon the inverse Mills ratios computed following the estimation results
of probit selection models with interaction terms (4, 5 and 6) of Table 5.3.
The inclusion of the additional random coefficients has some effect on the
magnitude of the coefficients but does not influence our interpretation. The
interaction term Foreign100×Property in model 2 (including λ) and the interaction
terms P Foreign×CPI (models 3-4) remain significant. Also, we find some positive
and significant effect of Openness following models 1 and 3 that do not include λ
(the coefficients are close to zero). The inverse mills ratio, the coefficient of λ is
significant in models 2, 4, and 6 and as such we prefer these estimation results over
those presented in models 1, 3, and 5. In comparison to the results presented in Table
5.5, we do not find any other systematic differences in the estimation results.21
Next, we compute the—full—conditional marginal effects of foreign ownership on
investment. These results are presented in the line plots Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The
point estimates are based on the results of models 2, 4, and 6 presented in Table 5.6
21 We also experimented using the natural logarithm of the ratio of investment in machinery,
equipment, land, and buildings over sales as the dependent variable. Analysis using this alternative
dependent variable supports the results of the analysis reported in Table 5.6.
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which include random-coefficients. We estimate the marginal effect of P Foreign on
Investment and of Foreign100 on Investment given different values of Property,
CPI, or Polity2. We use the values that correspond to the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and
95th percentiles of the institutional and political economy indicators that are defined
at the country-level. These indicators are placed on the horizontal axis of the different
line plots; as ordered from top to bottom Property, CPI, and Polity2. Figure 5.1
presents the marginal effect of P Foreign on investment and Figure 5.2 presents the
marginal effect of Foreign100 on investment. These results show that the marginal
effect of P Foreign and Foreign100 on investment changes along with institutional
development (Property and CPI) but remains fairly constant for different values
of Polity2. In particular, the marginal effect of P Foreign on Investment whilst
negative at high levels of corruption turns positive at lower levels of corruption (i.e.
control of corruption). However, these marginal effects remain close to zero and are
insignificant. The marginal effect of Foreign100 on Investment is usually negative
and significant. These line plots indicate that firms that are completely foreign owned
invest relatively more when these firms are located in countries with better protection
of property rights and control of corruption. In fact, the negative marginal effect of
foreign ownership is lower for countries that score high on Property and CPI. This
effect is not captured by the interaction term Foreign100 × CPI in the outcome
model.
Finally, we interpret the random effects σP Foreign and σForeign100. In order
to interpret these random effects we assume that they have a normal distribution.
Figure 5.5 in Appendix A plots the distribution of the random effects (as well as
that of the random intercept) that are derived on the basis of model 2 of Table
5.6.22 Overall, the distributions look approximately normal. Model 2 shows that the
fixed effect coefficient of Foreign100 is equal to -0.47. The coefficients’ corresponding
random effect parameter shows that for 95% of our sample population of countries the
coefficient of Foreign100 falls within the range of [-0.94, 0.00]. This result is derived
as following: -0.47 ± 1.96 × 0.24. This result suggests that, indeed in the majority
of countries, the country-averages are that completely foreign owned firms invest less
than domestic firms and partially foreign-owned firms. Using model 2 as a reference,
the proportion of countries for which the average slope is equal to or larger than 0
amounts to 2.51% (which corresponds to a z-score of 1.96). Following model 4, which
uses CPI as a covariate, the random effect parameter of Foreign100 suggests that
on average in the majority of countries foreign-owned firms invest less than domestic
firms. Here, based on a normal distribution assumption, the coefficient of Foreign100
for 95% of our sample population of countries falls within the range [-0.78, 0.12]. This
range includes positive values and as such suggests that, in several countries in our
sample, firms that are 100% foreign owned on average invest relatively more. Given
a z-score of 1.43, the percentage of countries in which foreign owned firms invest the
same or more than domestically owned firms is 7.58%. Model 6 yields somewhat
similar evidence; i.e. in 14.92% of the countries’ foreign firms invest the same or
relatively more than domestically owned firms. Therefore, despite that foreign equity
ownership appears to be associated with relatively less investment, our results by no
22 To save space we do not report the distributions of the random slopes for the other models.
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means contradict the work of Koo and Maeng (2006) who on the basis of a country
case study (on Korea) argue that foreign ownership positively influences investment.
The coefficient of P Foreign in model 3 that uses CPI as a proxy is significant
and negative. Following model 3, the random effect parameter σP Foreign, the 95%
range of the coefficient for partially foreign-owned firms is [-0.77, 0.21]. Following
this model, on average, in 13.14% of the countries (i.e. about 10 countries) partially
foreign owned firms invest the same or more than domestically owned firms and
completely foreign owned firms. The coefficients of P Foreign in model 1,2,4,5 and 6
(i.e. including either Property or Polity2 and/or including λ) are not significant and
the coefficients are substantially smaller in magnitude albeit the spread of σP Foreign
remains wide. Altogether, this evidence suggests that the point estimate coefficients
of P Foreign are rather unreliable.
Table 5.5: Multilevel RE and outcome models with macro-level covariates and
interaction terms
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE Outcome RE Outcome RE Outcome
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign -0.06 -0.05 -0.23* -0.18 0.03 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
Foreign100 -0.33** -0.41*** -0.23* -0.29** -0.19** -0.24***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
Age -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Export 0.02 0.10** 0.02 0.09** 0.02 0.08*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Labour 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size -0.15*** -0.04 -0.15*** -0.06* -0.15*** -0.06+
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Openness 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kaopen -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP -0.14* -0.14** -0.13* -0.16** -0.12* -0.11+
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Growth 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
CPI -0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Polity2 -0.02+ -0.02+
(0.01) (0.01)
P Foreign × Property 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Foreign100 × Property 0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
P Foreign × CPI 0.07* 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03)
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Foreign100 × CPI 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
P Foreign × Polity2 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Foreign100 × Polity2 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
λ 0.84*** 0.73*** 0.70***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Constant -0.13 -1.49* -0.36 -1.39* -0.60 -1.83*
(0.58) (0.67) (0.58) (0.65) (0.63) (0.73)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.32** 0.31** 0.31**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
LR Chi2 439.1 449.3 472.2 481.5 442.4 446.9
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
# of firms 19978 19978 20143 20143 19571 19571
# of countries 77 77 76 76 72 72
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Results for Labour, Age, Size and Foreign are available upon request
Table 5.6: RE and outcome random-coefficient models models with macro-level
covariates and interaction terms
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE Outcome RE Outcome RE Outcome
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign -0.07 -0.06 -0.28* -0.23 0.01 0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
Foreign100 -0.38** -0.47*** -0.27+ -0.33* -0.20* -0.24**
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08)
Age -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Export 0.02 0.10** 0.02 0.09** 0.02 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Labour 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size -0.15*** -0.04 -0.15*** -0.06* -0.15*** -0.06+
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Openness 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kaopen -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP -0.15** -0.15** -0.16** -0.18*** -0.13* -0.11*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Growth 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
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CPI -0.03 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Polity2 -0.02* -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
P Foreign × Property 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Foreign100 × Property 0.00 0.01+
(0.00) (0.00)
P Foreign × CPI 0.09* 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04)
Foreign100 × CPI 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
P Foreign × Polity2 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Foreign100 × Polity2 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
λ 0.84*** 0.74*** 0.71***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Constant -0.13 -1.46* -0.21 -1.25* -0.71 -1.93**
(0.55) (0.64) (0.55) (0.62) (0.60) (0.70)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
σP Foreign 0.27** 0.27** 0.25** 0.25** 0.30** 0.29**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
σForeign100 0.24** 0.24** 0.23** 0.23** 0.24** 0.23**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
συ 0.32** 0.33** 0.33** 0.33** 0.32** 0.33**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Joint LR Chi2 454.9 465.1 487.5 496.7 460.3 464.9
Joint LR df(6) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
# of firms 19978 19978 20143 20143 19571 19571
# of countries 77 77 76 76 72 72
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Results for Labour, Age, Size and Foreign are available upon request
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Figure 5.1: Conditional marginal effects of P Foreign on investment
Percentiles defined at the country-level.
Random coefficient models: Table 5.9 Models 2, 4, & 6
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Figure 5.2: Conditional marginal effects of Foreign100 on investment
Percentiles defined at the country-level.
Random coefficient models: Table 5.9 Models 2, 4, & 6
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5.6 Conclusion
In this study we have discussed how uncertainty related to irreversibility of fixed
capital in developing countries can hamper investment. In conformity with previous
studies on investment in developing countries we find that the high level of non-
investment across firms suggests that irreversibility of fixed capital is a strong obstacle
to investment.
We further investigate the role of foreign equity ownership on investment behaviour
and find substantial evidence suggesting that there is a negative relation between
foreign ownership and firms’ level of investment relative to sales. More specifically,
we find that, on average, firms that are completely foreign owned invest relatively
less in fixed capital. We find weak evidence which suggests that firms that are 100%
foreign owned invest less frequently and we find no such evidence for partially foreign
owned firms. This distinction suggests that, under specific conditions, limiting foreign
equity ownership could have a beneficial effect on overall investment levels provided
that such limitations on ownership do not discourage foreign investors to enter the
market and/or limit domestic industry development. Further research is required to
outline the specific conditions under which foreign firms invest relatively less than
domestically owned firms. Nonetheless, analysis using random-effect models reveals
that in a minority of countries there is, on average, a positive relation between foreign
equity ownership and investment.
The second major contribution of this study is the identification of the effect of
macroeconomic factors and institutions on investment behaviour. We find that such
determinants have relatively little explanatory power on the level of firms’ investment.
In comparison with this result, a country’s macroeconomic and institutional context
has a relatively higher impact on the probability that a firm invests e.g. in new
investment opportunities, replacement capital and/or restructuring. Further research
assessing the sensitivity of investment behaviour to a country’s macroeconomic
environment in specific (innovative) industries would enrich this understanding.
The overall lack of explanatory power of the macroeconomic indicators in our
sample of mostly developing countries may indicate that the ability of investors located
in these countries in forecasting expected revenues on the basis of macroeconomic
signals is low. Moreover, in some countries, markets are highly volatile and therefore
macroeconomic indicators can be poor predictors. Regardless of the underlying
cause, should this interpretation be correct, positive macroeconomic trends may fail
to further stimulate investment behaviour and markets may not be able to act as
stabilizers and accelerators or growth. The effectiveness of policy may also be limited
in this respect. Darku (2000, pp. 21) states that “the best way out is to ensure
more policy credibility and stability that will lead to a reduction in firms’ perceived
uncertainty”.
Further research on the extent to which this pattern may be different in
developed economies could provide more insight on the way forward. For example,
macroeconomic predictors, such as growth and interest rates (as well as real estate
markets and stock markets) are generally considered strong predictors of investors’
confidence in developed countries and, as a result, it is possible that the country-level
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effect on firm-level investment is greater in developed countries. Previous research
on the determinants of firms’ performance suggests the contrary. Hawawini et al.
(2004) decompose firm-level, industry, and country effects on firms’ performance in
six developed countries and find that the country effect is small—smaller than the
country-effect documented in this study. Using a broader set of 37 countries, Burstein
Goldszmidt et al. (2011) find similar levels of country-effects as documented in our
study and the authors argue that the country-level effect on firm performance is larger
in emerging economies than in developed economies.
This research has had the ambition to close the gap between a macro approach
towards studying investment and a micro approach towards studying investment. We
have gained a preliminary understanding on the degree to which micro and macro
evidence on investment behaviour is complementary; e.g. in suggesting that control
of corruption is positively related to (the probability of) investment. The extent to
which the negative effect of political economy on firms’ investment levels is robust
and/or can be explained using a theoretical model may require further exploration.
Moreover, the inability of this study to explore investment dynamics has been a
major limitation. Our application of a multilevel, cross-country investment model
can be extended with the exploration of the dynamic relation between a firm’s past
investment behaviour and firms’ outlook on future investment. As a result of firm-level
heterogeneity we expect that such research avenues will be an important development
towards better understanding investment behaviour.
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5.7 Appendix 5A
Table 5.7: Countries and Number of Firms
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Afghanistan 2007 356 142 15 1 242 94 20 91 110 155
Albania 2006 157 91 10 15 91 55 11 54 19 84
Angola 2005/09 685 265 95 35 498 150 37 376 21 288
Argentina 2005/09 1,627 1,110 90 152 514 648 465 1,175 39 413
Armenia 2007 238 120 17 7 133 72 33 83 23 132
Azerbaijan 2007 306 102 22 14 156 107 43 89 27 190
Bangladesh 2006 1,475 699 18 18 474 427 574 1,251 75 149
Belarus 2007 164 111 14 3 48 64 52 65 9 90
Benin 2008 71 35 7 5 43 20 8 27 5 39
Bhutan 2008 237 112 2 12 119 91 27 84 59 94
Bolivia 2005/09 594 362 54 35 292 209 93 342 39 213
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2007 238 174 16 4 87 91 60 90 30 118
Botswana 2005/09 528 308 79 166 303 157 68 210 51 267
Brazil 2007 1,032 705 35 30 373 422 237 786 14 232
Bulgaria 2006/07 1,018 603 57 59 401 400 217 834 110 74
Burkina Faso 2008 262 134 22 12 159 70 33 73 32 157
Burundi 2005 268 153 6 41 221 41 6 139 12 117
Cameroon 2008 299 146 33 21 128 109 62 96 12 191
Cape Verde 2008 106 59 13 7 47 46 13 40 15 51
Chad 2008 111 71 14 17 61 37 13 41 14 56
Chile 2005/09 1,600 1,105 68 87 483 689 428 1,152 34 414
Colombia 2005/09 1,696 943 70 40 787 596 313 1,189 89 418
Costa Rica 2009 352 230 12 44 129 147 76 222 4 126
Cote d’Ivoire 2007 345 142 23 40 218 91 36 137 11 197
Croatia 2006 454 352 34 18 168 158 128 310 24 120
Czech Republic 2007 160 127 16 13 53 65 42 68 15 77
Congo, DR 2005/09 542 250 33 64 401 109 32 273 25 244
Dominican
Republic
2009 305 139 22 31 95 113 97 103 13 189
Ecuador 2005/09 800 507 61 74 319 311 170 402 23 375
El Salvador 2005/09 789 439 57 62 305 293 191 469 39 281
Eritrea 2008 92 16 2 3 59 28 5 51 2 39
Estonia 2007 204 154 12 27 74 74 56 71 30 103
Ethiopia 2010 363 144 5 11 181 120 62 363 0 0
Fiji 2008 73 45 10 6 39 28 6 18 5 50
Gambia, the 2005 165 104 20 31 113 47 5 62 12 91
Georgia 2007 223 94 10 4 110 83 30 78 40 105
Ghana 2006 491 228 12 13 368 93 30 289 1 201
Guatemala 2005/09 811 439 37 61 304 293 214 513 44 254
Guinea 2005 220 122 8 16 196 18 6 134 7 79
Guinea-Bissau 2005 154 60 5 10 136 17 1 77 5 72
Honduras 2005/09 520 207 32 30 256 162 102 288 48 184
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Hungary 2007 252 120 23 29 78 88 86 99 25 128
Indonesia 2008 1,028 285 28 47 593 242 193 824 20 184
Iraq 2010 641 234 1 7 509 127 5 403 40 198
Jamaica 2009 245 86 19 8 113 106 26 87 8 150
Kazakhstan 2007 382 188 14 6 115 163 104 135 52 195
Kenya 2006 630 363 29 50 289 213 128 392 54 184
Kosovo 2007 130 68 0 0 93 31 6 45 16 69
Kyrgyz
Republic
2007 164 60 19 8 71 71 22 74 20 70
Laos 2007 353 87 20 43 165 123 65 142 13 198
Latvia 2007 206 178 20 26 67 65 74 69 24 113
Lithuania 2007 190 151 7 16 70 68 52 70 23 97
Macedonia 2007 272 191 26 13 102 117 53 96 41 135
Madagascar 2007 326 154 50 83 126 144 56 156 21 149
Malawi 2008 121 81 11 26 39 41 41 53 10 58
Mali 2006/09 574 224 20 20 476 90 8 329 11 234
Mauritania 2005 227 81 18 8 182 40 5 123 12 92
Mauritius 2007 299 182 14 23 145 111 43 140 14 145
Mexico 2005/09 2,464 1,011 128 104 1016 771 677 1,980 41 443
Micronesia 2007 52 31 7 4 36 16 0 9 3 40
Moldova 2007 295 175 24 11 106 122 67 94 32 169
Mongolia 2007 316 198 14 7 138 121 57 114 51 151
Montenegro 2007 69 50 2 2 32 26 11 24 3 42
Mozambique 2006 471 155 26 64 307 141 23 335 6 130
Namibia 2005 314 168 19 52 221 78 15 145 11 158
Nepal 2008 341 145 11 3 182 130 29 118 1 222
Nicaragua 2005/09 516 191 22 26 302 165 49 344 16 156
Niger 2008 78 39 9 8 51 22 5 21 2 55
Panama 2005/09 511 239 20 39 287 163 61 249 78 184
Paraguay 2005/09 587 365 33 33 259 254 74 328 31 228
Peru 2005/09 1,301 869 101 68 475 506 320 887 22 392
Philippines 2008 909 338 138 95 297 411 201 665 18 226
Poland 2007 210 125 7 14 97 61 52 77 25 108
Romania 2007 253 178 20 18 81 82 90 91 30 132
Russia 2007 609 424 23 15 145 232 232 431 33 145
Rwanda 2005/10 289 119 16 34 195 79 15 146 8 135
Samoa 2008 63 38 10 6 45 15 3 16 5 42
Senegal 2006 505 141 20 11 418 66 21 259 3 243
Serbia 2007 329 227 25 22 110 109 110 123 39 167
Slovakia 2007 162 119 13 10 52 56 54 56 23 83
Slovenia 2007 242 216 21 19 92 74 76 90 35 117
South Africa 2006 936 388 40 81 373 371 192 680 15 241
Sri Lanka 2010 497 135 18 5 272 141 84 275 1 221
Swaziland 2005 288 158 14 91 205 54 29 101 31 156
Tajikistan 2007 244 88 19 2 120 83 41 83 39 122
Tanzania 2005 407 205 23 27 268 104 35 277 16 114
Timor Leste 2008 103 66 0 16 77 26 0 49 19 35
Togo 2008 109 50 14 26 67 28 14 22 13 74
Tonga 2008 133 69 21 2 118 15 0 50 1 82
Trinidad and
Tobago
2009 294 95 32 9 134 83 77 101 22 171
Turkey 2007 789 440 27 5 233 302 254 628 6 155
Uganda 2005 550 221 27 65 373 145 32 334 22 194
Ukraine 2007 488 249 30 5 193 179 116 339 20 129
Uruguay 2005/09 788 479 42 63 314 304 170 465 43 280
Uzbekistan 2007 336 116 42 6 117 133 86 111 36 189
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Vanuatu 2008 92 69 11 24 58 34 0 7 19 66
Venezuela 2009 137 55 6 14 58 51 28 54 2 81
Vietnam 2008 927 631 45 86 221 370 336 693 52 182
Yemen 2009 276 116 10 0 178 72 26 150 1 125
Zambia 2006 479 185 38 78 270 146 63 301 4 174
Zimbabwe 2010 550 193 84 6 215 202 133 301 14 235
Total 45,480 23,651 2,739 3,028 21,225 15,228 9,027 27,075 2,483 15,922
Small firms have 5-19 permanent employees, medium firms 20-99 permanent employees,
and large firms 100 or more permanent employees.
Manufacturing includes leather, garments, textiles, food, metals and machinery,
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and other manufacturing industries.
Transport includes construction and transportation.
Services includes retail and wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants, and other services.
Table 5.8: Definition of firm-level variables
Corresponding
variable
Data description
Investment Total annual expenditure for purchases of equipment and machinery in last
fiscal year
Total annual sales in last fiscal year
Foreign Individuals, companies or organizations that are privately owned and have
10% or more foreign equity ownership
P Foreign Individuals, companies or organizations that are privately owned and are
partially foreign owned
Foreign100 Individuals, companies or organizations that are privately owned and that are
100% foreign owned
Labour Total labor cost (including wages, salaries, bonuses, etc.) in last fiscal year
Total annual sales in last fiscal year
Age In what year did this establishment begin operations in this country?
Export The percentage of the establishment’s sales that were: national sales/direct
exports/indirect exports
Size Number of permanent, full-time employees of this firm at the end of last fiscal
year
Land How much of an obstacle is access to land to the operations of this firm?
Finance How much of an obstacle is access to finance to the operations of this firm?
Competitor How much of an obstacle are the informal sector competitors to your
operations?
Sector Industrial sector classification recoded to (1) leather, garments and textiles,
(2) food, (3), metals and machinery, (4) chemicals and pharmaceuticals, (5)
other manufacturing, (6) retail and wholesale trade, (7) hotels, restaurants
and other services, and (8) construction and transportation
K Net book value of machinery vehicles, and equipment in last fiscal year
Source: ES
144
Figure 5.3: Histograms of the Distribution of Investment to Sales
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Figure 5.4: Histogram of the Distribution of Foreign Ownership
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Figure 5.5: Histograms of the Distribution of δ̂1j , δ̂2j , and υ̂j
Random coefficient model: Table 5.9 Model 2
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5.8 Appendix 5B
Robustness Analysis for the Dependent Variable
This appendix presents the results of a sensitivity analysis that explores the effect
of using alternative dependent variables to capture the determinants of investment
behaviour (and/or aspects thereof). These results are comparable to the results
of the probit and outcome model that are presented in models 1 and 3 of Table
5.1. First, Model 2 of Table 5.9 presents the results using the natural logarithm of
the ratio of investment to labour costs (ln(I/Labour)) as the dependent variable.
Both the probit selection model and the outcome model (model 1-2) do not include
Labour as an explanatory variable. Second, model 4 uses the natural logarithm
of the ratio of investment to capital (ln(I/K)) as the dependent variable. Capital
(K) is a measure of firms’ net book value of machinery vehicles, and equipment.
In terms of definition this dependent variable is a preferred measure of investment.
However, as a result of missing observations for K, the probit selection model 3 and
the outcome model 4 exclude the following countries in the analysis: Benin, Bhutan,
Cape Verde, Chad, Eritrea, Fiji, Malawi, Micronesia, Niger, Samoa, Timor Leste,
Togo, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Moreover, missing observations reduce the sample used
in the outcome model to 11,646 firms. Finally, model 6 uses the natural logarithm of
investment (ln(I)) as the dependent variable. The natural logarithm of sales (Sales)
is included as an explanatory variable in both the probit selection model 5 and the
outcome model 6. Investment and sales is converted from local currency to US dollar
amounts using annual average official exchange rates from the World Bank, WDI.
This Heckman selection model excludes observations for the countries Ecuador (for
2009 only), Kosovo, Slovenia, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe because of missing data on
exchange rates.
We find no systematic differences between the probit selection models 1 and
3 presented in Table 5.9 with respect to the results presented in Table 5.1. In
model 5 however, the coefficient of P Foreign is negative but this coefficient remains
insignificant. The coefficient of Foreign100 turns significant and remains negative.
And, the coefficient of Labour turns positive and remains significant. These differences
in the results are likely to be the effect of including Sales in the model. The coefficient
of Sales is significant and positive.
We proceed by examining the differences between models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5.9
with respect to model 3 of Table 5.1. The results of the outcome models (2, 4, and
6) show that the coefficients of λ are not significant; these Heckman selection models
are not successful in controlling for selection bias. Because a large number of firms
are omitted in model 4 it is not surprising that the coefficient of λ (of model 4) is not
significant. Another difference is that the coefficient of λ in model 2 has a negative
sign.
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Table 5.9: Probit and outcome random-intercept models models using
alternative dependent variables
Invest ln(I/Labour) Invest ln(I/K) Invest ln(I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Outcome Probit Outcome Probit Outcome
Selection Selection Selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.04 0.07+ 0.04 -0.10 -0.01 0.15***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Foreign100 -0.02 -0.08+ -0.04 -0.16* -0.08** -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Export 0.18*** 0.06 0.18*** -0.07 0.15*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Labour -0.04*** -0.00 0.04*** 0.19***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.26*** -0.14*** 0.25*** -0.11* 0.14*** 0.25***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
Sales 0.11*** 0.62***
(0.01) (0.02)
Land 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Finance 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Competitor 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
λ -0.09 0.05 0.04
(0.23) (0.34) (0.19)
Constant -0.76*** -0.77** -0.84*** -0.54 -1.63*** 1.14**
(0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.42) (0.07) (0.34)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.36** 0.48** 0.36** 0.45** 0.36** 0.62**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Joint LR Chi2 2366.2 1255.1 2301.4 698.0 2224.1 1771.1
Joint LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.15
# of firms 45480 23651 44039 11634 43925 22871
# of countries 101 101 87 87 97 97
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
The results displayed in Table 5.9 provide some evidence suggesting a positive
effect of acquiring a foreign partner on investment. Following model 2 and 6 the
coefficient of Foreign P is positive and significant; in model 4 this coefficient is
negative but insignificant. The coefficient of Foreign100 is negative in models 2,
4, and 6 but is only significant in models 2 and 4. The result presented in model
2 suggests that firms that are completely foreign owned invest more in labour (in
terms of wages) relative to fixed capital. Overall, the results support the findings
presented in Table 5.1 that suggest that firms that are completely foreign owned invest
relatively less in fixed capital formation. Some additional notable differences are that
the coefficients of Export and Labour are negative but not significant following model
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4 and the coefficient of Size is positive and significant in model 6. For the outcome
models, the ρ are higher than 0.06 (which is observed in model 3 of Table 5.1).
In particular, analysis using the natural logarithm of investment as the dependent
variables (model 6) yields a ρ of 0.15. One possibility is that this result is sensitive
to the exchange rate conversion.
Robustness Analysis for Partial Foreign Equity Ownership
In this section we present the results of additional experimentation with the
measurement of foreign equity ownership. Specifically, we build on the analysis of
Table 5.1 models 1 and 3 and use a set of dummies that identifies firms with different
levels of partial foreign ownership using separate categories: firms with less than 50%
foreign ownership (Partial − 50: 1,182 firms) and firms with 50% or more than 50%
foreign ownership but not 100% foreign ownership (Partial + 50: 1,557 firms). We
also control for the effect of Foreign100 on investment. These results are presented
in Table 5.10.
When using this set of dummy variables we find no effect of foreign equity
ownership on the probability of investment (model 1). Moreover, the coefficients
of Partial − 50 and Partial + 50 are also insignificant following the outcome model
(model 2). Albeit insignificant, the coefficient of Partial − 50 is positive and the
coefficient of Partial + 50 is negative. Still, we find no significant evidence which
suggest that there is a non-linear relation between partial foreign equity ownership
and investment. In agreement with the results previously discussed, there is a negative
relation between Foreign100 and firms’ investment to sales ratio.
Table 5.10: Probit and outcome random-intercept models models using an
alternative measure for partial foreign ownership
(1) (2)
Probit Outcome
Selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
Partial-50 0.02 0.08
(0.04) (0.06)
Partial+50 0.06 -0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
Foreign100 -0.03 -0.21***
(0.03) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.15***
(0.01) (0.02)
Export 0.17*** 0.07*
(0.02) (0.03)
Labour -0.04*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.25*** -0.10**
(0.01) (0.03)
Land 0.14***
(0.01)
Finance 0.01
(0.01)
Competitor 0.04**
Continued on next page
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(0.01)
λ 0.41*
(0.21)
Constant -0.82*** -2.12***
(0.05) (0.26)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.36** 0.38**
(0.03) (0.03)
Joint LR Chi2 2388.8 916.6
Joint LR df(1) *** ***
ρ 0.12 0.06
# of firms 45480 23651
countries 101 101
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Regression Analysis by Sector
Variations in investment behaviour are partly attributable to industry and sector
specificities. The effect of foreign equity ownership on investment behaviour may also
be influenced by these specificities. In this section we control for the robustness
of the results of model 1 and 3 of Table 5.1 across sector. First, in models
1 and 2 of Table 5.11 we limit the sample to firms operating in manufacturing
industries. Manufacturing industries include leather, garments, textiles, food, metals
and machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and other manufacturing industries.
Second, in models 3 and 4 of Table 5.11 we limit the sample to firms operating in
service industries which includes retail and wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants, and
other service industries. Because we have no data for firms operating in services in
Ethiopia this country is excluded from the analysis in models 3 and 4. The regression
models 1-4 do not include sector dummies.
We find no significant relation between foreign equity ownership and the
probability of investment. Model 4, which is based on a sample of firms operating
in service industries, suggests that firms with partial foreign equity ownership invest
relatively more than domestically owned firms. Firms that are completely foreign
owned invest less in fixed capital relative to sales. The coefficient of Foreign100
in model 4 (services) is roughly double the coefficient of Foreign100 in model 2
(manufacturing). For both models 2 and 4, λ is not significant. The magnitude of the
ρ are comparable in size with the results previously discussed on the basis of Table
5.1.
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Table 5.11: Probit and outcome random-intercept models models by sector
Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Services
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Outcome Probit Outcome
Selection Selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.14+
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Foreign100 -0.02 -0.15** -0.03 -0.31***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
Age -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.14***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Export 0.16*** -0.06 0.24*** 0.10
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Labour -0.06*** 0.38*** -0.02* 0.56***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.24*** -0.13*** 0.28*** -0.15*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
Land 0.17*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02)
Finance -0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Competitor 0.02 0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
λ 0.03 0.30
(0.25) (0.36)
Constant -0.64*** -1.66*** -0.78*** -1.66***
(0.06) (0.29) (0.06) (0.45)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.38** 0.33** 0.38** 0.44**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Joint LR Chi2 1550.5 510.4 915.8 347.8
Joint LR df(1) *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.07
# of firms 27075 14420 15922 7601
# of countries 101 101 100 100
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Robustness Analysis for Crisis
Finally we present the results of a robustness analysis that controls for the possible
effect of the financial crisis on investment behaviour. As a result of the financial crisis,
the economy in many developed countries has slowed down. Arguably, in developing
countries the effect of the crisis has been less severe. Yet, it may be possible to observe
differences in the determinants of investment behaviour when comparing investment
behaviour in pre-crisis years with the investment behaviour since 2008. In this section
we seek to establish the degree to which foreign investors behave differently in the
years preceding the recent financial crisis with respect to the ‘crisis years’.
The sample of observations is divided into a ‘pre-crisis’ sample (investment in fiscal
years 2005, 2006 and 2007) and a ‘crisis’ sample (investment in fiscal years 2008, 2009
and 2010). Rwanda is excluded from the ‘crisis’ sample because there are no firms in
our sample population that have positive investment in this country in the fiscal year
2010. Because the sample of countries differs across the ‘pre-crisis’ and the ‘crisis’
sample we cannot be certain that differences in results are attributable to the effect
of the crisis. The results are presented in Table 5.12: models 1 and 2 are based on the
‘pre-crisis’ sample and models 3 and 4 are based on the ‘crisis’ sample. These analyses
build on the random-intercept models that include only the micro-level covariates.
The analysis based on the ‘pre-crisis’ sample does not indicate an effect of partial
foreign equity ownership on the probability of investment or on the investment to
sales ratio. However, the outcome model suggests that completely foreign owned
firms invest less than domestically owned firms. The analysis using the ‘crisis’
sample likewise suggests that the coefficient of Foreign100 is negatively related to
Investment. Model 3 also indicates that P Foreign is positively related to the
probability of investment.
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Table 5.12: Probit and outcome random-intercept models models (pre-crisis &
crisis years)
Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Outcome Probit Outcome
Selection Selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign -0.01 0.01 0.14** 0.11
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
Foreign100 -0.04 -0.23*** -0.02 -0.14*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Age -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.19***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Export 0.19*** 0.09* 0.12*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Labour -0.06*** 0.43*** -0.04*** 0.46***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Size 0.25*** -0.11*** 0.26*** -0.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Land 0.15*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02)
Finance 0.05** -0.06*
(0.02) (0.02)
Competitor 0.05** 0.04+
(0.02) (0.02)
λ 0.20 1.04**
(0.23) (0.37)
Constant -0.76*** -2.03*** -0.97*** -2.77***
(0.06) (0.27) (0.09) (0.52)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.36** 0.34** 0.42** 0.47**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Joint LR Chi2 1623.7 512.6 974.8 376.1
Joint LR df(1) *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.11 0.05 0.15 0.09
# of firms 29139 15574 16261 8077
# of countries 72 72 47 47
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
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6.1 Main Contributions
The analysis of institutions and policies as determinants of long-run economic growth
is confronted with major challenges in the identification of the relative effect of
various growth drivers. This thesis bundles four empirical studies that contribute
to the literature in this field. The point of departure of this thesis has been the
empirical exploration of the effect of institutions on proximate sources of growth:
i.e. financial development and investment. We have also related foreign investment
to domestic industry development. Additionally, we have made an effort to analyze
the relation between industrial policy and growth. The focus of analysis has been
on explaining cross-country variations in development and, whenever possible, the
analyses include a time dimension. We have gained a more subtle understanding
of the relative importance of different institutional and policy dimensions. We find
evidence suggesting that certain institutional developments and policies supporting
private sector development are positively related to economic growth. As detailed
in the next section, we also find evidence which suggests that other policies and
institutional dimensions may have no effect on growth or may have a negative effect
on growth.
Summary of Findings
The empirical analysis started with an investigation of the degree to which
institutional characteristics are related to an intermediary factor of economic
performance. The study presented in Chapter 2 investigates the relation between
institutions and financial development. Based on a literature survey of theories linking
institutional foundations and financial development, three categories of institutions
are outlined: property rights protection, security of contracts, and competition.
Property rights institutions are defined as important because of their role in protecting
investments that are financed by loans. The formalization of contracting institutions
are important for credit market development because financial arrangements are
influenced by respect for contracts. The importance of competition institutions
is related to both the demand and supply side of credit extensions. Using data
from the institutional profiles database (IPD2009) 15 variables are identified that
correspond to the above mentioned institutional characteristics. Next, principal
component analysis (PCA) is used to construct three indicators corresponding to the
different institutional characteristics. Hence, we showed that PCA allows measuring
and separating specific but closely related characteristics of a country’s institutional
setting. Empirical estimations using the Hausman-Taylor method with Amemiya-
MaCurdy specification reveal that the three institutional indicators are positively
and significantly related to financial development (i.e. higher level of credit to the
private sector). This result remains robust when controlling for the effect of financial
policy. These results partially contradict the findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)
who, using different institutional indicators, only find a limited effect of contracting
institutions on financial development. Regarding the policy indicators, we find some
effect of financial policy on credit to the private sector. Specifically, we find that there
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is a (relatively small) positive effect of regulating banking supervision and liberalizing
entry barriers in the banking sector on financial deepening. According to the results,
there is no effect of privatization in the banking sector on the level of credit to the
private sector. Additionally, we estimated the effect of the institutional characteristics
on banks’ lending capacity and on investment and found mixed results. Overall, we
conclude that institutional formalization has a positive impact on credit deepening.
The formalization of competition institutions has a positive effect on investment
but property right institutions and contracting institutions are not significantly
related to investment. This finding probes further inquiry into the extent to which
the formalization of institutional formalization leads to the ‘right’ type of financial
deepening; e.g. which stimulates investment in capital formation.
In Chapter 3 we focused on the role of industrial policy in stimulating growth. On
the basis of the taxonomy of economic policy developed by Rodrik and Subramanian
(2005) we sought to distinguish between ‘pro-market’ and ‘pro-business’ policies. ‘Pro-
market’ policies are aimed at increasing competition and market access. Rodrik and
Subramanian (2005, pp. 215) define pro-business policies as policies that support
the development of the existing industry and are “aimed primarily at benefiting
incumbents in the formal industrial commercial sector”. Using a set of policy
variables from the IMD World Competitiveness yearbook and exploratory PCA we
are, to some degree, successful in distinguishing between pro-market and pro-business
policies. On the basis of this categorization of variables we have constructed a
pro-market and a pro-business indicator. The pro-market indicator consists of the
average score of pro-market policy variables for each country and year and the pro-
business indicator consists of the average score of the pro-market policy variables
for each country and year. Pro-market variables measure policy aspects including
deregulation, competition, ownership structures, and liberalization and pro-business
variables measure policy aspects including environmental and labour regulations and
support for innovation and R&D policy. The two indicators are positively correlated
suggesting a positive relation between the levels of countries’ implementation of these
policy types. We used fixed-effects analysis covering 56 countries for the years 1995—
2009 to estimate the effect of industrial policy on growth and income. On the one
hand, our results suggest that pro-market policies have no clear effect on growth
and income. On the other hand, we find that pro-business policies are positively
related to growth. Additionally, we have constructed an indicator that measures
innovation and technology policy and estimate the relation between this indicator
and economic performance. The innovation indicator is constructed using a sub-set
of the pro-business policy variables. Our results suggest that the positive effect of
pro-business policy is to a large extent attributable to policy support for innovation
and technological advancements.
The study presented in Chapter 4 uses the analysis by Morrissey and
Udomkerdmongkol (2012) as a starting point. These authors find a negative effect of
FDI on domestic investment, a positive effect of governance on domestic investment,
and a negative mediating effect of institutions on the relation between FDI and
domestic investment. The negative mediating effect is interpreted as evidence for
the hypothesis that domestic investment is discouraged in countries with ‘unfriendly
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regimes’ unless investors acquire a foreign partner. We view this hypothesis as
slightly limited. Using theory on technology spillovers and political elite rent-
seeking we propose that the sign of the interaction effect is dependent on whether
the effect of foreign technological spillovers is more dominant than the effect of
rent-seeking behaviour. We tested the robustness of the results of Morrissey and
Udomkerdmongkol (2012) using alternative dependent variables, alternative GMM
specifications, and also using fixed-effects and pooled-OLS estimations. First, we find
evidence that the authors’ results suffer from spuriousness as a result of subtracting
data on FDI from data on domestic gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to construct
the dependent variable. We used data on investment from PWT and the WDI and
(when not seeking to separate domestic and foreign investment by subtracting FDI
from GFCF) find evidence suggesting that FDI crowds-in investment. Furthermore,
according to the regression results, the coefficients of our variables of interest (FDI,
governance, and the interaction term) decrease in significance when using a more
appropriate GMM specification. As a result, our analysis suggests only a weak relation
between governance and institutions and some evidence of a negative mediating effect
of governance on the relation between FDI and domestic investment. We interpret
this negative interaction effect as evidence that rent-seeking behaviour favours foreign
investors at the expense of domestic investors and find that this effect dominates the
effect of foreign technology spillovers on domestic investment.
To some degree, Chapter 5 extends the previous analysis of the impact of FDI
on domestic investment; this time we used firm level data on investment and on
foreign equity ownership. We deviated the scope of analysis from studying the
degree of crowing-in (or crowding-out) and instead we investigated the relative effect
of foreign-equity ownership on investment. Our overview of the existing literature
suggests that, in contrast to macro-economic evidence, there is a lack of empirical
evidence on the determinants of investment in developing countries using firm-level
cross-country studies. Our study uses firm-level data on 101 developing and emerging
economies to analyze both micro-level and macro-level determinants of investment.
We confirm that firms in developing countries have a high level of non-investment.
In agreement with previous studies we interpret this phenomena as a result of high
irreversibility of investment and proceed to study determinants of both the propensity
of investment as well as firms’ investment to sales ratio (i.e. in the latter case provided
a firm invests more than zero). On the basis of a multi-level Heckman selection
model we find that investment behaviour is heterogeneous in nature and that the
macro-level impact on investment behaviour is relatively small. We find evidence
that firms that are completely foreign owned invest relatively less and less frequently
than partially foreign-owned firms or domestically owned firms. One possibility is
that foreign firms operate relatively more in extractive industries that require less
long-term commitments. In addition, we find some evidence that in countries with
better property rights protection and control of corruption firms invest relatively more
frequently. Finally, we find some evidence of a positive mediating effect of property
rights protection and control of corruption on the relation between foreign ownership
and firms’ investment to sales ratio.
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Towards an Integrated Policy Framework
There is a substantial amount of variation in the institutional framework between
countries. As a result, opportunities and constraints for private sector development
differ. We have argued that in order to compensate for certain ultimate constraints
policy makers require more specialized knowledge on the interrelations between
growth factors. We have framed our scope of analysis on the objective of establishing
whether either the neoliberal policy approach or the structuralist policy approach is
most fruitful in terms of stimulating economic development. Additionally, we sought
to find empirical evidence that illustrates the feasibility of blending the two policy
approaches. In this section we present some of the complementaries and differences
of the results of the four empirical studies and reflect upon the extent to which this
thesis contributes towards the framing of an integrated policy approach.
What can we conclude about the effectiveness of the structuralist approach and/or
the neoliberal approach towards economic development? If we are to summarize
the neoliberal approach towards development in terms of property rights protection,
‘good governance’/institutions, financial policy, foreign investment policy, and (other)
‘pro-market’ type policies our findings are ambiguous. We find that FDI positively
contributes to a country’s overall level of investment. We also find evidence suggesting
a positive effect of regulating banking supervision and of liberalizing entry barriers
in the banking sector on credit and investment levels. However, the relation between
institutions and investment is less strong than expected. Moreover, we find no positive
effect of ‘pro-market’ policy on growth and we find no effect of privatization in the
banking sector on credit levels. The results presented in Chapter 5 suggest that
foreign owned firms invest relatively less than domestically owned firms. Additionally,
we find evidence of a negative effect of ‘good governance’ on the relation between FDI
and domestic investment. This result is interpreted as possible evidence that, as a
result of rent-seeking interests, foreign investors benefit at the expense of domestic
industry development. Some of these findings are, for example, in line with the
theory of Schamis (2002) who argues that, under the pretext of market development,
market liberalization and privatization policies have re-distributed large rents to
elite. Based on these results we propose that under certain conditions some level
of protectionism—e.g. limitations on foreign investment—may be beneficial for the
economic development of a country. Following the study on industrial policy, policies
that support the development of firms by means of laws and regulation and funding
towards technological development have a positive effect on growth. These outcomes
provide support to the thesis that structuralist policies can be growth enhancing.
Chang (2002) similarly concludes that the industries of todays developed economies
initially benefited from protectionist policies.
In Chapter 3 we compared industrial policy that supports pro-market development
with industrial policy that supports industrial development. One important result
is that our measurements for these two types of industrial policy are positively
correlated. We argue that this result suggests that countries have successfully
combined both aspects of neoliberal and structuralist policy into the policy framework.
Admittedly, we have not been able to study traditional structuralist policies; instead
our analysis only captures the more ‘soft’ type of structuralist policy. Moreover,
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we find that the two policy indicators are positively correlated with indicators of
property rights protection and freedom from corruption, which means that countries
with stronger property rights protection and less corruption implement relatively more
industrial policy/policies.
The possibility of integrating aspects of the neoliberal approach with aspects
of the structuralist approach towards development is somewhat in line with the
work of Lin and Monga (2010). Lin and Monga propose a new framework, the
‘New Structural Economics’ (NSE) approach, and use this framework to develop
policy recommendations for achieving rapid sustained economic growth. NSE
recognizes the importance of the state in addressing market failure and coordination
problems which are at the heart of the structuralist approach towards development.
Lin (2011) similarly argues that subsidizing new industries and FDI policies can
stimulate technological upgrading and yield (endogenous) growth. However, under
the framework of NSE, Lin also argues in favour of pursuing a nation’s comparative
advantage by relying on the market mechanism to allocate resources and by building
leadership and governance. Hence, Lin does not dismiss the importance of the free
market in stimulating growth. The degree to which a country should follow the current
comparative advantage remains debated (see also Lin and Chang, 2009). What seems
conclusive is that both aspects of neoliberalism and of structuralist policy should be
recognized as important growth drivers.
6.2 Discussion, Limitations and Future Research
Directions
In this thesis we have experimented with a range of perception-based data and
methodology. We find that some of the empirical results are sensitive to the choice
of data. Based on different data choices we propose new insights with respect to
conclusions previously drawn by reputable scholars. For example, in Chapter 4,
we find that empirical results are sensitive to the choice of data on GFCF and its
implementation. Johnson et al. (2013) also demonstrate that cross-country growth
analysis is sensitive to data selection choices. Using different versions of the PWT
GDP estimates, Johnson et al. show that some findings in growth analysis are not
robust to the variability of data between versions. For data sources where data
updates are not publicly traceable it may be more difficult to independently replicate
empirical findings of scholars. As such, we emphasize that transparency in data
collection and data treatment are much needed to improve and ascertain evidence-
based policy making. Additionally, we find that some empirical results are sensitive
to choices in methodology. We warn researchers that PCA (and other types of factor
analysis) is sensitive to rotation techniques. Decisions at this level of analysis may
have consequences on the results of regression analysis.
Inherently, perception-based indicators will remain limited in several respects.
As suggested in the work of De Crombrugghe and Farla (2012), perception-based
indicators may suffer from issues related to measurement endogeneity and/or biases.
Measurement endogeneity occurs when the object of measurement is influenced by
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the developmental path of a country. “Theories about institutional development
may be influenced by the institutional characteristics of generally high performing
countries” (De Crombrugghe and Farla, 2012, pp. 20). Bias in the data can
stem from misconceptions in perceived changes or cross-country differences of survey
respondents. An additional possible shortcoming of perception-based indicators is
that changes in a country’s score on various variables or even between countries may be
a result of changes in data collection and data treatment. Finally, indicators describing
characteristics of institutions and policies lack actionability (Oman and Arndt, 2010).
Therefore, we also refrain from developing more concrete policy recommendations on
the basis of our empirical studies. And, on a similar note, we also see limited value
in the practice of ranking countries on institutional indicators.
The formulation of ‘good governance’ used in association with the WorldWide
Governance Indicators of the World Bank is admittedly vague. These governance
indicators do not give a clear indication of what institutional factors should be a
priority. The notion expressed most clearly is that whatever is so called ‘good’ is
missing in countries that score low on the governance indicators. One possibility
would be to replace the term ‘good governance’ with a more neutral term whereby
countries that score low on the good governance indicators are merely seen as countries
that have a different institutional system. This approach is, for instance, taken by the
Polity IV project which measures a country’s political system in terms of democracy
versus autocracy.
There is an additional shortcoming that is important to mention at this point.
We set out this study with the intention of establishing causal relations between
institutions and policy and economic performance. For example, we find that there
is a positive effect of formal property rights institutions on the level of credit to the
private sector. Hence, in terms of policy conclusions, it is reasonable to argue that
countries that have poor protection of property rights would benefit from having
more protection of property. However, steering institutional change (and to some
extent also policy reform) is challenging and often contested. Moreover, the success of
property rights institutions in stimulating growth is dependent on a country’s broader
institutional framework. The reason is that institutions are deeply rooted within a
country’s social and economic context. ‘Good institutions’ should not be understood
as a normative model of a global set of institutions that would fit every country’s
history, society or economic features (see also Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2008).
Easterly (2008) concludes by posing the question of whether the bottom up view
of institutions is hopelessly pessimistic with respect to the alternative ‘top down’
perspective where institutions can be relatively easily ‘corrected’ on the basis of
a policy programme. We are more comfortable with the ‘bottom up’ view. Our
empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between institutions and growth is
more complicated than perhaps was previously thought. It has become unrealistic
to assume that changing the ‘de-jure’ institutional system of a country with poor
property rights protection towards the institutional system similar to that of e.g.
Switzerland will yield positive growth and development. Institutional change is
(usually) a slow step by step process. At this stage we consider it beyond our scope of
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analysis to draw policy recommendations on the degree to which governments should
seek to steer institutional change.
Regarding our conclusions on industrial policy we likewise remain humble. One
missing element in Chapter 3 is the link between market oriented policy and market
competition and therefore our study would benefit from further analysis in this specific
direction. One aim of a future research agenda is to empirically explore the effect of
competition ans innovation policies on investment at the industry level. Moreover,
it would be fascinating to assess the degree to which industrial policy and industrial
capabilities are related. On the one hand, industrial policy is intended to create
new industrial opportunities. One the other hand, together with market competition,
sufficient capabilities are essential to drive industrial development. We find that
the dynamics behind these interrelationships remain insufficiently explored from an
empirical perspective.
Likewise, we expect that further research on the interaction between institutions
and policy will yield valuable insights. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we have
distinguished between the effect of institutions and policy on economic performance.
Still we find that in terms of measurement the distinction between institutions
and policy is sometimes blurred. Certain policy aspects appear institutionalized.
Specifically, competition policy is part of and/or related to a country’s legal system.
It is possible to approach this concept from an institutional perspective whereby
the focus is on discussing the functioning of competition regulations. An alternative
perspective is that competition policy ought to be tailored to sector development and
reformed in accordance to the level of industry maturity.
Finally, it is noteworthy that multi-level modelling has been used rather scarcely
in economics, especially with the aim of bridging microeconomic and macroeconomic
analyses. Further research in this direction will be fruitful and may provide a better
understanding of the micro mechanisms by which policies and institutions influence
an organization’s behaviour.
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Samenvatting
In de empirische analyse van instituties en beleid als determinanten van lange-
termijn groei wordt men geconfronteerd met methodologische uitdagingen bij het
schatten van het relatieve effect van verschillende groeifactoren. Dit proefschrift
bundelt vier empirische studies die bijdragen aan de literatuur op dit gebied. In de
essays onderzoeken wij het spanningsveld tussen enerzijds het ogenschijnlijk succes
van neo-liberaal beleid en anderzijds het ogenschijnlijk succes van structuralistisch
industrieel beleid in het stimuleren van economische ontwikkeling. De resultaten
suggereren dat landen aspecten van neo-liberaal beleid en structuralistisch beleid
hebben gecombineerd in hun groei politiek. In overeenstemming met het werk van
Lin and Monga (2010) wordt voorgesteld dat beide aspecten van neo-liberaal beleid
en structuralistisch beleid worden erkend als belangrijke groeifactoren.
Het eerste essay onderzoekt de relatie tussen instituties en financie¨le
ontwikkeling. Op basis van een literatuurstudie van theoriee¨n over de relatie
tussen instituties en financie¨le ontwikkeling worden drie institutionele factoren
ge¨ıdentificeerd: eigendomsrecht instituties, contractuele instituties, en concurrentie
instituties. Met behulp van data van de Institutional Profiles Database
worden 15 variabelen ge¨ıdentificeerd die overeenkomen met de bovengenoemde
institutionele factoren. Vervolgens wordt principale componentenanalyse (PCA)
toegepast om drie indicatoren te construeren die overeenkomen met de verschillende
institutionele kenmerken. Volgens Hausman-Taylor schattingen met Amemiya-
MaCurdy specificatie blijkt dat de drie institutionele indicatoren positief en significant
gerelateerd zijn aan financie¨le ontwikkeling. In deze essay wordt financie¨le
ontwikkeling gemeten als het niveau van de kredietverlening aan de particuliere sector.
Het hierboven beschreven resultaat blijft significant wanneer wordt gecontroleerd voor
het effect van financieel beleid.
De doelstelling van het tweede essay is het analyseren van de rol van industriebeleid
in het stimuleren van groei. Indicatoren voor enerzijds ‘pro-market’ en anderzijds ‘pro-
business’ beleid worden geconstrueerd met behulp van de taxonomie van economisch
beleid ontwikkeld door Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) gebruik makende van een
reeks variabelen van het IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. Pro-market beleid
is gericht op het vergroten van de concurrentie en markttoegang. Rodrik and
Subramanian (2005) definie¨ren pro-business beleid als beleid dat de ontwikkeling
van de bestaande industrie in de formele industrie¨le commercie¨le sector ondersteunt.
De twee indicatoren zijn positief gecorreleerd hetgeen suggereert dat er een positieve
relatie is tussen het niveau van implementatie van deze twee verschillende typen beleid.
Fixed effect schattingen suggereren dat ‘pro-market’ beleid geen duidelijk effect heeft
op economische groei en het niveau van inkomen. Anderzijds geven de resultaten
aan dat pro-business beleid positief gerelateerd is aan economische groei. Daarnaast
wordt een derde indicator geconstrueerd die de intensiteit van innovatiebeleid en
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technologiebeleid meet. Deze indicator wordt geconstrueerd door middel van het
aggregeren van een deel van de pro-business variabelen. Aanvullende schattingen
suggereren dat het positieve effect van pro-business beleid op economische groei voor
een groot deel kan worden toegeschreven aan innovatiebeleid en technologiebeleid.
Het derde essay onderzoekt het verdringingseffect van buitenlandse investeringen
op het niveau van binnenlandse investeringen, het effect van instituties op het niveau
van binnenlandse investeringen, en het interactie-effect van instituties op de relatie
tussen buitenlandse en binnenlandse investeringen. Deze studie bouwt voort op de
studie van Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012). Deze auteurs vinden een negatief
effect van buitenlandse investeringen op binnenlandse investeringen, een positief effect
van instituties op binnenlandse investeringen en een negatief effect van instituties
op de relatie tussen buitenlandse investeringen en binnenlandse investeringen. Het
negatieve bemiddelende effect wordt ge¨ınterpreteerd als een bewijs voor de hypothese
dat binnenlandse investeringen worden ontmoedigd in landen met een ‘onvriendelijke
overheid’ tenzij investeerders een buitenlandse partner hebben. Wij zien deze
hypothese als enigszins beperkt. Wij interpreteren het interactie-effect met behulp
van theorie over technologie-overdrachten (‘spillovers’) en rentezoekend gedrag door
de politieke elite. Het netto-effect hangt af van het relatieve belang van buitenlandse
technologische overdrachten en van rentezoekend gedrag. De resultaten Morrissey
and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) zijn erg gevoelig voor een verfijnde definitie van de
afhankelijke variabele en alternatieve GMM specificaties. Wanneer, in tegenstelling
tot de methode gebruikt door de auteurs, het niveau van buitenlandse investeringen
niet wordt afgetrokken van het niveau van binnenlandse investeringen suggereren
GMM schattingen dat de instroom van buitenlandse investeringen binnenlandse
investeringen niet verdringen maar integendeel opdrijven. Bovendien worden de
coe¨fficie¨nten van de variabelen minder significant met alternatieve GMM specificaties.
GMM analyse toont aan dat er slechts een zwakke relatie bestaat tussen instituties
en investeringen en dat er een negatief interactie-effect is van instituties op de relatie
tussen de instroom van buitenlandse investeringen en binnenlandse investeringen. Dit
negatieve effect wordt ge¨ınterpreteerd als een bewijs dat rentzoekend gedrag gunstig is
voor buitenlandse investeerders maar ten koste gaat van binnenlandse investeringen.
Dit resultaat suggereert ook dat dit effect groter is dan het effect van buitenlandse
technologie-overdrachten op binnenlandse investeringen.
Het laatste empirische essay maakt gebruik van micro en macro data uit 101
ontwikkelingslanden en opkomende economiee¨n om het effect van determinanten op
zowel microniveau als macroniveau op investeringen te analyseren. Het onderzoek
bevestigt dat bedrijven in ontwikkelingslanden in hoge mate niet investeren. In
overeenstemming met voorgaand onderzoek interpreteren we dit fenomeen als een
gevolg van de hoge onomkeerbaarheid van investeringen. Deze studie onderzoekt de
determinanten van zowel de kans dat een bedrijf investeert als de grootte van gedane
investeringen, gemeten in verhouding tot de totale omzet in het eerst voorafgaande
fiscale jaar. De resultaten van een multi-level selectiemodel van het Heckman-
type suggereren dat investeringsgedrag heterogeen is en dat macroniveau effecten
op investeringsgedrag relatief beperkt zijn. Bedrijven die volledig in buitenlands
bezit zijn investeren relatief minder vaak dan bedrijven die gedeeltelijk in buitenlands
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bezit zijn en dan bedrijven die volledig in binnenlands bezit zijn. Een mogelijke
verklaring is dat buitenlandse ondernemingen actiever zijn in industriee¨n waar er op
lange termijn minder wordt ge¨ınvesteerd. Deze studie toont tevens aan dat bedrijven
relatief vaker investeren in landen met een betere bescherming van eigendomsrechten
en tegen corruptie. Ten slotte suggereren de resultaten dat er een positief interactie-
effect is van een goede bescherming van eigendomsrechten en tegen corruptie op de
relatie tussen buitenlands bezit en investeringen in verhouding tot omzet.
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